%

lution triumphed, rightist elements
tried to frustrate it and keep Cuba in
_ the capitalist camp. But following the
_ Agrarian Reform and other revolution-
| ary laws, imperialism cut off trade and
this strengthened the genuine revolu-
tionary current within Cuba.

Later, however, the petty bourgeois
and anti-communist elements centred
their attacks against old members of

the PSP, especially against Anibal
_ Escalante. ;

The petty bourgeoisie and rightist
elements Set about preparing the con-
ditions for the denunciation of March
26, 1962, reinforcing their position with
_ the October Crisis. These two events,
March 26 and the October Crisis, faci-
litated a reorientation of Cuba’s trade
policy, once again toward the capitalist
countries,

More. The aims of the petty bour-

'geoisie were not only to shift trade to
the capitalist areas, but also to bring
Cuba back ‘to the system that had been
abolished in January, 1959.

the capitalist countries, as alleged by
; the micro-faction, seriously damaged
| trade relations between Cuba and the
‘socialist camp. The latter finally agreed
to resume discussions on trade agree-
ments that had been set aside without
| previous notice by Cuba when Cuba
turned toward capitalist markets: This
resumption of discussions was ‘possible
thanks to the Soviet Union, which
underwrote all the financial operations.

On the October Crisis, Escalante was
| said not to have expressed any opinion.
| But some members of. the micro-faction
opined that because of the wise policy
of the U.S.S:R: in withdrawing the mis-
siles, and the letter from Khrushchov
‘| to Kennedy, not only was war averted,
*) but an imperialist attack was blocked
for. a long period of time.
The micro-faction was also said to
have estimated that the serious diver-
‘|gencies between Cuba and China
strengthened the position of the pro-
letariat in Cuba; and. that the problem
with China was additionally beneficial
because it weakened the thesis that
the only way for the people of Latin
America was the armed struggle.
In géneral, the micro-faction was
said to believe that neither objective
nor subjective conditions existed for
the armed struggle. Further, that the
fight, and the way in which it was
raised in Venezuela, was a mistake.
Raul said the group accused the
Cuban Revolution of interfering in the
internal affairs of Latin American Com-
munist Parties. The group is said to
have argued that each party must lead
its Own revolution, and to have accused

_ skyist line for the export of revolution.
| The group, Raul stated, suggested
‘that the Cuban leadership tries to im-
‘pose its line on other Communist par-
_|ties, and it criticized the public criti-
cism by Cuba of what Raul called the
“rightist leadership” of the Communist
Party of Venezuela. Raul added that
‘the group justified and defended the
‘position of the Venezuelan party.

In Latin America, the group was said
‘to have contested, Cuba is practically
divorced from the majority of Com-
munist parties over its conception of
how to develop the fight. This could
,create serious problems Of solidarity
toward the Cuban Revolution and for
unity of action against imperialism.

On the Cuban economy, Escalante
xpressed scepticism that the 1970 goal
f a 10 million ton sugar harvest would

be reached. He is said to have main-
ained that measures to increase in-
talled capacity in the sugar industry
ere not proceeding quickly enough
Thus, he argued, Cuba’s economy in
1970 would not be able to achieve the

This supposed rapprochment with :

the Cuban leadership of having a Trot- ’

aecessary indices to adequately solve

the problems facing the country. Pro-
duction in general, he argued, is under
the norms required to meet the needs
of the people.

Production policy everywhere, he as-
serted, is based on a budgetary system
which rests on moral incentives, abso-
lutely setting aside material incentives,
failing to recognize the laws of social
development. All of which has caused
a slackening in production.

Voluntary, work, Escalante maintain-
ed, is being called for to meet produc-
tion goals, but when this does not pro-
duce enough to meet costs, it results
in inferjor quality in production.

In addition to all of the above, the
micro-faction is said to have maintain-
ed that there exists an anti-Soviet cur-
rent in the leadership of the Cuban
party. The group supported this charge

by pointing to ever closer commercial -

relations with France by Cuba.
Such relations, said, the group, were

-encouraged especially by central com-

mittee members Jose Llanusa, Marcelo
Fernandez, Alfredo Guevara and Car-
los Franqui, with the idea of also draw-
ing closer to France politically, and
drawing further away from the Soviet
Union and the socialist camp. :

Certain French artistic exnibitions in
Cuba and an increase in French tour-
ists were also cited to bolster the
closer-to-France argument.

This current toward France, Esca-
lante is said to have affirmed, has
been stimulated by the “new attitude”
of DeGaulle. Following French defeat
in Vietnam and Algeria, DeGaulle pre-
sents a “correct” position of peaceful
coexistence, of free trade among all

countries, including tactical confron- -

tation with U.S. imperialism. But, said
Escalante, DeGaulle continues to cain-
cide strategically with the aims of im-
perialism due to his class position.
Further, on the “anti-Soviet current,”
Escalente is said to have claimed that
candidate members of the Cuban party.

are asked their opinion of the Soviet

Union to determine if they are sym-
pathetic or not. If they are, then dis-
cussions are held with them about
“some problems.”

In relation to the Soviet Union, Raul
Castro said members of the micro-

faction had criticized Fidel Castro’s.

speech of July 26, 1966, in which the
Cuban leader referred to Soviet aid
to Chile, Brazil and other Latin Ameri-
can countries. This point has been
raised several times by Fidel Castro
since then, with" increasing severity.
In his closing speech to the OLAS con-
ference, however, he clarified that
Cuba does not oppose trade between
Latin America and the socialist coun-
tries, but does oppose socialist-coun-
try aid.

Castro argues that such aid, if not
trade, helps the ruling powers in Latin
America to stay in power, and thus
-works against the national liberation
movements in Latin America.

The Soviet position—and the attri-
buted to. the “micro-faction”—includes
the argument that commercial rela-
tions (how to distinguish aid from
trade completely?) with Latin America
help to weaken the stranglehold of
U.S. imperialism on the continent, and
thus, in fact, contribute to the na-
tional liberation movements.

Qn the micro-faction’s contacts with
Czech, East German and Soviet citi-
zens, the report of Raul Castro sounds
a critical note about “the conduct of
a very few advisers, journalists and
officials of foreign embassies who par-
ticipated in the activities of the micro-
factionalist elements.”

But it adds, “as a question of ele-
mentary justice,” high praise for the
work of the innumerable Soviet and
other socialist-country technicians in
Cuba, who “have always maintained
an exemplary conduct and absolute
respect for our Revolution.”

~The ‘coup’ was on
the other foot —

Stanley Harrison, who went to work
in Prague shortly before the historic
events whose 20th anniversary is cele-
brated this month, recalled some eye-
witness impressions and sums up what

really happened.

RRIVING in the Czechoslovak capi- —

tal late in 1947, it seems to me
now, was like coming in for the
last five minutes of a five-hour drama.
It’s not possible to understand the
February 1948 events except as the
closing scene of developments specific-
ally Czech and Slovak, deeply rooted
in the two peoples’ history of struggle.
Once you fall for the “Communist
coup” version of what happened, you’re
sunk. Visibly to anyone in Prague at
the time, it made little sense then, and
it makes even less today.

About the time that our own labor

movement was writing Socialism into
its program (Clause 4), a great demon-
stration, on May Day, 1918, filled
Prague’s quarter-mile long Wenceslas
Square behind a banner reading “A So-
cialist Nation” and extending the full
width of the square. '

Nearly 30 years later, after surviv-.

ing Munich, partition, nazi occupation,
quisling regimes, the people decided, in
a classically democratic exercise of
will, that nobody was going to stop
them building such a nation.

Prague in the late summer of ’47

“presented strange contrasts. Puzzling
not only to a newcomer, but to many
Czechs, too.

Everywhere one was told: “We have
had our revolution.” There was a com-
mon assumption that the National
Front Government which had emerged
from the war would bury the evil past
and build a better-society. It was the
way many people in Brtiain thought
and hoped about the 1945 Labor Gov-
ernment, only more so. :

But there was also mounting unease
about the future. The year before. Chur-
chill’s Fulton speech had launched the
cold war, and earlier in 1947 American
pressure had ousted the Communists
from the French and Italian govern-
ments,

The drive first to buy up, and then
later under Dulles to roll up, the pro-
gressive regimes of eastern Europe was
being mounted.

All over Czechoslovakia a disastrous
drought killed the crops, rations were
cut as ‘winter came, on, people went
hungry and there were many short-
ages. 3

About the first two words of the
‘language I learned were ‘“‘smelinar”
and “pod pultom”—“black market” and
“under the counter.”

The immediate postwar Two-Year
Plan had managed to raise output to
above the 1938 level. But much of the
product was vanishing into the maw
of private trade. ;

The big hotels were full of Ameri-
cans on leave from their occupation
zone of Germany. Round them hovered
types ready to pay anything for dollars.
They bought goods in France and Swit-
zerland, sold them at a large profit, and
with the crowns they got, acquired
textiles to smuggle out of the country.

The Government itself was a. very
special- product of the alliance against
Hitler fascism, a kind of living postwar
embodiment of this alliance.

It was based on a program, agreed at

Kosice in Slovakia in the war’s final ©

stages, providing for large-scale natio-
nalization, for a wide democracy ex-
cluding only the parties discredited for
all time by their Munich record and col-
laboration with the nazis, and for alli-
ance with the Soviet Union.

Autumn 1945 saw the nationalization
of the banks, insurance companies,
mines and other ‘“‘controlling heights.”

In the May 1946 elections, the Com-
munists gained nearly 40 per cent of
the vote and with the Social Democrats

held a narrow majority in Parliament.
The other main parties were the Na-
tional Socialists, the People’s Party
(Catholics) and the Slovak Democrats.

The first big row came late in 1947
over a Communist proposal to compen-
sate small farmers hit by the drought
by a tax on the wealthy. Another broke
over national insurance legislation.

. The unions called a Congress of
Works Councils for February 2 and a
Congress of Peasants’ Committees was
to meet a week later. On the agendas: -
further nationalization and a new land
reform.

In the Cabinet the situation became
tense and on February 20,.12 of the
16 non-Communist Ministers resigned.
They counted on the Social Democrat
leaders swinging to their side and on
some army and security service groups.

‘The word flew round that President
Benes would reject the resignations
and install a government of experts—a
device especially sinister to Czech ears,
not only because of its use during the
capitulation to Hitler, but previously
by the 1920 Republic to curb the Left.

That was the start of a breathless
five days. The next day, an immense
mass rally in the Old Town Square
heard a report on the crisis from the
Communist Premier, Klement Gott-
wald, and demanded that Benes accept
the resignations.

On February 22, the Congress of
Works Councils called a one-hour token
strike for February 24. There were
8,000 delegates and only ten opposed. ~

Meanwhile the people went beyond
demonstrating. Action committees of
the National Front sprang up every-
where.

The resigning Ministers saw  thous-
ands of their nominal supporters join
the committees. They became generals
without troops. They tried to retreat
from their rash act. Their only hope

‘ was that Benes would not let them re-

sign. ;
The February 24 strike was total. On
February 25, while fully one-fifth of
the city’s million people packed the ~
Wenceslas Square and surrounding
streets, we heard the radio announce
zt noon that the resignations had been
accepted.

The trial of strength was over, Benes
had bowed to thé popular will — for
which the cold warriors and the emigres
never forgave him.

In Slovakia, on which the right wing
parties were greatly counting, it was
the same story. Great meetings, melt-

‘ing away of the ranks of the largest

party (Slovak Democrats, with 60 per

. cent of the May 1946 votes), rebuild-

ing of the National Front from below
to carry through the real changes
wanted by the majority of the people.

The right-wing ministers, and those -
who egged ‘them on in the West, had
grossly miscalculated. The West, said
the secretary of the trade union move-
ment Exzen Erban, sent in “a Trojan
horse which prematurely disgorged its
contents.”

‘It was to cover up this disaster, and
indeed to turn it into a pretext for

’ better conceived hatchet work against ~
_ national independence and democracy

elsewhere that the absurd myth of the
“Communist seizure of power’—prov-
ing the alleged impossibility of peaceful
co-existence—was at once launched in
the West.

Twenty years and dozens of import-
ed military coups and wars later, and
amid the shame of Greece and the
horrors inflicted on Vietnam, more
people can see what. the policy that
took shape in the late ’40s has led to.

‘So it’s high time to get the record
straight about Czechoslovakia 1948.
There was a conspiracy, but the Czechs
and Slovaks rising in their millions
smashed it. The “coup” was entirely on
the other foot. (Morning Star)

MARCH 15, 1968—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 7