|
|
(
‘
|
|

|
j

i"

"

»
;
)

)
.
|
|

|

|
|

i

4
\

y

u
; =U
Pal

c

Compulsory Arbitration

—Federal Minister of Labor, John Nicholeson

“I have not been in this office long enough to be able to say whether ‘the solution lies $
in the establishment of arbitration or of labor courts, such as those that have been set up in.
Australia and other countries of the world. The answer may lie in that kind of action because,
while they have had a divided success, on the whole they have been successful.”

How it works in Australia

HE most ardent supporters of the system of com-
pulsory arbitration in Australia are those people
whose wages and working conditions are not

determined within that system.

ki These include employers, politicians, judges, “top
Tass” functionaries of the state, newspaper editors
and some of the leadership of the trade unions.

This does not mean that the system is entirely
Without Support from the trade union movement as a
Whole or from the working class in general. But sup-
Port from these quarters is substantially qualified and
to 2 Considerable degree stems from the fact that the
“mons obtain an essential legal status from the laws
which establish and maintain the arbitration system.

These laws are varied and have their origin in
“’gislation of the Commonwealth and each of the six
state governments. The wage-fixing and penal tribun-
als established under these laws vary. Some consist
entirely of judges. drawn from the ranks of the legal
Practice—barristers with a minimum period of prac-
tice — while others consist of laymen and include
Persons drawn from the ranks of the union officials.

_ But the main body of these laws has certain com-
mon features which, despite variations and differing

Composition of the tribunals operating under them, -

8ive them common purposes. These purposes and the
°peration of these laws are unaffected by the presence

of former trade union officials on the arbitration
tribunals. :

Furthermore, the presence of these former trade
ton officials has not prevented the leading trade
1/0N organizations in Australia, including the Austra-
a Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the national
ies union centre, from attacking the operation of
w€ system and more particularly many of the -deci-
Slons of the varying arbitration and penal bodies.

A veritable library of works dealing with compul-
Sory arbitration has been published in Australia. The
analysis and conclusions in these publications differ
according to the Class position of the authors. The
xperience ‘of the workers and the many decisions
made by their trade union organizations, however,
Show that compulsory arbitration in Australia is an

integral part of the state appartus established for
the Purpose of:

t * Controlling and restricting the rate of wages and
the level of working conditions, i.e., assisting to
vane that labor power is paid for at less than its
alue, se

eae Exercising control over trade unions and by a

Series of penal powers directed at unions and individ-
< officers and members, restrict and virtually abolish
e

right to strike.

Experience shows that, without fail, the various
tribunals pursue these purposes. That they do not
rntirely succeed is due solely to successful resistance
y the workers and the unions. It is only. this resist-
"ce which prevents the system from serving in full
he purposes of the employers in the inevitable strug-

a

le between capital and labor over the price to be

Paid for labor power.

ede more highly organized and politically devel-
e

d sections of the workers and trade unions oppose

L. J. McPhillips

Member of the Central Committee of the
‘Communist Party of Australia.

~~

compulsory arbitration and in. fact seek to obtain
satisfaction of their wage and other demands outside
the system and the tribunals by use of their organized
strength and various forms of collective bargaining.

Sometimes this takes the form of industry-wide
campaigns conducted on a coordinated basis in the
work places or campaigns in individual work places.
It also takes the form of formal and official negotia-
tions for legalized agreements enforceable at law.

The need for these efforts outside the arbitration

System arises from the fact that the wage rates fixed

by the arbitration tribunals are very much lower than

the amounts needed to meet workers’ living costs.

The value of these efforts is revealed by the fact that
the rates obtained by direct action and collective
bargaining are in excess of the rates fixed for the
same work by the arbitration tribunals.

For example, the Boilermakers’ Society is a union
whose members and officials have frequently clashed
with the arbitration authorities, and a recent survey
(taken on Jan. 5, 1966) reveals that the average rate
paid to boilermakers is $8.42 (Australian) higher than
the rate fixed by the arbitration tribunal. The same
can be said for a large range of other occupations
filled by workers who do not confine themselves to
arbitration to determine their wage rates.

The success of these activities and the concern of
employers at the danger of arbitration being under-
mined are revealed in a special circular issued by one
of the employers’ organizations in May of of this year.

Headed “A Warning to All Employers”, it draws
attention to a record number of strikes in 1964 and
1965 and goes on to warn that trade union policy “is
to by-pass our arbitration system and instead to use
direct action.’” :

To offset this it proposes three “simple steps”:
“Firstly, do not negotiate directly with the unions,”
secondly, report any claims the unions make, and
thirdly: “Remember the old axiom... united we’ stand,
divided we fall.”

This amazing document reveals very clearly the

' employers’ panic at any development which tends to

undermine the processes of the system of compulsory
arbitration. It also is an attempt to strengthen opposi-
tion of the employers to paying wage rates in excess
of those decided by the arbitration tribunals. This
stems not only from a desire to pay no more for
labor power than the legal minimum, but also from
the fact that the extent of payment in excess of the
rates prescribed by the arbitration tribunals is very
frequently and successfully used by the unions t

have the arbitrated rates increased.
No system of arbitration can eliminate the contest ~

between capital and labor, and compulsory arbitration
in Australia is no exception. Some official figures
published by the Commonwealth Government Statis-

*

tician covering strikes in which 10 man-days or more
are involved help to show this:

In the. year ending December, 1952, there were
1,627 such strikes recorded and these involved a
total of 505,734 workers. In 1961, a year of economic
recession in Australia, the number of such dispute _
dropped to 815 and the workers involved 300,357.
But in 1964 the disputes numbered 1,334 and the
workers involved 545,628 and in 1965 the respective
figures were 1,345 strikes involving 475,014 workers.

\ There are many disputes over wages and working
conditions which do not reach the stage of actual
strike action. In many cases the workers resort to
forms of action short of strikes, such as short stop-
work-meetings, extended lunch time meetings, bans and-
limitations on overtime, restriction of output, etc.

These actions are not included in the official figures
quoted above.

Control over the unions is exercised by a number
of means, which include: compulsory registration of
union rules; prescribed conditions to be included in the
rules; power of the arbitration authorities to invali-
date rules; power to direct alteration of rules; power
to actually alter the rules of a union contrary to its
desires; power to fine and imprison individuals and
to fine unions for breaches of orders made by the
arbitration authorities.

- This latter power is very extensive and is incessant-
ly invoked by the employers per medium of a very
simple and quick acting process. A strike is threat-
ened; the employers seek and almost without excep-
tion obtain an order directing the union to refrain
from strike action; the union proceeds with the strike;
the employers’ ask the court to fine the union for
contempt. In these proceedings the merit of the dis-
pute leading to the strike action is of no account. The
extent of these penal powers is revealed by two edicts
on which the penalizing authorities act: a strike is
any form of action taken in concert by employees
without the permision of the employer, and the super-
vision and control of unions is vested by the law in
the arbitration authorities.

Use by the employers of these very convenient
powers has robbed union funds of hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in fines and heavy legal costs.

All this prompts the question: “Why don’t the
unions withdraw from arbitration?’ The principal
answer to this is that registration under the arbitra-
tion acts is the means by which unions obtain a legal
entity with the power to prosecute for failure of the
employer to pay prescribed wage rates and all the :
other legal rights necessary for a union organization
in a capitalist society. As a result even those unions
which do not accept the arbitration tribunals as the
final authority on their wage and other demands and
which proceed to prosecute their demands by means
outlawed by the arbitration acts, do not seek to with-
draw from registration under those acts.

Despite all the guff about the benefits of arbitration
in Australia, the workers and their unions do not
rely on this system for satisfaction of their demands,
and only their deliberate resistance prevents this
system from achieving its main purpose of controlling _
and limiting wage rates and hog-tying the unions to -
the state machine. é

August 26, 1966—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 3