Sl i

Autonomy plan wins
indigenous support

By PAUL OGRESKO

When Hurricane Joan slammed into the
Atlantic coast of Nicaragua last. month it
caused death and destruction in a land
which has already borne more than its share
of sadness and poverty in the last few cen-
turies. When the Nicaraguan revolution
took place in 1979, the Sandinistas inherited
not only the daunting process of trying to
rebuild a war-ravaged country, but also the
separate world of the Nicaraguan Atlantic
coast and the Miskitos, Creoles, Sumus,
Black Caribs and Ramas who live there.

Divided by something far more tangible .

than a mountain range, Nicaragua existed
as two solitudes, and the revolution found
that wounds that had festered for decades
would not heal easily.

The Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, unlike
the predominately Hispanic Pacific coast, is
populated by several peoples — there are
the Miskitos, Sumus and Ramas Indians
whose first language is pre-Hispanic. Also,
there are large Black Carib populations
who speak Creole-English and have lived
on the Atlantic coast for centuries.

Nicaragua has experienced a process of
dual colonization. While the Pacific coast
remained in the hands of the Spanish colon-
izers, the Atlantic coast was exploited by the
English and ‘Dutch. In 1589, the English
and Dutch established bases on the Atlantic
coast, trading with the Miskitos, Sumus and
Ramas Indians. Unlike the Spanish, who
carried out a campaign of wholesale exter-

mination of the Indian populations, the »

English pursued a different path of coloni-
zation. In the 17th century they crowned a
“Miskitos King,” a puppet ruler to protect
English interests, and proclaimed a Miski-
tos kingdom under English protection.
Meanwhile, descendants of Dutch pirates,
and large populations of~escaped slaves,
settled on the Atlantic coast. >

It was not until 1860, almost 40 years
after Spain pulled out of Nicaragua, that
Britain recognized Nicaraguan sovereignty
over the Atlantic coast. In 1894, the Atlantic
coast was finally incorporated into Nicara-
gua, but it was not to last long. Aiming to
crush a liberal uprising in Nicaragua, U.S.
marines invaded in 1912 and proclaimed
most of the Atlantic coast a “neutral zone.”
The marines would remain till 1925 when
they pulled out, only to return a year later to
fight the people’s army of Sandino.

The U.S. marines suppressed the indi-
genous peoples of the Atlantic coast who
had formed co-operatives and given aid to
Sandino’s army. Following Sandino’s
assassination, and the rise of the U.S.-
financed Somoza dictatorship, there were
mass reprisals against the Miskitos. The
area was opened up for the transnational
corporations who reaped profits in wood,
gold and rubber. The social fabric of the
indigenous culture was torn apart by pov-
erty and disease as the Atlantic coast
became a kind of pre-“free trade” zone, a
source of cheap labour for North American
companies. :

The divergent development of the “two
Nicaraguas” would become a major hurdle
for the Sandinistas to surmount following
the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979. National
and social differences between the two
coasts went far deeper than the revolution-
ary government first realized. Differences in
language, religion and social values — and
decades of racism and paternalism on the
part of the Hispanic (white) population —
could not be changed overnight.

In the words of Tomas Borge, Nicara-
gua’s Minister of the Interior, the Sandinis-
tas arrived on the Atlantic coast as honest

8 « Pacific Tribune, November 21, 1988

but naive revolutionaries. “We were
strangers ... knowing nothing of the pecul- —

iarities which characterized the social trans-
formation of the Nicaraguan Caribbean.
We were advancing without a compass, ina
straight line, without understanding there
are always many paths.”

Literacy campaigns that failed to deal
with the complex reality of the Atlantic
region, the spreading of the counter-
revolution into the area, and relocation
plans soon exacerbated the differences
between the Sandinistas and the indigenous
leaders. Within two years 30,000 Miskitos
refugees had headed for Honduras, while
the U.S. administration fanned the flames
of hysteria with a disinformation campaign
talking of Sandinista plans to “wipe out”
the Indian problem.

By 1981, several Miskitos groups had
formed a military alliance with the contras.

‘Meanwhile, the Reagan disinformation
campaign had some influence on the devel-
opment of aboriginal politics in the Ameri-
cas. Certain adherents of the philosophy of
“Fourth Worldism”, which recognizes the
distinct reality and development of aborigi-
nal populations around the world, claimed
the ‘“Miskitos problem” was proof that
Native self-determination could not be
solved by progressive governments and
could only be achieved outside of “European-
state” political processes.

U.S. Indian activists such as former
American Indian Movement leader Russell
Means have embraced that tenet of Fourth
Worldism, which sees little room for com-
promise and resolution of self-determina-
tion within the state system of the Americas.

Means has also denounced Marxism as
offering no solution to aboriginal politics.
Not acknowledging that Marxist theory
needs to be developed on aboriginal strug-

gles around the world, Means dismisses it as -

an alien, “European” ideology, confusing
some of its more conservative practitioners
with the materialist potential the theory
holds.

Means was one of those who embraced
the cause of the Miskitos from the begin-
ning, at the same time that the CIA leaped
at the opportunity to divide and rule within
Nicaragua, maximizing the initial mistakes
ef the Sandinistas to further contra-
Miskitos support. Indeed, the indigenous
rights of the Miskitos became a rallying cry
of the U.S. administration, which, after
decades of silence during the Somoza years,
suddenly developed a concern for aborigi-
nal rights.

In Managua, the revolutionary govern-
ment began a serious, self-critical analysis of
the Atlantic situation out of which, in 1984,
came the concept of autonomy — recogni-
zing the need for regional self-government
on the Atlantic coast and setting a path for
building a multi-ethnic, multilingual Nica-
ragua where national rights would be rec-
ognized.

The process of reconciliation, while not
smooth, had begun. By the end of the year,
the Nicaraguan government had created the
National Autonomy Commission, which
began a process of popular consultation
with the indigenous populations of the
Atlantic region, gathering opinions on the
form and direction self-government should
take.

In 1985, in the town of Yulu, on the hood
of a jeep, the first indigenous group under
the leadership of Eduardo Pantin signed a
peace agreement with the ‘Nicaraguan
government. In May 1986, the first pilot
project in autonomy was launched in that
community.

MISKITO VILLAGE ON NICARAGUA’S ATLANTIC COAST... Sandinistas’ poli-

cies gaining new ground.

Despite all the machinations of the CIA,
the indigenous-contra alliance began to fall
apart. Another principal indigenous group,
under the leadership of Francisco Gon-

zalez, told a meeting of the contras (“‘Nica- -

raguan Democratic Force”) that they
would no longer fight to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government. In September
1987, the National Assembly of Nicaragua
formerly approved the autonomy statute
for the whole Atlantic region. Thousands of
Miskitos refugees began to return to Nica-
ragua, while more Miskitos groups dropped
out of the contra alliance.

The contras responded by increasing ter-
rorist attacks on the Indian communities.
Besides the usual killings, kidnapping and
rapes, they focussed on destroying all the

‘reconstruction projects, such as schools and

housing construction on the Atlantic coast.
Rather than stopping the autonomy pro-
cess, the contra attacks served only to

increase indigenous support for the Atlantic
projects. Armed Miskitos, who formerly
had been allies of the contras, now organ
ized self-defence militias and fought both |
independently and alongside the Sandinista
army against the contras. By 1988, only oné |
indigenous group, Yatama, remained align
with the counter-revolution.

In April 1989, the first elections will take
place for regional governments in the Atlan
tic region. Each community will elect @
delegate for municipal administration an
for a 45-member regional council. The pro
cess of autonomy will then have to maké
that most difficult step of all — going from
a legal reality to an economic, social ane)
political one. ug

Like the Nicaraguan revolution itself, it
will not be an easy transformation but on®
that, in the face of war, destitution al!
hurricanes, has sparked a ray of hope fof
indigenous people across the Americas.

= ne

By MARC FRANK

The Reagan administration’s Salva-
dorean model of “‘low intensity conflict”
continues to take a beating at the hands
of the Farabundo Marti National Liber-
ation Front. The Duarte regime and mil-
itary appear helpless in the face of the
Front’s two-month-old offensive, as
popular forces strike almost at will in all
14 departments of El Salvador.

In late October, as bombs exploded in
military offices and exclusive neighbour-
hoods in San Salvador, the FMLN
entered various cities and towns outside
the capital, including San Miguel, the
country’s third most important urban
centre. They also destroyed three key
coffee processing centres, including the
country’s largest, attacked dozens of
army posts, and launched a Latin Amer-
ican diplomatic offensive aimed at forc-
ing the Duarte regime to the bargaining
table.

Salvadorean government officials and
military continue to play down their
recent setbacks, claiming the FMLN
offensive is merely a publicity stunt to
catch U.S. attention during the presiden-
tial elections. But the military has sent
reinforcements to various parts of the
country where the FMLN threatens to
take complete control.

Meanwhile a delegation of leading
FMLN commanders, including Comman-
der Joaquin Villalobos and Leonel Gon-

FIVILN forces on move

zales, began a tour of eight Latin
American countries, among them Perv, .
Argentina, Costa Rica and Ecuador.

Speaking in Lima, Villalobos said: “El
Salvador is moving toward a general
social explosion. Popular forces have
taken back the streets and the revolu-
tionary war has unquestiohably advan-
ced. Within this situation, the FMLN 15
trying to lead the struggle in such a way
that the costs of this explosion are kept tO
a minimum.”

The FMLN commander again called
on the Duarte regime to negotiate 4 |
cease-fire and form a coalition govert- |
ment. He charged. the Reagan adminis" |
tration with continuing to oppose 4 |
negotiated solution to the Salvadora?
war, thus prolonging the country’s suf-
fering, and called on Latin America®
governments to step up their Central
American peace efforts.

An Amnesty International repot
released Oct. 19 illustrates the conditions
the FMLN is fighting against. The report
found right-wing death squad murdets
have tripled over the last year. “SalvadO-
rean death squads are simply used so the
government can avoid being he
accountable for the tortures, disappe4!
ances and extra-judicial executions
committed in its name,” the repo
charged.

; Mat Frank is Havana correspondent
‘or the U.S. People’s Daily Vor