eS an . it spiPortant that base is to U.S. imperialist ‘Policy was demonstrated by the Korean “at from 1950-1953 which kept Korea Nided at the cost of 54,000 American lives “Nd more than 1,000,000 Asians. 5) hew war scare is raised by U.S. offi- als despite repeated proclamations by 2. ‘a DPRK that its goal is the peaceful un- 4 non of the country through a gradual | «.2CeSs consistent with the will of the Kor- 2 people. On his recent tour which includ- Bye Rumania, Algeria, Mauritania, ‘| batia and Yugoslavia, Premier Kim Il a3 Sought to build support for just such the tempt at peaceful unification. When }ap,, United Nations assembles this fall, ‘| en the question of the 30-year division of rea will be raised and the occupation Ars Soil by U.S. troops will be challenged. Present, 42,000 American soldiers equip- in ee tactical nuclear weapons remain edt uth Korea under authorization extend- paki oe Gerr8 likelihood ‘that the United Nations | sanction oT! countries, will terminate its + aa og Correctly both the dangers of war f Korea Prospects for peaceful change in | Us There is a great deal of bluster in | from ge t8es of imminent “aggression | So ja it (© Nuclear retaliation. Faced with an i Policy tnavstem that is disintegrating and a | 8 dete thas failed “tragically,” the U.S. i South Koned to strengthen its hold on : rea in order to forestall any fur- | “OUD anoanne = 22 azlsc 34 by the United Nations in 1950. There is. Thera! Assembly, led by the socialist and ion for U.S. forces to remain in Kerea. . | to... important for the peace movement _ North” and in U.S. threats to re-. an pn ee ern Sea seg ae et aoe a cat ... zi mong - tied ad * as ae: ar h Ch SOG eS 6 5 > B ‘ ther erosion of its military position. For _ U‘S. policy a threat of war serves many purposes, all of which revolve around the justification for continuing U.S. occupa- _ tion: U.S. troops are needed to stop ‘‘ag- - gression,” and expanded military budget is needed to provide “‘security”’ to the “free _ world,” support of a dictatorial regime is the better of two evils. But there is a ser- . ious weakness in an ally like South Korea, ruled by the martial law regime of Pak Chung-hi which lacks an extensive popular base among workers and peasants, and which increasingly represses its own stu- dents, religious and intellectual leaders.. Such a regime is a liability because it can- not alleviate or hide internal discontent, which not only poses a danger of revolution but also spoils the regime’s palatability for an American people weary with de- fending that kind of “freedom” in Asia. To counter this exposure of the realities of South Korea, the U.S. seeks to strength- en the image of Pak Chung-hi as a defender of the ‘free world” against a ‘militaristic, | communist north.” It is a rather weary ploy, to be sure, after Diem, Ky and Thieu in Vietnam, but the U.S. is stuck with a iscredited Cold War script... : Time magazine, April 28, 1975, stated: - “Jn the opinion of senior U.S. officials in the Pentagon, the State Department and the U.S. intelligence community, South Korea does not face an imminent attack ~ from the north.” “A greater threat,” U.S. officials warn privately, “‘is that Pak’s repressive meas- ures, taken in the name of internal secur- ity, may bring massive public protests st him or even a coup. “There could be an ugly confrontation. Pak has exacerbated the situation,’’ said a leading U.S. expert. “There is growing concern in Washington that Pak is follow- ing what U.S. official describes as the ‘worst approach’’’. On June 20, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Weyand declared: - “There is ‘very little chance of a major attack from the north’ .”’ The realities in Korea are different than U.S. policy invents. First in importance, the DPRK is a socialist country with strong support from its people. North Koreans have worked hard through the last two decades to rebuild cities, factories, schools, hospitals, and recreational facili- ties. They. are proud of their accomplish- ments and are not about to: throw all of this material wealth away (not to men- tion their lives): in a reckless bid to unify their country by war. But they do want, and justifiably, is the end of U.S. occupation so that the Korean people can peacefully pursue the course of reunification. Even while recognizing the element of bluster and brinkmanship in U.S. policy, outweighed by the positive indications to- ward peaceful change, it would be unreal- istic to ignore the real danger of war in Korea. Since 1953, when the Korean War ended by an armistice, the U.S. has main- tained a large army-in South Korea and a nuclear airforce. At present 42,000 Ameri- can soldiers are there, dating back to the UN authorization, but since supplemented by treaty with a South Korean government maintained militarily and economically by the U.S. In this way, the U.S. claims to be assisting a ‘‘free’’ country when in real- ity it is preserving a protectorate. South Korea’s military dictatorship demands the presence of American soldiers despite the ‘fact that the south’s population is more than twice as large as in the DPRK, sim- ply because it is the Korean people who must be repressed. The New York Times, July 10, 1975: “Under the guise of promoting stability, the U.S. is presiding over an increasingly unstable position here in South Korea.” Newsweek admitted that: “Founded in 1961, and employing an estimated 35,000 people, the Korean CIA has gained a repu- tation for brutality that, to judge from its victims, seems richiy deserved.” Clearly there is a striking parallel: be- - tween Korea and Vietnam, where the U.S. erected a puppet state in the south that was totally dependent on U.S. money, arms and advisors: For 20 years the U.S. sought to crush a liberation struggle that contin- ually grew in strength despite the enor- mous bombing and 550,000 American sol- diers. As long as U.S. soldiers remain in Korea, and the just aspirations of the Kor- ean people for the end of foreign occupa- tion and one Korean nation remain alive, ‘there is danger that the U.S. may once again resort to war in order to prevent national liberation. The U.S. ruling class now has over 2,000 military bases in over 70-countries, manned: by over 500,000 U.S. military per- sonnel. In the Pacific, the U.S. and its al- lies, old and new, are occupying and man- ning military bases on other peoples’ lands, from South Korea through Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines and Thailand. — . It behooves us, the American people, to end our government’s imperialist policy and thus end the threat of war in Korea. As Americans we have neither the right nor the need to perpetuate the colonial status of a part of Korea. Our cry to our government must be, “‘No more Vietnams! No more Korean Wars! withdraw our sol- . diers from Korea!” Reviewing the facts Following are excerpts from Korea—Uneasy Truce in the Land of the Morning Calm, a publication of the American-Korean Friendship and Informati6n Center. The history of Korea . . . particularly for Americans, has been presented with deliberate distortion and pseudo-facts to the point where it is today perhaps the most misunderstood and confusing area of the world. It is also potentially one of the most dangerous focal points for the peace of the world. S On June 25, 1950, war erupted in Korea between North and South. Although most people in the United States weré led to believe that the war was instigated by the North, no such proof has ever been established. In fact, historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, in The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (Harper & Row, 1972), documented the weakness of the ‘North Korea aggression’’ theory. Further, the first news stories at the outbreak of the war—later suppressed—reported incursions by Rhee’s (Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea, 1948-1960: Ed.) armies into North Korea, where they were re- pulsed and pursued into the South. Whatever the origin of the fighting, it was clear that Rhee’s days were numbered without a national emergency and a . national mobilization. _ The toll was enormous: countless thousands of Korean dead, some of them victims of experimentation by the United States forces with new methods of kill- ing; 142,000 American casualties; devastation in Korea that defied belief; $80 billion in military expenditures by the United States, with much of the profit going into the accounts of U.S. and Japanese munitions- makers. Yet, withal, an unswerving determination on the part of the Koreans to rid the country of foreign invaders and unify the land. j z e : : - Rhee was succeeded as head of the South Korean government by John M. Chang, a vacillating man of the middle, friendly to the United States but aware of the intense feeling in the country after years of repression, and the desire ‘for reunification with the North. Demonstrations for unity were an almost daily occurrence, and a student march was scheduled to culminate in a meeting with . North Korean studentseon May 19, 1961. The day before the meeting, Chang was removed in a military coup, under the pretext that his policies were paving the way for. a ‘‘Communist takeover” of the government. General Pak Chung Hi emerged as the ‘‘strong man.” _. The Pak regime has, if anything, been even more repressive than that of . Syngman Rhee. A vast network of spies and informers infests the country, under the direction of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Thousands have been imprisoned, first under the Anti-Communist Act of 1961, and Korea is, in short, a police state whose government then under the succeeding laws forced through ‘by Pak, each more stringent than the previous one, depends for its existence on the support and approval of the United States government. ‘ @ Hope of reunification remains a dominant feature of life in North Korea. Another overriding consideration is the ever present realization that another devastating conflict is possible. : PACIFIC TRIBUNE—NOVEMBER 28, 1975—Page 7