‘

‘young people

~ Secret documents proving Rhee

f plotted war now in hands of UN

_ By ROBERT FRIEDMAN

LAKE SUCCESS.

In the hands of United Nations officials at this moment is a handful of political dynamite—a sheaf of documents with enough explosive power to
demolish the myth created bp the U.S. state department that South Korea was “invaded” by the Korean People’s Democratic . Republic.

The documents are top-secret stuff, conclusive proof of the charge, consistently made by the Pyongyang government and 4s consistently evaded by
the warmakers, that Syngman Rhee plotted against the North, with the active counsel and assistance of top American diplomatic and-military officials.

Seized from Rhee’s govern-

“ment files when the People’s

Army took Seoul earlier in the
war, the secret documents in-
clude letters from and to Rhee
from his Korean aides and Am-
erican advisers; instructions
from U.S. ambassador to Seoul,
John J. Muccio, to Rhee’s govern-
ment; orders from U.S. Brigadier
General William Roberts to divi-
sional commanders of Rhee’s army,
and other damning evidence.

The text of the secret documents,
with photostatic copies scheduled
to follow, was cabled to the UN two
weeks ago by the Korean People’s
Democratic Republic. Available to
the press as regular, publicly dis-
tributed UN material, the sensation-
al material has nevertheless been
kept from the American and Can-
adian people by the commercial
press.

These documents show that on
April 10, 1949, Rhee wrote to his
personal representative in the U.S.,
Cho Bion Ok, instructing him to
discuss “frankly, in strict confid-
ence, with highly placed United
Nations and United States officials
... our plans for ‘the unification
of North and South Korea.” (See

‘text on this page.)

On September 30, 1949, Rhee
wrote to Dr. Robert Oliver, former
American adviser to his govern-
ment, asserting that “now is the
pyschological moment to take ag-
gressive actions... .” (See text on

this page.)

But not by their “own eaete

alone?’ According to the Korean
People’s Democratic Republic’s
charge to the UN, U.S. Ambass-
ador John J. Muccio sent the fol-
lowing instructions to American
Generals Roberts and Page and
South Korean Ministers Sin Sem
Mo, Kwon Syn Er and Kim I
Sek, in July, 1949:

“During the months of July
and August, large-scale prepara-
“tions are to be made for the cam-
paign against the North. Con-
sistent measures must be taken
to prevent internal disorders,
mass arrests of anti-government
elements and members of the
South Korean Labor party must
be made and strict observance
of the state security law ensured.
I am confident that you will do
everything necessary to carry out
these arrests.”

General Roberts is the former
U.S. Chief of Military Mission in
South Korea. On July 18, Bon I
Son, chief of naval staff for Rhee,
wrote to Admiral Radford, com-
mander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet:

“We shall be happy to offer cer-
tain of our ports, including Inchon,
Pusan, Yosu, Mogho and the naval
base of Chinghae, for use as tem-
porary bases by any unit belong-
ing to a fleet under your command.”

The plan to attack the North
had been carefully worked out, in
terms of arms, U.S. support and
even fifth column activity inside
the Korean People’s Democratic
Republic.

On April 6, 1949, Rhee’s ambasss
ador to the U.S., Myun Chang, had
written: “General Wedemeyer has
made the personal and confidential
recommendation that we send well-
trained, reliable and competent
into North Korea
with the object of sowing distrust
toward the Communist system and
the national government and pre-
paring the way for the republic.”

According to the Korean People’s
Democratic Republic’s charges to
the UN, U.S. military authorities
were dissatisfied with the handling
of border incidents. Genera]. Rob-

TRUMAN

DULLES

MacARTHUR

erts told a meeting of Rhee army
divisional commanders on August
2, 1949, according to one of the
documents, that “almost every in-
cident has been provoked by the
South Korean security forces.”

Two months jJater, he ‘com
plained to another such meeting,
according to one of the captured
documents, that many Rhee units
“launch arbitrary attacks against
-the North, squander masses of
shells and obtain no results in
spite of heavy losses.” According
to the document, Roberts ordered
that thereafter, “attacks on the
territory north of the 38th’ Par-
allel may be carried out by the
National Defense Army only on
the orders of the United States
Military Experts’ Mission.”

On October 12, 1949, Rhee’s Ko-
rean aide, Cho Bion Ok, wrote in-
forming him: “I have read your
letter to Dr. Oliver on the question
of unification, or more accurately,
on the liquidation of the puppet
regime of North Korea, with close
attention and interest.”

He had discussed the. matter
“with Ambassador Chan and Dr.
Oliver,” Cho Bion Ok reported,
and they had “come to the unani-
mous conclusion that this (the
plan for aggression) «should be re-
garded as the fundamental plan of
our government.”

But, cautioned Rhee’s aide, “I
am inclined to believe, however,
that the time is not yet ripe for
the realization of this program. In
the first place, I doubt whether we
are adequately prepared; and world
public opinion will not etegiis
acts of this kind.”

Wait,
the plan “into effect when we are
ready and the right moment has
come.”

“The right moment,” originally
scheduled for 1949, did not come ac-
cording to the Korean People’s De-
mocratic Republic’s mesasge ac-
companying the documents to UN.
Rhee provocations at the 38th Par-
allel border were repulsed. Popular
resistance and guerrilla bands in
Rhee’s own territory threatened
his own regime.

On December 30, 1949, Rhee ad-
vanced the timetable, telling a press
conference: “In the new year we
shall all strive as one man to re-
gain the lost territory.” Earlier, on
November 3, Cho Bion Ok, in close
contact. with U.S. government
circles here, had advised Rhee that
the “cold war cannot continue in-
definitely” and that the plan “must
be adapted to the development of
the international situation as a
whole.”

This development, clearly, was
the Truman-Wall Street program
for a third World War. For Rhee,
in his December 30 talk, hinted that

said Cho Bion Ok. Put

“in the new year, in accordance
with the changed international sit-
uation, it is our duty to unify South-
ern and, Northern Korea by our
own strength. *

Thus the Rhee plans for
war rolled on. : :
In January, 1950, according to
a statement by Kim I Sek, former
Minister of Internal: Affairs for
Rhee, General Roberts told the
Ministers of the Rhee government:

“The plan of campaign against
the North has been decided upon.
There is not much time left now
before a beginning must be made
to put it into effect. Even
théugh we shall begin the attack,
we muést nevertheless find a pre~
text providing some justification.
The report of the United Nations
Commission is of paramount im-
portance in this connection. The
United Nations Commission will
naturally submit a report favor-
able to the United States of Am-
erica, But you all know that
you also must at the same time
win the sympathy of the United
Nations Commission and give
your attention to this matter.”

civil

In June, 1950, the sinister figure

of John Foster Dulles, international
banker, front for Nazi cartelists
and U.S. state department adviser,
cast its shadow over .the North
Korean border.

In a speech to Rhee’s troops, ac-
cording to the document,
boasted:

“Not even a strong opponent will
be able to resist you. You will
not have to wait long for the time
when-you wili be able to display
your strength.”

They did not have to wait long.
On June 25, war came to Korea.
Only two days later, the U.S. had
intervened. Every
weapon had been used to drown
out the Korean People’s Domecratic
Republic’s charge that Rhee plotted
and carried out an attack on North
Korea.

’

Now, in the hands of the Un-
ited ‘Nations, there is the evi-
dence ... an explosive sheaf of:
secret documents. It is up to the
people, everywhere, to see that
the power of the truth may still
be used to further the liberation
of the Korean people and to pre-
serve the peace of the world.

propaganda,

Communist ban

lin Australia

‘blow at peace’

TORONTO

Outlawing of the Communist
party of Australia is “a cowardly

| blow against the forces of peace

in the Pacific,” said Tim Buck, LPP)
national leader, in a statement re-
leased on behalf of the LPP natio-
nal committee protesting the action
to the government of Australia.

The statement demands repeal of
the act and calls on all democratic
Canadians “to make their voices
heard in condemnation of the ban
to the Australian High Commissio-
ner in Ottawa.”

“The action of the government
of Australia in outlawing—at the
behest of U.S. reaction—the mili-
tant Communist Party of Australia
is a cowardly blow against the
forces of peace in the Pacific,” de-

Dulles) clared the statement.

“By this act, the satellite govern-
ment of the Australian Common-
wealth tears the mask from the
aggressive war aims of the Anglo-
American bloc, Truman’s drive to
seize strategic positions in Asia, ‘to
throttle the great colonial libera-
tion movements requires that the.
dominions be turned into. aggres-
sive bases for war; and repression
of the popular forces of the peace:
camp in Australia, is part and par-
cel of the imperialist offensive
against Asia.” :

Branding the actions of Aus-
tralian labor party leaders “who
have made themselves accomiplices-
in a fascist law’ as shameful, the
statement expressed confidence
“that the great Australian working
class with its splendid tradition of
miliancy and democracy will rally
such a storm of opposition to the
infamous act, as will remove it

| from the statutes.”

7

LETTERS EXPOSE LONG PREPARATIONS

April 10, 1949.

FROM: Syngman: Rhee
TO: Cho Bion Ok, Rhee’s per-
sonal representative in the U.S.
“You should discuss this situ-
_ ation frankly, in strict confi-
dence, with highly-placed United
Nations and United States offi-
cials. You should inform them
in strict confidence of our plans
for the unification of North and
South Korea. We are substan-

at the present time in all respects
but one: we are short of arms
and ammunition. . ...

“We must have suffcient arm-
ed forces to advance to the north,
to join up with the army in
North Korea which is devoted to
us, move the iron curtain back
from the 38th parallel to the
river Yalu and there guard the
frontier jagainsk eae infil-
tration.”

* * *
: July, 1949.

BY: John J. Muccio, U.S. Am-
bassador to Syngman Rhee’s
government.

tially ready for this unification -

‘We are ready to advance aah?
Rhee advised U.S. in April 1949

TO: Gens. Roberts and Page,
South Korean Ministers Sin
Sen Mo, Kwon Syn Er and
Kim I Sek.

INSTRUCTIONS
“During the months of July
and August large-scale prepara-

tions are to be made for the ©

campaign against the North.

Consistent measures must be

taken to prevent internal dis-

orders; mass arrests of anti-
government elements and mem-
bers of the South Korean Labor

Party must be made and strict

observance of the State Security

Law ensured. IE am confident

that you will do everything nec-

essary to carry vat these ar-
rests.”
* * *
September 30, 1949.

FROM: Syngman Rhee,

TO: Dr. Robert Oliver, former
American adviser to the South
Korean government.

‘J am firmly convinced that
now is the psychological mo-
ment to take aggressive action
and to join up with the units
of the Communist Army in the

/North which are loyal to us,
So as to destroy the remaining j|°
units in Pyongyang. We shall
drive Kim Ir Sen’s men into the
mountains and starve them out °
there.

“Our defense line must be set
up on the Tuming and Yalu
rivers. Our position will then
be 100 percent better ... we
will all work peacefully — you
in Washington and New York
together with our two ambassa-
dors and other friends, and we
here in Seoul and Tokyo, striv-
ing for one goal—that we be |.
permitted to cleanse our coun- »
try and put our affairs in order.

“To quote an old expression
once used by Churchill, ‘Give
us the tools and we will finish
the job’ You must convince
American statesmen and Ameri-
tan public opinion, so that they
may tacitly consent to our start-_
ing operations and carrying out
our program,:-and also give us
the necessary material support.
The longer we wait the more dif-
ficult it will be for us to do this.”

PACIFIC TRIBUNE .— OCTOBER 27, 1950 — Page 2: