UNM EULA |

in which case Yugoslavia would have
become active in its foreign policy only
after the forces of reaction had been
victorious in some of these countries, in
whih case Yugoslavia would have been
able to form a bloc in alliance with
these forces. -

He then said the situation, however,
has changed so fundamentally that it
has become necessary for Yugoslavia to
give up the role of reserve and come to
the forefront, thus becoming the organ-
izer and leader of an alliance of bour-
geois-democratic states which relied on
the U.S. and constituted a military bloc

against the Soviet Union.

Here I want to point out that during
our conversation in Kelebia, Rankovic
stressed that everything he had told me
was part of Tito’s plan and that he was
informing me of this on Tito’s orders.

Plan against democracies
. CHAIRMAN: What was the plan?

RAJK: The plan was that since the
reactionary forces
Democracies had been defeated, Yugo-
slavia herself was to take overt the lead-
ing and organizing role in overthrowing

_ the state order in the People’s Democ-
racies. Tito, however, was of the opinion
that Yugoslavia could not do this openly,

said Rankovic. It would be impossible

since friendship with the Soviet Union
had deep rootS among the Yugoslav
people and the peoples lof the other
People’s Democracies and because of the
strength of the socialist camp. That ‘is
precisely why Tito must mask his policy
and resort to deceit.

According to Rankovic, Tito presented
this deceitful policy as follows: As a re-
sult of the war, or more precisely, as a

_ result of the heroic partisan ‘war of the
Yugoslav people, Yugoslavia enjoys the
admiration of the peoples of the New
Democracies. Tito, therefore, planned,
while keeping up the pretense of friend-

inside the People’s |

ship -with the Soviet Union and the

People’s. Democracies, to use this mag-
netic force, this _popularity, to form
various alliances between Yugoslavia
and the~People’s Democracies. Tito in-
tended to group these countries round
_ Yugoslavia under socialist, people’s de-
- moeratic slogans of friendship with the

- Soviet Union, under the pretext that, in

view of its geographical position, Yugo-
-slavia had an important strategic role
to play against the aggressive policy of
the United States and in general against
the Anglo-Saxon countries. This was to
serve as the main argument in order

to group the remaining countries around

Yugoslavia economically, taking advan-
tage of the country’s popularity for this
purpose.

In the meantime, the establishment of .

alliances was to take place on the basis
of talks with the governments of the
People’s Democracies. Tito, however,
Stressed that at the same time as these
talks were proceeding, it was also ne-
ecessary to take measures to wrest the
democratic forces in the People’s de-
-mocracies from the influence of the So-
viet Union and bring them under the
influene of Tito. This wag to be made
easier by the creation of various Bal-
kan alliances with the help of which’
Tito was to lay the political foundation —
for a single Balkan alliance. And, final,
ly, the last point in this plan was that,
‘Simultaneously with the activities in
these two directions to overthrow the
governments in the People’s Democra-
cies, work was to be conducted on Tito’s
instruction in each of the People’s De-
-mocracies to rapidly consolidate all the
right forces and get them ready for
action so that when the time arrived
they could overthrow the people’s dem-
oeratic governments in power, by armed
action if necessary.

Assigned to Hungary

Chairman: Were you entrusted with
this task as far as Hungary was con-
cerned?

‘Rajk: As far as Hungary was concern-

ed, I was given this task. The Kelebia
Meeting ended in Rankovic promising
“new instructions, He also said there was
‘no need to feel isolated since besides
themselves there were other forces op-
erating in this direction.

In this direction he mentioned the fact
that the Marshall Plan would haye the
effect of making the economic life of
‘the People’s Democracies difficult and

the grounds of economic difficulties

Fa

- fluencing the youth. - :
The Resolution of the Information Bu-

create the prerequisites for bringing
these countries into a united front.

It should be borne in mind, said Ran-
kovéc, that the United States and the
Anglo-Saxon countries in genera] were
steadily intensifying their provocative
war policy. In Hungary and the other
People’s Democracies this would un-
doubtedly have the effect of causing un-
certainty in the minds of politically im-
mature people who would become pan-
icky and try’ to orientate on America.
Rankovic stressed that the British La-
bor Party, the Blum supporters and the
Saragat followers—that is, the right la-
bor leaders and the French and Italian
right social democrats—would start in-
tensified propaganda in support of the
Marshall Plarm and the provocative pol-
icy of the United States.

Chairman: After the Kelebia meeting
did you talk about this with American
officials?

Rajk: Yes. In the spring of 1948 I men-
tioned this-to Chapin, the U.S. ambassa-
dor to Budapest. I told him of my con-
versation with Rankovic in the course
of which Rankovic had stressed that the
United States would try to divert the
Soviet Union's attention and thus pre-
vent it from interfering with the seizure
of power in Hungary.

U.S. envoy okayed Tito

Chairman: What did Chapin say to
this? ; ‘ ae

Rajk: Chapin told me that he knew
of this plan and that the U.S. would
not stand in the way of Yugoslavia’s pol-
icy. After this it became clear to me
that it was not merely for reasons of
personal vanity that Tito wanted to be-
come head of an alliance of states; it
was clear that Tito had submitted his

‘plan to the Americans, that the latter

had approved it or jointly elaborated
it, and that Tito and his government
were merely the executors of thig plan.

Chairman: To what extent was it pos-
sible to realize all this? eee

Rajk: It was not realized. The concen-
tration of reactionary forces could not
be effected because early i spring
of 1948, that is, after the Kelebia
meeting, the workers’ parities started the
unity talks.

The fusion of the two workers’ parties
started a process in the country’s. in-
ternal political life which led to various.
people we had previously placed in cer-
tain posts being removed from them.
Neither could the task be carried out in
the various public organizations because
our agents had been removed from all
spheres. of state life and public organ-
izations, from state institutions, the ar-
my and so on during the re-organization
of the government in the course of 1948.

At the same time, the activities and
propaganda of Catholic reaction led by
Mindszenty, on which Tito had backed
heavily, yielded no results, for when
the schools were handed over to the
state, the strengthened people’s demo-
cratic state deprived Catholic reaction
of one of its main instruments for in-

'

_ reau exposing Tito’s policy dealt a shat-

tering blow to the whole plan. This, in,

Be essence, completed the first phase of

.

Tito’s policy when he wanted to bring
about the overthrow of the people’s de-
mocratic order in the different countries,
while pretending to pursue a policy of
friendship. |

Chairman: But you did carry out some _

activity in the interest of your common
aims, did you not?

-Rajk: My concrete activity was this:
in accordance with instructions I spoke
to Korondy and told him that, in the
event i the members of the government
being arrested, he was to attend to the
formation of a special punitive police
battalion. Korondy received instructions
from me that he would receive all sub-

-sequent orders from Palffy.

Meets with Rankovic
After the publication of the Informa-

_ tion Bureau Resolution—I think it was

in August— Brankov came to me and
told me that Rankovic wanted to meet
me,at all costs'to discuss the situation
that had arisen. I replied that I was
read to meet him but only if he would
come to Hungary and only if our con-
versation remained a secret. Mrazovic-
arranged the meeting with Rankovic:
We met in a forester’s hut. Later I
learmed that Palffy, as head of the Bor-

der guard, had made the necessary pre-
parations for Rankovic’s illegal entry
into Hungary.

Since I do not speak Serbian,,; the
Yugodlav Ambassador Mrazovic acted
as interpreter. Rankovic started by say-
ing that the Resolution of the Infor-
mation Bureau in no way affected the
ultimate aim he had described to me
at Kelebia, that is, the overthrow of
the - People’s Democratic governments,
the establishment of bourgeois democra-
cies, the formation of a union of states
with Yugoslavia as the centre, rélying
on the U.S. against the Soviet Union.

However the methods used to carry out
these tasks would vary according to
circumstances, Life, said Rankovic,
forces us to come out sharply and reso-
lutely in order to realize this program
and three tasks must be arried out in
order to do so.

The first task which falls to the lot
of Yugoslavia itself is to mobilibze the
peoples of Yugoslavia against the Soviet
Union. The second task is to consolidate
and organize the anti-Soviet forces in the
People’s Democracies and prepare the
reactionary forces for action. The third
task is to take advantage of the contra-
dictions between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union and at the appropriate moment,
to overthrow the People’s’ Democratic
government in-Hungary by armed force.

Rankovie went into the following de-
tails in connection with these tasks. A
certain transition period was necessary
before they could openly come out against
the Soviet Union, because, much to their
surprise, the voots of friendship and loy-

' alty to the Soviet Union among the

working masses of Yugoslvia were deep-
er that they had thought, even after
years of Tito propaganda.

A special program wag needed in order
to turn the Yugoslav masses against the
Soviet Union. Rankovic called this pro-
gram the “brilliant” Tito “returning
plan,” by which he meant the plan to
turn the Yugoslav working people’s
friendly attitude toward the Soviet
Union into an anti-Soviet attitude. Ran-
kovic said that Tito, after elaborating
this plan, showed it to Djilas, Kardelj
and to him. They discussed and approved
it.

Under guise of criticisms

The essesence of this plan was to start
out by friendly criticism of the Informa-
tion Bureau Resolution, to pretend thzt
they only wanted to clear up some mis-
understanding with the Soviet Union:
Together with “friendly” criticism they
would even praise the Soviet Union!

Later they would change the tone of
their criticism, begin to describe the In-
formation Bureau Resolution as slan-
der, but still not in a tone hostile to the
Soviet Union and the People’s Democ-
racies. At a later stage they would
blame the Soviet Union, alleging that
‘it wanted to prevent the peoples of Yu-
goslavia from building socialism, want-
ed to divert them from the path leading
to socialism.

This was to be followed by the last
phase of the “returning policy,” when
it was to be pointed out that while the
Soviet Union was preventing the social-
ist development of Yugoslavia, the Un-
ited States was contributing to it. In
this way it was planned to set, the peo-
ples of Yugoslavia against the Soviet
Union. Tito, said Rankovic, estimated
that the western countries would take
up this propaganda and spread it. Tito’s
supporters in the People’s Democracies
were faced with the same task.

Plan revolt against gov't |

Rankovic said that apart from this
propaganda which was to evoke anti-
Soviet sentiments among the masses, it

_ Was necessary to realize that it was not

propaganda that was of decisive signifi-
cance today but the consolidation of re-
actionary elements of all shades, that is,
anti-Soviet elements and fascist ele-

ments,

It was necessary, he said, in the in-
terest of achieving our aim to use all
the means at our disposal and quickly

put them into operation before there —

was any further consolidation in the
People’s Democracies. He therefore
recommended that,in addition to propa-
ganda we should also orientate not only
on the hostile elements: concealed in the
army and the police but also on the old

' fascist, Horthy elements dismissed from

the army.
Rankovie stressed that it was now

(

t

necessary to concentrate on these ele-
ments and to show greater activity than .
hitherto in order to draw the kulaks
ver to our side and to consolidate -
them. Rankovic conveyed Tito’s opinion. ~
that since the publication of the Infor-.
mation, Bureau Resolution there could
no longer be any talk of seizing powen ae
through peaceful channels. 0
The people’s democratic order must ©
be overthrown by armed revolt. In this
connection he stressed that I should fol- —

low the activity of the great western

powers in preparing for these ‘events.
Rankovie said: there is not only the
“brilliant returning policy” to achieve —
the ultimate aim but also policy agreed
between Tito, the United States, Britain
and the western powers in general, in-
cluding the Vatican. This policy aimed at —
overthrowing the governments in the -
People’s Democracies. i

Speaking also on behalf of Tito, Ran-
kovic stressed that armed force was all-
important when overthrowing the state
power. At the beginning of the putsch
to seize power, Tito was prepared to -
send Yugoslav units.

Tito would have attacked

Rankovie further reported that they |
would select the necessary people and >
form various units which would be sta-
tioned on the Hungarian-Yugoslav bor-
dei. So. that these units should remain
unnoticed, they would endeavor to form
them of Hungarians living in Yugosla-
via,! equipping them with Hungarian
uniforms. :

Chairman: Did he offer other military
aid? os

Rajk: Apart from this, when drawing
up his plan Tito took into account the
fascist units made up of former Horthy
and Szalasi followers who were located
in the West, in the Anglo-American zone.
Rankovie said that when he had spoken
to me earlier, they-—-that is, Tito and
Rankovic—had taken steps to contact
the conmmanders of these units.

In view of the fact that Hungary is
separated from these zones by the So- -
viet zone running along the Austrian
border, these units were to reach Hun-
gary from Austria via Yugoslavia; at any
nate when the time arrived for them
to go into action they would be at our.
disposal. So that the concentration of
these forces along the Hungarian border
should not be moticed, Tito elaborated a
special plan which was approved by
Djilas and Kardelj, namely, to revive the
charge of revisionism against Hungary.

Chairman: What «in your opinion
would these fascist and Yugoslav units
have done had they reached Hungarian
ternitory?

_Rajk: At any rate they would have
been extremely brutal toward the demo-
eratic forces. It was in Tito’s plan to
spread the rumor among the Yugoslav
peoples that Hungary, with /the tacit
support of the other People’s Democro-
cies and even the Soviet ‘Union, enter-
tained aggressive intentions against Yu-
goslavia and that it wanted to wrest
from it the territories “inhabited by Hun- ©

-garians. Proceeding from the charge of

revisionism, a series of provocative bor-
der incidents between Hungary and Yu-
goslavia were planned.

Actually, from the end of 1948, the
Yugoslav government in official state-
ments began to accuse Hungary of re-
visionism. For instance, the chairman of

; the Serbian parliament made a state-
ment protesting against the revisionist
. Policy of the Hungarian government. It

was about that time that the Yugoslavs -
started to provoke border incidents
which often ended in Hungarian border
Suards being killed.

_ Chairman: What demands did Ran-
xaeie make on Fuse dy on behalf of
Yugoslavia?

Rajk: Prime Minister Tito and Minis- a9
ters Djilas, Kardelj and Rankovic inn ee
formed me that after ‘the seizure of
power the would demand, first of all,
the right to complete control of the Hun-
garian armed forces, that is, the army
and the police.

With this aim in view, Tito insisted
that Palffy, a man upon whom he could
rely, should become ministen of defense,
and the Yugoslav agent, Antal Rob, min-
ister of the interior. Taking into account
the ultimate aim, that is, the establish=—
ment of a bloc of states, Tito demanded
the subordination of Hungary’s foreign
policy to the Yugoslav government. Fin-_

PACIFIC TRIBUNE — OCTOBER 21, 19149 — PAGE 6