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1964

WA DOCUMENTARY -- PART 11

THE WESTERN CANADIAN LUMBER WORKER

UNION POLITICAL ACTION VITAL
TO PROTECT WORKERS’ RIGHTS

an
WwW HY does the IWA support trade union political action?”

This question is often asked by those who think that the Union
should deal exclusively with wages and working conditions. The
answer is simple. The fight for bargaining rights and. contract gains
made political action imperative. It was not possible for the Union to
“stay out of politics” and serve the interests of the woodworkers
effectively. It could no more neglect its political responsibilities than
it could neglect its bargaining responsibilities. They went together
like brick and mortar. Either, without the other, would have been
pointless. Since its foundation, every IWA convention has been com-
pelled to reckon with legislation, usually inspired by the employers,
which threatened to nullify the value of gains secured on the economic
front.

It has been stated repeatedly on behalf of the Union by those
with negotiating responsibilities: “We must also act in the political
field because that is where we must go to safeguard the prime ob-
jectives of the Union. In the early days, the battleground was on the
picket lines and at the plant gates. Now, the major battleground is
the legislative halls of the nation.

“We must take political action for the same reason that our
people in the early days faced company goons and prison for union
activity. We have won some protection against vigilantism. Now, the
organized employers have decided that the place to cripple trade
union strength is on the legislative field. They’re putting millions into
the effort. We’re not forming a labor party, but we will encourage
our members fo use their franchise to elect legislators who are friendly
to the ideals and purposes of the trade unions.”

It was just as simple as that.

The Union’s first political battle was in defense of the 1935 Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act). This Act, which made col-
lective bargaining the policy of the United States, was under heavy
fire from the organized employers. Even after the law was declared
constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, the powerful lobby of the
National Association of Manufacturers exerted pressure on Congress
to repeal or amend the law which guaranteed labor's basic rights.

ClO and AFL unions joined at first in forming Labor’s Non-Partisan
League, but on the West Coast the IWA mainly supported the program
of the Commonwealth Federation which sought to influence the election
of candidates pledged to support labor's aims. The IWA took an active
part in the defeat of an anti-labor governor who had condoned ruth-
less strike-breaking tactics. IWA officials were also active in pressing
for enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938, which placed a
floor under wages and a ceiling over hours of work.

Approval of his New Deal legislation led the IWA, together with
other CIO unions, to support the re-election of President Roosevelt in
1940. When Congress passed the War Labor Disputes Act, 1943, the
IWA in protest supported the CIO Political Action Committee to seek
more effective political expression. This form of organization was
necessary as the Act prohibited contributions by unions in federal
elections. With the slogan, “Every Worker a Voter,” the IWA, as part
of the CIO-PAC, played an active part in the re-election of President

Roosevelt in 1944.

The political strength demonstrated by the Union was recognized
during World War Il, when IWA representatives were appointed to
important wartime agencies dealing with emergent problems of wage
stabilization and production requirements. Political pressure was nec-
essary to secure wage increases and contract improvements as well as
to resist the employers‘ attempts to break down established conditions.
Political activity was largely responsible for substantial gains made
during this period.

The Taft-Hartley Act, 1947, gave American trade unions a stern

on the need for political action. It imposed a series of rigid
restrictions on legitimate trade union activities. As stated by the Union,
it was designed to “destroy labor unions, degrade living standards,
and extinguish basic rights.” It was admitted by members of Congress:

“It covers about aise: aaa of the matters pressed upon us very
employers” and “the Bill was written sentence by

Sentence and paragraph by paragraph by the National Association of

Manufacturers.”

i President S. Truman vetoed the Taft-Hartley Bill but his veto

. De eiten by Congress. He declared on that occasion: “This bill

buld kening our trade union movement... |
ve ved ‘ip seopegpe is secs threat to the successful working

society.

With reference to a clause in the bill authorizing the issuance of
temporary injunctions forbidding strikes, President Truman ‘said: “This
would thwart the entire purpose of the National Labor Relations Act
in establishing the Board, which purpose was fo confer on the Board,
rather than the courts, the power to decide complex questions of fact
in a special field requiring expert knowledge. This provision of the
bill is clearly a backyard step toward old abuses of the labor in-

junction. No similar provision directed against employers can be
found in the bill.”

The IWA, together with other CIO unions, through the PAC, en-
gaged in an intensive political action campaign and made the Act
a major campaign issue in the 1948 general election. President Tru-
man and the Democrats promised the repeal of the Taft-Hartley
Act if victorious. They won the election, in a major political upset, and
labor rejoiced, anticipating that this infamous law was on its way
out. The rejoicing was premature, for the employers’ influence on
Congress prevailed.

The Taft-Hartley Act paved the way for the enactment of “right-
to-work” laws in a number of states which banned the recognized
forms of union security. This required political action at the state level
by the Union, which succeeded in those states where labor had or-
ganized political strength. At the same time, action was necessary
within State jurisdiction to secure adequate labor laws such as those
governing Industrial Accident Insurance.

The AFL-CIO merger provided a national framework for political
action, the Committee of Political Education (COPE). This gained the
official support of the IWA, as an AFL-CIO affiliate. Three major phases
of political action have been stressed by COPE—registration, education
and expression of opinion.

IWA Local Unions became active in the job of persuading workers
to register and vote. The task of checking voters’ lists against member-
ship rolls proved to be an immense task, but in many centers was
assumed cheerfully. The Union‘s educational program stressed the
importance of political action. Steps were taken by the Union publica-
tions to inform the membership of the voting records of candidates
seeking re-election. Perhaps, of the greatest importance, the Union’s
membership exercised the constitutional right of stating publicly what
they believed to be right in the interests of the people and the nation.

A basic feature of the program was the initiation of the Union’s
members into significant community service on an organized basis.
The training of unionists for effective participation in community serv-
ices has proved the importance of their contribution. Training in this
field has opened outlets for community service which has won public
confidence for those members who have qualified for positions of
leadership. It has shown that the interests of the Union coincide with
those of the community.

Disquieting disclosures of alleged corruption in a few unions led
to the enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959. It introduced an unprecedented intervention by govern-
ment in union affairs.

Some features of this Act placed an administrative burden on
the IWA, despite its demonstration of adherence to democratic prin-
ciples. Other features of the Act provided additional opportunities
for employers to harass unions engaged in strike activities. Signifi-
cantly, the passage of this Act by Congress indicated a change in the
political climate adversely affecting trade unions. The National As-
sociation of Manufacturers seized on the theme of “labor monopoly
power” to launch a nation-wide campaign designed to weaken union
strength and provide the basis for further union-crippling legislation.
The IWA has seen this campaign as a distinct threat to collective bar-
gaining for better wages and working conditions. The issue will be
fought out on the political field.

Developments in American legislation had an important influence
on Canadian labor legislation, mainly enacted in that country under
provincial jurisdiction. The Canadian counterpart of the NAM, the
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, projected NAM anti-labor pro-
posals into Canadian politics, and exerted heavy pressures on the
provincial legislatures. Compulsory conciliation became general and
in many instances compulsory arbitration was submitted for strike
action. Situations which developed in British Columbia and. Newfound-
land illustrate the reasons why Canadian woodworkers now attach
greater importance to political action.

In British Columbia the laws affecting labor were so amended
as fo provide for government intervention during disputes in a manner

See “POLITICAL ACTION” — Page 10