UT Te Wess A ate el alae: pk Hea IB ig! Abridged text “th the speech haa at ‘the San Francisco conference by ANDRE GROMYKO, Soviet delegate ~ 2 Pg ie Goyie delegation considers it necessary at the very outset to ane the importance of the question pertaining to the .peace treaty Japan. The importance can be seen from the fact. that’ many of uagiany represented at the present conference were the object of » Japanese aggression, not to speak of the Chinese People’s Republic, _ the people of which during a long period of time inal to struggle single-handedly against the eae aggressors. ' The Japanese arnry invaded Manchuria in 1931. After a six- year occupation of Manchuria, which was converted’ by Japan into a military base for further aggression on the Asian _conti- ment, militarist Japan in 1937 in- -vaded Central China and occupied vitally important centers. The Chinese people, in the struggle’ against the Japanese aggressor, suffered severe losses both in hu- aman lives and in material values. In 1938 Japan invaded the Sov- jet Union, in the Vladivostok region at Lake Hasan. Although repelled, the Japanese militarists did not abandon their aggressive plans in regard to the Soviet Un- fon. In 1939 Japan again attack- ed Soviet territory in the region of the Mongolian People’s Repub- lic, at Halhingoh, Again repelled, the Japanese militarists nevertheless did not abandon their aggressive plans in respect to the ‘Soviet Union, did not conceal the fact they set as their aim seizure of the Sov- iet Far East. A number of other states in Asia and the Far East, including — India, Burma, Indonesia and the Phillippines. have suffered from Japenese aggression. Finally, the people of the United States also know! what Japanese aggression means, since the at- tack on Pearl Harbor. is. still fresh in their memories. This attack widened the scope of Jap- anese aggression. After this at- tack the Japanese militarists in- vaded a number of other countries in Asia and the Far ‘East. The war enveloped all Asia. It was “necessary for the powers to exert united effort in order to save the independence of the countries attacked by the Japanese aggres- sor and to create conditions for the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East. Many countries of Asia and the Far East suffered great losses while fighting for their national’ inde- pendence against the Japanese militarists. 4 All this goes to show that it is high time to make use of ‘the conditions created as a result of © . the defeat of the Japanese agegres- sor to establish peace in the Far -East. Guided by this fact the Soviet Union has repeatedly pro- posed to undertake practical ‘steps providing for the solution of this task. In the course of recent years it proposed to ac- celerate the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union has always proceed- ed, and is proceeding, from the fact that peace should be demo- cratic, conforming to the inter- ests of the people, and not imper- ialistic, profitable only for certain circles of insatiable imperialists, Hence, we should consider. such a peace treaty and such a'peace settlement with Japan as would not permit the rebirth of Japan- ese militarism and would provide for peace and security for all countries of. Asia and the Far Hast, 7 Interested in this are‘not only countries which have suffered from Japanese aggression, but the Japanese people itself, which is paying for the crimes com- mitted by Japanese. militarists. The national interests of the Japanese people require that there should exist peaceful re- 4 pirate abl a TT lations between Japan and other | nations, and first and foremost with its | neighboring. countries, | In considering the question ‘of the peace treaty with Japan, first of all arises the ‘question—What are the principles ‘which should serve as a basis for this treaty? How to provide for the preven- tion of Japan being again con- verted into an aggressive state? How to achieve that the fate of Japan should’ not again fall into the hands of militarists who are already raising their heads un- abashedly, openly declaring their plans for revenge? This task can be successfully ‘ resolved if the conference parti- cipants will proceed from the principles which found. their ex- pression in well known interna- tional agreements. This concerns first of all such agreements as ‘the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Yalta Agreement of 1945, un- der which the \U:S., Britain, China and the Soviet Union undertook specific obligations both as re- garded completion of the war with Japan and the transfornia- tion of Japan ~ into a maacetul democratic state. ; : This concerns also such, agree- ments as the United Nations De- claration of January 1, 1942, un- der which the UN undertook obli- gations not to conclude a sep- arate peace with enemy states, including Japan, and the decis- ions of the Far Eastern | Com- * mission—having as its members the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, China, France, The “Netherlands, Canada, - Australia, New Zealand, India and the Phil-: ippines—on the basic policy with regard to Japan to be adopted after the end of the war. The Potsdam Declaration sit the resolutions of the Far East- ; ern Commission on the basic - policy in regard to Japan pro- vide for eradication of Japanese militarism and prevehtion of con-— ditions which would permit the CO TE TG P, ’ OUELLETTE tt Tr Tt Tin Ti rebirth of militarism in. Japan. The Far Ea8tern Commission decision of June 19, 1947, “Basic Policy in Regard to Japan After its Capitulation,” imposes on Ja- pan, for example rigid restric- tions’ in’ respect to. its armed forces, The Potsdam Declaration points out the necessity to elimi- ‘nate the power and influence of thosé who deceived and misled the people of Japan. It also shows the necessity to take measyres to prevent Japan from rearming and sion foliowang es path of conquest. ‘varanasi y the Soviet Union didn’t si the Japanese ‘teeatel e rie PUL ELLIE LLU ORL IC OUI anti Met nei et Tee emanennpANN NN anne Onn : ft ‘ Thus, demilitarization is one of the principal tasks which should be resolved by the peace treaty with Japan. This. first -of all means that the treaty should in- Clude provisions restricting the strength of Japan’s armed forces —land, naval and air. It goes without ‘saying "that after conclusion of the peace treaty, all occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japan and her territory should not be: used for the maintenance of for- eign military bases. Absence ‘in the peace treaty of ‘a specific and clear indication to that effect would contradict the very aim of a peace settlement with Japan which should lead to the re-estab- lishment of her sovereignty, and would also contradict the inter- ests of the fonin tenance of race in the Far East. @. The above-mentioned agree- ments of the powers provide for transformation of Japan into a democratic state. dam . Declaration it is directly . Stated that “the Japanese govern- ment shall remove all obstacles” to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.” It is also said there * that “there shall be establishedy ‘freedom. of speech, religion and thought, as well as- respect for the fundamental hu- man rights.” In the decisions of the Far Eastern Commission it is stated ” that “the Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop its, in- clinations for individual freedoms and respect for the fundamental human rights,especially the free- dom of religion, assembly and as- sociation, speech and of the press. It shall. also be encouraged to form democratic and representa- tive organizations.” Such is the second vital task. - set -by the powers already during * the time of war with Japan—the task of the democratization of Japan. The purpose for ‘setting this task is ‘quite clear. Militar-. ist Japan was ruled by a reaction-~ ary clique. The entire political and .social life was undér the control of this clique and the big Japanese trusts—Mitsubisi, Mit- sui and others which sprpon ed it. It follows, therefore, Fiabe the task of the demilitarization of { Japan and the prevention of the — ‘rebirth of Japanese militarism is closely interlinked with the task of the. democratization of the political ‘and social life of the country, with the task of estab- lishing in Japan a democratic or- . der under which the fate of the country would not depend on the arbitrariness of a group of: re- actionary militarists. In the, Pots-_ ’ cheap labor of the Japanese work like form of redeeming the dam-_ _ since these countries have a SUR PACIFIC TRIBUNE _ SEPTEMBER by, 1981 — PAGE < : _ Japan and the. development %% claims of a number of states t0 be much easier for Japan to 40 i ’ Of great importance in rae nection with preparation of AP peace treaty are the question pertaining ‘to the development © Japanese economy. It is known Pies that in the past this economy — served the purposes of pe circles. Its development was dir- ected in such a way as to prepare 4 the Japanese industry and agth : eulturesto satisfy war needs. The . basic resources of the industry and agriculture were used for ie ne production of armaments, am es strategic material, and not f0F the needs of the civil population. rig This means the Japanese peace treaty must not place ee in the path of the developmen” of. peaceful Japanese economy: fe This principle has already been formulated in the Potsdam De claration. Is it necessary to awell at length on the fact that providing for an unlimited ‘development 4 its foreign trade is corresnondiake ; ‘not only to the interests of th@ maintenance of peace in the Far East and establishment of good- neighbor relations between Japan -and other states, particularly those neighboring with it, DU also corresponds to the interest he of the Japanese people? Such 2. development of Japan’s economy ie would for the ‘first time open before the Japanese people oe - opportunity for an improve of its welfare. Objection to including stich clauses in the treaty can only come from those who try ths st strangle Japanese economy: Be make it dependent on the inter ests of foreign. monopolies. Ob- jection to inclusion of such clauses can only come from thos? who strive to direct the develop ment of Japanese economy 20% for the satisfaction of eee , Tequirements of normal economic » relations of Japan with other — states, but for the militarization - of Japan, for the adaptation of . its economy. to the cherished plans of certain great powers 10h i a new war in the Far East. AS healthy, peaceful ‘Japanes? economy would permit Japan satisfy easily the legitimate — compensate for damage calnsel by Japanese aggression. It woul this than to pay for the damage by directly using the labor of the Japanese population, as it is! provided for by the American British draft. . oun -It is not difficult to understand what ihas prompted such a pro> posal. It has been prompted: bY © the desire to make use of the — er and peasant, without any Te gard to the’ fact that this slavery” age caused ‘by Japan would divert a “considerable part of its. pro-- ductive forces., It is profitable not for the countries. which are legitimately claiming redemptio? | — for damages jnflicted on them — plus of manpower. But it Jai profitable to certain great powers © which want to benefit at the expense of Japan’s cheap labor. — The peace treaty with Japao should naturally, resolve a num — ber of territorial, questions. py this respect as well the United — States, Britain, China and the Continued on next page