STALIN ROLE

OSEPH STALIN was a highly contra-
dictory figure. He was undoubtedly
a party leader of great prestige and
renown, an excellent strong-willed,
energetic organizer. In 1922, when the
Civil War ended and the country embar-
ked on peacetime development, he was
elected general secretary of the party.
After observing Stalin’s work in this
post, Lenin sounded a warning in a let-
ter to the Central Committee at the
end of 1922: “Since Stalin became gen-
eral secretary he has concentrated in-
finite power in his hands, and I am not
certain he will always be sufficiently
cautious in his use of that power .
Stalin is too rough.” Lenin suggested
that Stalin might be replaced as gen-
eral secretary by someone who would
be “more patient, more loyal, more
polite and more attentive to his com-
rades, less capricious, etc.”

The letter was discussed at the Thir-
teenth Party Congress, meeting a few
months after Lenin’s death, in the
spring of 1924. The bitter debates with
the Trotskyites, who had attempted to
push out the core of the party Central
Committee that had taken shape under

Lenin, had just ended. In the debates
Stalin had firmly upheld Lenin’s pro-
gram for building socialism. His theo-
retical writings, which appeared in
Pravda, the leading party newspaper,
had become highly popular. Weighing
all the circumstances and hoping Stalin
would heed the criticism, the Congress
delegates voted to retain Stalin as
general secretary. By secret ballot they
elected him a member of the Central
Committee by an absolute majority.
Throughout all the difficult years
that followed, Stalin was the recog-
nized leader of the party and played
an outstanding part in guiding the
country’s destiny. Together with other
leaders he supported the party’s gen-
eral policy and fought the opposition
groups that doubted whether socialism
could be built in Russia. His will-power
and persistence were of great signific-
ance in turning Russia into a socialist
country at a time when the danger of
military attack was steadily increasing.
During the thirties the halo of
“oreat” and “brilliant” began to be
created around Stalin. The country’s
achievements and the growth in its
wealth and power, all the results of the

work of millions of people, were attri-
buted to a single man. Stalin not only
accepted the glorification as his due
but also encouraged it. He grew con-
vinced of his infallibility and became
more and more impatient with anyone
who opposed him. Lenin’s fears were
confirmed, Stalin began to abuse his
power. : :

In spite of the party’s rule of col-
lective leadership, a rule that had been
tested in the most involved situations,
Stalin himself more and more often de-
cided major issues that required
thorough study and discussion .by the
leadership. The negative consequences
of this made themselves felt in various
spheres.

It was at this time that the tried and
tested principles of relations between
the party and the state security bodies
were violated. The state security ser-
vice had done much to protect the
gains of the revolution, and great trust
was placed in it. But things changed
after control over it by the party and
the government was replaced by Sta-
lin’s personal control, and when his
decisions not infrequently took the
place of the normal administration of
justice. To please him the political ad-
venturers whom he placed at the head
of the service (Nikolai Yezhov and
then Lavrenti Beria) fabricated all

kinds of documents and accused pro- |

minent party and government officials
and Red Army commanders of espion-
age and treason.

At the time, the party and the people
knew nothing about Stalin’s abuse of

. his power. The country believed he was

actively working for socialism, and
trusted him completely. It was widely
believed that the repressive measures
being taken were against real enemies.
The first to suffer repression were for-
mer ideological opponents, who were
depicted as agents of foreign secret
services. Then the same accusation was
levelled at other communists. The re-
sult was that many honest and dedic-
ated people perished, were slandered
and imprisoned.

In trying to understand what happen-
ed we must not forget that the Soviet
Union’s position in international affairs
was in many ways as threatened and
alarming as it had been two decades
before, at the time of the Civil War and
the foreign intervention. The Soviet
Union was squeezed in a hostile ring.

force a

Nazi Germany, the shock prot

world reaction, was openly ili
ing its goal of destroying the sot is
state and was rapidly building

z : ¢ ¢ e We
might. Ruling circles in i mas
attack the East. It is obvious thal i

perialist secret services wante i ay
as many poisonous seeds 8 FF...
ahead of time. An undeclared, invert
vicious war was being waged ame
the socialist state. All this cont
the Soviet people of the need iy
back vigorously and could not hee
fecting their judgement of the face a
the period, including those conn
with the Stalin personality cult, sovit ay

An analysis of this aspect ® |
history was started by the CO
Party at its 20th Congress in 1999:
party decisions pointed out “det oy
sonality cult is alien to the ide
communism and to the news Heh,
created by the socialist revoluty al |
negative phenomena ha nar cilhs
done the building of soc
harm. But even in the mos ne
period they had not paralyzed (a5? h
tivity of the party and governm chante di
whole and had not been able 1 ciel e
the socialist nature of Soviet ic pit tf
In those years the new econ
were successfully carried out, st iq
cialist foundation of the Sova dem hy
was consolidated and, althoug | i
cratic principles were violater sid)”
working people were being dav" itt! he
state administration than 9 acti
country at any other time. pitt ‘
with the unhealthy trends pan df,
Stalin’s actions gave rise, thous? ih.
communists tried to TS) i; Ii
democratic, Leninist principl?® ging :
life of the society they wer® ah

Despite everything produce rest P
Stalin cult, the Soviet people = eve
their faith in the ideals of the’. (jie
tion and of the party that B oti :
building of socialism, Thelf de ry Ce Pe
the gains of socialism was 2° NOR
both before and during the fut Ri
documents indicate compl€ ti
in the face of a problem tne ou iy
encountered in the conqueré came.
of. Europe but which they ined Oh
against in the Soviet districts ell Re
cupied. This was

ialism Ful
|

the compler vf

between the people and the! and i by
ment, between the people (

party.

HE FIRST decade after 1945 in the

ya ofp
e war a re

Soviet Union was a period of the

rehabilitation of the areas that
had suffered from the nazi incursion,
the upsurge of the economy, science
and culture after five years of war. And
the most important event in the coun-
try’s political life was the 20th Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union — the first after the
death of Joseph Stalin.

The wounds inflicted on the Soviet
Union by the war were truly mon-
strous. Almost one tenth of the popula-
tion at the time perished. Great harm
was caused to the most developed pre-
war areas, especially in the industrial
aspect, in the western and southern
parts of the European USSR. Twenty-
five million people remained without a
roof over their heads. Though tremen-
dous efforts were undertaken already

‘November'’4, 1967°—

in the course of the W' h F
production level, whic by the
catastrophically, mainly il coh fl
of creating new in ee efits Bae
the East (the Urals: ” 5, J? ii
Asia), nevertheless eV" ‘try Pi
branches of Soviet indUS' vat ma
much less than before the ‘A
The general plan for ;
economic revival was the mpeg “i
envisaged not only thé if ,
ation on the pre-war ie ent il ae
but also its consideraP ,

cht Yl

y
war. The mines flo0 any an
were dried, blast furn the hf
put up in the placé pded Sy,
ones, and urgently @, gie™ A
houses built. Stalingt™’ Pi |

paciicre® ,