By GA GREEN

Chile has been going through a unique
political experience. It began with the
election of a Marxist president.

Salvador Allende is not the first so-
cialist to win top office in a capitalist
country. Social-Democratic regimes
have held governmental responsibility
many times and in many countries, But
to confuse these with the Chilean de-
velopment is to mix birds of quite dif-
ferent plumage.

_The Social- Democrats in power,
whether in West Germany, Austria,
Britain, France, the Scandinavian coun-
tries, or elsewhere, never really sought
to implement a socialist program. They -
were content to administer the capi-
talist state for the capitalists. Above
all, they never interfered with the sac-
red property rights of the ruling class.

Even when taking office after great
revolutionary upheavals such as oc-
curred with the overthrow of the Tsar
in Russia and the Kaiser in Germany,
the Social-Democrats took governmen-
tal power to preserve Capitalism, not to
end it.

Where such “socialist” regimes un-
dertook to nationalize industries, these
were usually “sick” industries requir-
ing immense new Capital investments
as blood transfusions to restore them
to “health” again.

RADICAL REFORMS

But the Allende government has na-_
tionalized some of the most profitable
industries, particularly copper, and has

' Set its course on nationalizing all the
basic industries. Nor does it pay the
Price asked for them. It has also made
clear that its objective is a socialist
Chile.

It is for these reasons that U.S. im-
perialism, the Chilean industrialists,
and large landowners have such enmity
for the Popular Unity government and
seek to topple it as rapidly as possible.
They know they are dealing with some-
thing quite different from a Social-
Democratic government. The Right
fears that if Allende remains in office
for the full six years of his term, it
may be too late to reverse the tide.

In some ways this is analagous to
the position taken by the slavocracy
at the time of Abraham Lincoln’s elec-
tion in 1860. He, too, was eléctetd by
just a plurality. He did not even prom-

ise to free the slaves, but the slave

Owners feared that their power would

ooze away, so chose civil war to pre-
vent this.
DIFFICULT CONDITIONS

What makes the situation in Chile

so complex is that the process of revo-

lutionary change must be propelled for-
ward under conditions in which only
one arm of government is in the hands
of the Left. Popular Unity won the
executive branch, but the judicial and
legislative branches, and most of the
local governments, are not under its

Sway.

Furthermore, the army is still basic-

ally the old one, and the same is true

Chilean copper miners.
PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, MAY 19, 1972—PAGE 6

Se

of the police. The Right also has a
powerful press and media network with
which to confuse and divide the people.
As for the old entrenched government
bureaucracy, it too is still largely in-
tact. And last but not least, the Chilean
Constitution and basic laws are framed
to protect the system of bourgeois pro-
perty relations.

To complicate matters still more, Al-
lende won the election in a three-way
race, receiving only 36% of the vote.
The only reason Congress acceded ‘to
the demand to seat him was that the
constitutional tradition was too strong
to be violated brazenly. Later when
attempts were made to foment an
army coup, these foundered on the
same constitutional rock.

PLOTTING A COUP
This constitutional quandary is dis-
cussed quite unabashedly in the secret
ITT memoranda on Chile. One such
document states that “the armed forces
and Frei (Eduardo Frei, former Chris-
tian-Democratic president) prefer a

constitutional way out ... that doesn’t
preclude violence — spontaneous or
provoked.”

The ITT paper then proceeds to state
how violence can be provoked while
still wearing a constitutional guise. “A
constitutional solution,” it goes on to
say, “could result from massive internal
disorders, strikes, urban and rural war-
fare. This would morally, justify an
armed forces intervention for a definite
period. But,” it laments, “there is little
hope for this. The Marxists will not be
provoked.”

Also discussed in the ITT documents
is the possibility of provoking the more
inflammable groupings of the ultra-Left
into a “violent backlash.” One such
attempt mentioned was made on Sep-
tember 27, 1970. The ITT paper refers
to it as “amateurish” because it failed
to “produce the conditions conducive to
a military intervention.”

WON’T BE PROVOKED

Under these circumstances Popular
Unity wisely refuses to give the Right
the provocation it seeks. If it does come
to blows the responsibility must be
clearly that of the Right. Unable to
get Congress to adopt a new series of
laws, the Allende government tries to
Squeeze what it can out of old laws.
The same laws that gave former presi-
dents the constitutional right to inter-
vene in the economy are now interpret-
ed and applied in the interests of the
people.

There is a limit, of course, to how
far bourgeois laws can be turned
around, but the screams of Outrage
emanating from the Right indicate that
this is being done to a certain degree.

Both the Left and the Right seek to
change the present Constitution. The

I PARA UNA Aj
7D

President Allende uddressing the May Day demonstration in Santiago last year. The CUT is Chile's major labor federation:

Left wants to amend it to make it
more democratic.» It wants to put an
end to the present highly unrepresen-
tative two-chamber Congress, replac-
ing it with a more representative single
chamber. It also wants to broaden the
franchise so that all can vote.

DIVERGENT-. AIMS

The Right also has come forward
with its constitutional amendments and
has even gotten a majority of Congress
to vote for them. These aim at taking
away from the president the powers
under which he has been intervening
in the economy and nationalizing the
big corporations.

In other words, the Left wants con-
Stitutional changes that correspond
with the need for further revolutionary
change, while the Right wants to amend
the Constitution — or destroy it total-
ly — to serve the interests of counter-
revolution.

Thus the struggle for power takes
the form of a constitutional struggle
which the people may be asked to
decide by plebiscite sooner or later.

It is also clear, that under these cir-
cumstances the government cannot es-
tablish ‘socialism by issuing some kind
of decree. Socialism can only result

- from a period of intense struggle.

THE LEFTIST ATTACK

Even in Chile, some people find it
hard to understand this. One such group
is known as MIR — an abbreviation
for Left Revolutionary Movement. MIR
originally opposed the campaign to
elect Allende. Evidence of this is still
to be found posted on walls and fences,
One MIR sign we saw read: LUCHA SI,
VOTO NO (Struggle yes, vote no).
But to tell people to Struggle and not
to vote is to forget that there are times
when not to vote is not to struggle.
Yet now that Allende is president, MIR
would like to have him produce the
revolution forthwith.

This does not mean that everything
that the Popular Unity movement and
government has done has been timely
and correct. Mistakes have been made.
As has been admitted, the process of
agrarian reform has been too slow, the
workers have not -been drawn suffi-
ciently into full Participation in the
production struggle and into the entire
revolutionary process, and bureaucratic
tendenciés have been serious obstacles.
Yet all these must be seen in the con-
text of the struggle taking place and
under tremendously complex condi-
tions. :

OPENING THE ROAD

It is-clear that the socialist revolu-
tion has not yet come to Chile. State
power is not yet in the hands of the
working class. But it is no longer com-
pletely in the hands of the exploiting
classes. To change metaphors, it can

CONTRA Lo}
CONTRA B

tal O1
be said that an important govern ag |
bridgehead has been won by
Left which opens up the road t0
socialist goal. }

V. I. Lenin, in his book “Left: Wi
Communism: An _ Infantile Dis als

urged the Communists in the caPIi4 7,

world to concentrate all efform
seeking out the forms of transi
approach to the proletarian revolu inst
Chile’s Marxist forces belie of
they have found the specific f0 if
transition that meets their own SP® af? |
historic conditions. Whether they oh
successful in making that trans igs
and without major reverses, 4¢P

on many factors. y
CONDITIONS FOR VICTOR”

It depends on the revolutionary 03
sciousness, unity, discipline al efor
luteness of the working class tO g als:
its gains and to push forward its the
It depends on the close alliancé ~ i997
workers and poor peasants and 0 ion
winning and neutralization of 5

pushes forward its program withon id
cillation, while at the same ting ene’
ing all provocative traps set by ; ines
mies. And it depends on the Té gai
of the masses to defend theif oll’
against all attempts at counter
tion.

solidarity to prevent the * omit |
carrying through financial,
and military designs to crush
tic Chile and its Marxist gover® oT)

Pablo Neruda says

“ The changes taking place
Chile have brought about oti
mendous upsurge in the.

- of the masses, who as nev pon
fore have begun to foal
sibility for the fate of theif wevell
Idnd. These changes, hen dou
have also given rise to trem acti”
animosity from internal re ling
U.S. monopolies and the
circles of the U.S.

et

That is why our people as
before need the widest 0” we
tional support and solidarity: on’
know that all of progressive if
kind is on our side. We oF assist
dent that the solidarity a" nd th
ance of the Soviet Union 9% she
other socialist states, oral ip
world’s progressive forces wc’
frustrate imperialist consP ait”
against the Popular Unity 9° —
ment. ize

—Chilean poet, Nobel! F

winner Pablo —

: tio?
Finally, it depends on intern@ fro
}