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CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

By IDRIS COX

JN THE midst of the tragic armed con-
flict in Nigeria, and the contradic-
tory reports from both sides, there

seems to be a serious danger of losing

sight of the basic factors which have
led to this situation, and the big issues
now at stake.

Whether military victory is won by
the Federal armed forces, led by Gen.
Gowon, or those of Biafra, led by Col.
Ojukwu, all 56 million Nigerian people
will have to pay a heavy price for this
conflict, perhaps for years to come.

The big rise in oil production, and
the rivalry between foreign oil trusts
is a new, disturbing factor. But the
Arab peoples know to their cost the
disastrous results of the scramble for
big oil profits by: the foreign oil con-
cerns. This could also happen in Nige-
ria.

The problems of this vast country
(four times the size of Britain) could
have been solved by peaceful means.
To unite its many nationalities and
tribes has never been an easy task, and
the aim of British strategy has always
been to keep them divided. Nor has
military rule since January 1966 pro-
vided a solution.

However, a return to the phoney
“democratic” set-up initiated by Bri-
tain before Nigeria’s independence in
October 1960 will not improve the situ-
ation.

e

For it was precisely this kind of
Federal system that enabled the feudal
rulers of the North to exercise their
political domination on a Federal level,
to encourage regional divisions and
open the way to more widespread cor-
ruption.

These were the factors which led to
the mass uprising and military coup of
January 1966. Radical junior officers
were the first to launch the military
coup, many of whom are still in deten-
tion. They were foiled by Maj.-Gen.
Ironsi, who took over the military
command:

Military governors were chosen for
each of the four regions — North, East,
West, Mid-West—who, together with
Ironsi, formed the real core of the
newly formed Supreme Military Coun-
cil.

In the early stages there seemed: to
be good prospects of moving toward a
more democratic and united Nigeria,
Ironsi dissolved the old Federal system,
declared Nigeria a “unitary state” and
gave pledge on a new constitution,
under which elections would be held to
choose a new central government.

What Ironsi failed to reckon with
was the vested investment of the feudal
emirs. His attempts to win their sup-
port for a unitary state proved of no
avail.

As an Ibo from the East, they re-
garded him as the leader of the “Ibo
plot” to overthrow the old regime. The
fanatical hatred aroused by them in-
cited Northern soldiers to murder
Ironsi on July 29, 1966.

Three. days later, Col. Gowon (who
came from a small Christian lingustic
community in the North) took over the
military command. This action was
never recognized by Ojukwu or the
Eastern military Government either
then or now.

Gowon reversed Ironsi’s policy. The
proposed unitary system was condemn-
ed and the old federal system restored.
In his first official broadcast the
January coup was described as a “‘na-
tional disaster.”

The Federal booklet Nigeria 1966,
which Gowon — in January 1967,

October 6,, Tr PACIFIC TRIBUNE wa Rage

blamed the “army officers mainly from
the Ibo ethnic group of the Eastern
region.”

Two million Ibo people lived and
worked in the North. They had a re-
putation for higher levels of education
and skill, and. occupied important posi-
tions in industry and the armed forces,
and skilled occupations in the back-
ward economy of the North.

Despite criticism-of the Ibos, Ojukwu
was still prepared to co-operate with
Gowon in order to preserve Nigerian
unity, and in August attended a meet-
ing of regional military governors, at
which it was agreed to convene a con-
ference of regional delegations to con-

- sider the broad outlines of a future

constitution.

This ad hoc conference met on Sep-
tember 12 for three weeks. A variety of
proposals came under discussion, in-
cluding one from Ojukwu for a con-
federated system, dividing the country
into 12 regions—six in the North to
prevent the domination of one big re-
gion—and for all regions to have more
autonomous powers.

Before the conference met again tow-

le

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4

Independent Republic
a Federation since

tion by breakaway Biafra ofter it
- early last August.

year-old Nigerian Federation a
now dragged on since July 6.

militarily with Biafra.

the Mid West.
inhabitants

single tribal group in the region.

General Gowon.

! Fy. ys

fe hia

~ Mojor Okonkwo, who is 35, was put the
Biafra’s secession, lon Moy 30,

Major Okonkwo, in a four-minite brood
Mid West capital, said the new “Republic: of Benin” would: cooperate

He said the new republic would like te remain in the British Com-
monwealth and would seek membership in the United Nations. It would
also ask for support from the Organization of African Unity.

: The development came atter reliable reports began to reach Lagos
that Federal troops had mounted a major offensive to try to recapture

Major Okonkwo, who trained as a doctor in the United States,
comes from the Mid West but is an Ibo, like the majority of Biafra’s

The Ibos are comparatively numerous among the Mid West’s two
and a half million people, but are opposed by the Edos, the biggest

After the proclamation, the situation in Nigeria is:
North and West remain in the Federation, with the West’s Yorubas
backing the Federal government of Northern military ruler Major-

Eastern Region—seceded and declared itself Biafra.

Mid West—seceded and declared itself Benin.

The Mid West's secession came as Nigeria awaited the arrival
later this month of a top-level peace committee formed by the Organi-
zation of African Unity to try to settle the Nigerian crisis.

ard the end of October, no less than
30,000 Ibos working in the North were
massacred and nearly two million (the
remainder) forced to flee to find re-
fuge in the East. This terrible slaught-
er and oppression further’ inflamed the
situation.

Ojukwu made repeated demands for
a meeting of the Supreme Military
Council (which had not met since
Ironsi’s murder), and eventually it was
agreed to meet outside Nigeria on the
“neutral” territory of Aburi in Ghana,
on January 4-5, 1967.

The meeting reached a surprising
measure of agreement. Among its deci-
sions was that the army be governed
by the Supreme Military Council as
the final authority; that military gov-
ernment would have full. control in
their regions.

No “State of Emergency” could be
declared by the Supreme Commander
anywhere in Nigeria without consulta-
tion with and the consent of the ap-
propriate regional military governor.

Gowon and all the military govern-
ors accepted and actually signed the
minutes of these decisions. They are all

= "

nn

il

eel |
any 1 in

) of the administra-
the Mid West _

: bon Benin city, the .

teh
on record and cannot be refu
tape recordings were made

e a

But when Gowon returned’ ’
these decisions were P¥ ut is i
storage on the advice (act?
own account) of his Fedét é
ent secretaries and civil 5g

For Ojukwu this was the the
It led to the setting UP oe Gi
State of Biafra, in May
then issued a decree di
into six regions, the
keeping the existing W® Fs
West, and creating a neW ‘he

It was now argued that te a
of the North would prev
tion of Nigeria by one
ever, the Northern litany
still in control until Mare

To make matters WOlS ip
March rival oil interests C the
and U.S.) have bedeville ‘e
between Biafra and the f@

Oil has now repeal
geria’s main export, and aM ok
tirely in the Eastern and rich 2
regions, both of whic
broken away from fede

Shell-BP are the main
(about 70 percent) mit ;
other foreign oil firms #
ploring. ch
Oil royalties last y& ast
million, of which 9:
percent of oil is prod to
million. This has peeved t ae I
divisions between B Biafra
deral rulers.

It may well be that
is to back the Federal ™
BP, and U.S. strateay ay
But, bearing in min
in the Arab world, Bri
interests are biding ¢ thei 1
this does not preve? ae :
strings from behind the 5 \

r)
a
Some British arms; ee ine
licences were gran ted
ment, have gone t0
U.S. arms have not beé ie
ported. Supplies of arm he
be obtained through h ot
No steps are peing @
to prevent the private @
and even the recruitm
cenaries, to assist
Biafra seems to 5 |
through similar chann
and West Germany:
The volume of
traffic to Nigeria is
cealed. There are aap)
transport planes t4
use or the federal forces: el cot!
These reports ha cm men ot |
by the Federal Gove a aut? fy
but not yet by the Sov! fot the ‘fl
It is not unusual ist © od ’
Union and other Socia ent st ‘
supply arms to indeyt loc sale
aligned with imperial® ogicl
The solution of thé rset
Biafra and the federé al TU ats i ts
rian affair, but also areas) Od
whole. There are a an
signs of disintegral be ae
between and within
states. infla™ i

Despite the preset e ft
tion there coul sce a ao |
al

solution (with patiene in
practised on both sides)
between Biafra am at K
The Biafran proP (Cone ai ,
meeting at Kins as for
take steps to coed by all. “a it,
should be welcom ¢
No matter how ines ent e
on these or similar far PP '
peaceful solutio Hi vi
prolonged an disas serve neh
flict, which can he yale “ft
serious damage to a
and from which ! it
to recover,

a tet e),