FEATURE THE SOVIET HORDES By FRED WEIR In the best-selling “‘future history’’, The Third World War, General Sir John Hackett paints a nightmarish scenario of a Warsaw Pact surprise attack upon western Surope. In the story, the communist attackers out- 1umber the NATO forces by a vast margin; the hapless lefenders are nearly swamped by wave after wave of idvancing soldiers, tanks and aircraft. Fearing the >onsequences of nuclear war, NA TO refrains from using itomie weapons in self-defence, almost until the end. Like all good fiction, The Third World War closes ona rappy note: the Soviet bear is vanquished, not by num- vers, but by technical expertise, determination and the moral superiority of free men. The Third World War, entertaining as it may be, is not just another novel. Until recently, General Hackett was 1 top NATO commander. Listed in his book are a qumber of prestigious collaborators — NATO intellec- ual, military and political leaders who assisted him in its sroduction. Indeed, The Third World War is the ictionalization of a long-standing NATO propaganda ippeal. The elements are the same ones we encounter in ihe daily press, and read increasingly in publications not iabelled fiction. The premise is simple and straightfor- ward: the Soviet Union and its allies are said to out- number the western forces by huge margins in every “The Eastern bloc has for many years possessed a sub- stantial margin in military manpower deployed in Europe, a 2 to 1 advantage in tactical aircraft, and a 3 to I advantage in tanks.” — Ronaid Reagan, election speech, 1980 significant index of conventional military power. The scenarios which are derived from this often vary, but the import is the same. Using the threat of nuclear war to immobilize the West, the Soviets will then employ their ‘‘everwhelmingly superior’ conventional forces to con- quer the world, or portions thereof. Here is one version of this “‘blackmail”’ thesis, suggested by Reagan protégé General Daniel O. Graham: ‘The Soviets evacuate their cities and hunker down. Then they move against NATO, or Yugoslavia, or China, or the Middle East with superior conventional forces. The United States is faced with the demand to stay out or risk nuclear exchange in which 100 million Americans would die, as opposed to 10 million Russians.” Conclusion? The West must re-arm, re-arm, re-arm. If Hackett’s Third World War nightmare is to be pre- vented, then huge arsenals of every conceivable type of weaponry will have to be acquired soon, we are told, to offset the Soviet numerical preponderance. Most west- erm governments have already drawn up their shopping lists, and they are indeed massive. Conveniently, the western media have reported the “Soviet hordes’’ turning up practically everywhere: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, even Nicaragua. Remember the panic in the fall of 1979 when it was learned that a Russian “‘combat brigade’ was poised on the Cuban shore of the Florida Strait? More recently a menacing Soviet troop build-up has been “‘discovered”’ in the Far East where Japan — coinciden- tally? — has been resisting U.S. demands to spend more of her industrial profits on American weapons systems. The myth of Soviet numerical supremacy has become so prevalent, so widely spread, that it is reinforced daily, often in lurid detail, through the media and the state- ments of Western leaders. Virtually every ‘*Soviet threat*’ formula is based upon this premise. Can it possi- bly be untrue? There are a number of independent agencies in the western world which monitor arms escalation. Foremost among these is the International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) in London, a pro-NATO group which annually publishes its prestigious statistical summary, the Military Balance. Then there is the Stockholm Inter- national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) whose World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook is generally considered to be the most objective military source book. There is also the non-governmental Center for Defence Information in Washington, headed by retired Admiral Gene LaRoque. The publications of these agencies reveal a vastly different picture of Soviet military power than that painted by the Pentagon propagandists. Of the four tradi- tional indicators of conventional military prowess — manpower, naval forces, tactical aircraft and tanks — the Warsaw Pact has aclear lead in only one. In three out of four categories — plus the intangible area of tech- nological sophistication — the NATO powers enjoy a distinct, often decisive lead. In this article we will com- pare manpower and naval forces. : PACIFIC TRIBUNE— MARCH 26, 1982— Page 6 Perhaps the most pervasive myth of all is that of the sheer weight of Soviet manpower. Judging by a recent U.S. Department of Defence pamphlet, Soviet Military Power (which reads as though torn from the pages of General Hackett’s novel), the Pentagon is seriously con- cerned with this problem: “The NATO doctrine is to fight with conventional arms until we are losing, then to fight with nuclear tacticals until we are losing, and then to blow up the world.”’ — Morton Halperin, former U.S. deputy secretary of defence. EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Number of Warheads) 7.000 NATO/FRANCE = 6.000 Short range = 5.000 (can reach .| Eastern Europe) m= 4 000 a I p C > 3.000 C ti p= 2.000 t « p> 1.000 ‘Traditionally, Imperial Russian and Soviet armies have been characterized by great numbers ... The So- viets today have superior ground forces in Europe. They have a substantial advantage in the number of troops. At the outset of a war, the Soviets plan to move quickly, slicing through NA TO forces in the Central Region and driving to the English Channel ...”’ However, hard facts indicate otherwise. The com- bined population of the 14 NATO countries* is 556,060,000; the seven nations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have a total population of 370,3280,000. All of the rhetoric about the size of Soviet forces in Europe notwithstanding, when we turn to The Military Balance, we find that the opposing armies stand roughly equal. NATO has 64 active divisions totalling 2,800,000 troops. Facing them are 68 divisions of the Warsaw Pact, witha total of 2,600,000 (a Soviet division being somewhat smaller than its NATO, counterpart). In fact, the com- - bined armed forced — army, navy and air force — for all of the Warsaw Treaty nations came to 4,743,000 in 1980. The comparable figure for NATO countries is slightly higher, 4,881,300. ; Nor is this the full picture. NATO is able to concen- trate its forces along a relatively short confrontation line in Europe, while the United States sits securely aloof in fortress America. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, must guard an 8,000-mile land frontier, and must con- tinue to allocate a huge portion of its military potential to contend with the rapidly modernizing, hostile Chinese armed forces of 4,455,000. If Chinese forces are added to NATO forces, the Warsaw Treaty can be seen to have little more than 50% of the numerical strength deployed by its enemies! During the mid-1970s we heard a great deal about a ‘“‘naval gap’’. It was claimed that the U.S. Navy was no longer able to ‘“‘keep the sea lanes open,’’ no longer able to guarantee U.S. ‘‘vital interests’ in the Persian Gulf, because of the ‘‘phenomenal growth’’ of the Soviet fleet. Senator William Fulbright was moved to comment on the monotony of it all in the New York Times (Aug. 7, 1974): ‘‘We have witnessed how Admiral H. Moorer and Admiral E. Zumvalt announce all of a sudden — and this is an annually repeated ritual when the financial alloca- tions come up for approval — that we are below strength, our fleet is below strength, we are below strength in all departments, we are in very bad shape militarily and therefore need more money.” : More money the Navy got. In the latter half of the 70: the U.S. Navy launched its biggest peacetime construc- tion program ever. These ships are now coming on line, from the new Trident ballistic missile submarines, to the giant aircraft carrier Vinson, undergoing sea trials in early 1982. Yet incredibly the naval gap is still with us. We are told that the Soviet Navy has 1,764 warships, while the U.S. Navy has only 462. The Pentagon pam- phiet, Soviet Military Power, is positively hysterical ‘‘Moscow could . .. say to the West, ‘Gentlemen, we are superior in ground forces, we can take most of West Ger- many in 48 hours. You cannot checkmate that by strategic nuclear forces, for you no longer have superiority. Now we want to collect’.’’ — Edward Luttwak, Reagan protégé, quoted in Time, April 3, 1978. about this point: ‘‘This growing naval force, emerging from large, modern shipyards is designed to support sustained operations in remote areas in order to project Soviet power around the world.”’ However, no less an authority than the U.S. De- partment of Defence, in its FY 1982 Report, warns us that, “‘Gross numerical comparisons are misleading since they do not account for size or capability.’’ Even in terms of gross numbers, though, the gap narrows con- siderably when NATO is compared to the Warsaw Trea- ty. The latter has 1,800 vessels, NA TO has 1,500. More- over, from The Military Balance we learn that NATO has a far greater proportion of major combat ships. More Source: Center for Defense Information } : [ NATO. J | fi Belgium 868 u Britain 3229 Canada 80.-- Q Denmork 347 Fronce 509.3 | Greece 184.6 ltaly 365.— | I Netherlands 1148 Norway x0 fe Portugal 60.5 Turkey 566.— in United Stotes 2022. -- Wes: Germany 495, — total (NATO) 4880.6 Chino 4360 § NATO — China 9240.6 H (1) In eddition, italy disposes of 84,500 corabi- I nieri, who ore regular forces of the Army and f ‘are not included in the above figures. ies HV | \ |S |S HC ~ fi | i ACCORDING IO THE ESTIMATE OF THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ALLIANCE, THE NATO REVIEW, OF i FEBRUARY 1980, THE NATO FORCES AMOUNT 10 5.256.000, THEREFORE THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AMOUNT JO 90 PER CEN! OF THE NATO FORCES AND TO 50 PER CENT OF THE COMBINED OPPOSING FORCES OF NATO AND CHINA. peek ge ee than 1,400 vessels of the Warsaw Treaty fleets are eithet non-combatants, or small coastal craft. Thus, despilé the numbers of Warsaw Treaty ships, NATO fleets out rate them in total tonnage by a ratio of more than 2 to (see chart), and by a considerable margin in firepowel- The Pentagon allegation that the Soviet fieet is dé signed to project Soviet power around the world is not# ble, since the Warsaw Treaty navies are conspicuous!) lacking in this capability. NATO fleets on the othe! hand, particularly the U.S. Navy, are clearly design with global operations in mind. The most significatt! index of such naval power is the aircraft carrier, of whic! the U.S. Navy has 14, deploying some 1,100 comba! aircraft. NATO combined fleets have 18 active aircr carriers, plus six more in reserve. The Warsaw Treaty has two aircraft carriers, considerably smaller than thé standard NATO types, deploying mainly helicopters: Another indication of the global intentions of a natio# is the size of its-mobile marine corps. The MilitatY Balance 1979-80 informs us that the United States Marine Corps totals 184,000, recently amalgamated with some army units to form the Rapid Deployment Forc® The only comparable Soviet outfit is the Naval Infantry: numbering 12,000 men. Fred Weir, author of the 1980 pamphlet, The Arms Menace, is a history graduate who has travelled widely in eastern and western Europe and the Middle East. po pf aS) ; *Spain has recently applied, and will almost certainly be accepted as the 15th member of NATO. Spanish armed forces num 321,000. MAIN REFERENCES: Dornan, Dr. James, et al: The U.S. War Machine Crown Publishers, New York, 1978 Fulbright, Senator William: The Pentagon Propaganda Machiné | *Liveright Publishing Corp., New York, 1970 | ~ Gervasi, Tom: The Arsenal of Democracy Il Grove Press Inc., New York, 1981 International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1979-1980 ISS, London, 1980 Joyce, James Avery: The War Machine Quartet Books, London, 1980 Kaplan, Fred: Dubious Specter, A Second Look at the “goviel Threat” Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C. 1977 Myerson, Michael et al: Stopping World War Three U.S. Peace Council, New York, 1981 Stockholm International Peace Research Iristitute: Yearbook, 198! Alqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1981 ; United States Department of Defence: Soviet Military Power U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981.