everywhere. armed detachments of workers, called the Red Guard, were being formed. Zinovyev and Kamenyev, who were still against the uprising, resorted to direct treachery by publishing an art- icle in one of the newspapers, in which they named the exact time of the up- rising. Warned in this way, the Prov- isional Government took urgent meas- ures to suppress the imminent Revolu- tion. Army units most loyal to the gov- ernment were moved from the front. Kamenyev and Zinovyev wrote in the newspaper that the uprising would start after the Second Congress of Soviets, scheduled to open on October 25, but the Central Committee decided to start it earlier, on the 24th. The up- rising Centre was headquartered in Smolny, a former institute for the daughters of the nobility, and it was here that Lenin arrived in the evening of October 24 in order to direct the up- rising personally. On a command from the headquart- ers, the Red Guard units seized the key positions and cut off approaches to Petrograd so as to block the way for the troops coming in from the front. On the night of the 24th all government buildings, including the Winter Palace, site of the Provisional Government, were surrounded. By the morning of the 25th the Provisional Government was overthrown and on the 26th the Winter Palace was taken by storm and __ Rises the pilot Five-Point Stor, ja, salutel Not to your lands, ~~ But to your deathless workingclass Who broke the spears of all the Tsars Upe breasts, thot we might aunted doys and harried ways, hounded slaves who breathe all the former ministers were arrested. The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which opened on October 25, 1917, (the first took place in June), pro- claimed Soviet Power and adopted its first Decrees, chief of which were the Decree on Peace and the Decree on giving the land over to the peasants, The first Soviet Government was form- ed, called the Council of People’s Com- missars, and headed by Vladimir Lenin. On November 2, armed uprising was victorious in Moscow. In 1918 Moscow was made capital of Russia. From Oc- tober 1917 to January-February 1918, the Socialist Revolution won over most of the territory of the former Russian empire. The beginning of the Civil War and the intervention The exploiting classes overthrown by the October Revolution, and the de- feated counter-revolutionary parties \ 9904 - ME OCTOBER DAYS -~ JAUAIRI DIF AY — \A? db redmavowl began a struggle against the new power by means of economic boycott and open revolt. Internal counter-revo- lution was heavily supported, material- ly and morally, from abroad. Later the Entente and the USA started their in- tervention. In order to preserve the gains of the Revolution and to cope with counter- revolution, it was crucial for Soviet Russia to disentangle herself from the World War. Therefore, following the refusal of the Entente Governments to discuss the Soviet Government’s pro- posals on concluding peace and termi- nating the war, Russia began separate iegotiations with Germany which end- ed by the conclusion in March 1917 of a humiliating Brest Peace Treaty. In this way Russia avoided a final milita- ry debacle and won badly needed time to create a new army to fight the coun- ter-revolution, September and October 1919 were the most critical months for Soviet Russia since the revolution. But. by 1920 the young Soviet Republic had defeated the last shock troops of the counter-revolution and intervention, the West-armed 740,000 strong Polish Army, and an 150,000 man army of General Wrangel in the Crimea. Russia paid a heavy price for its victory. Eight million people had suf- fered because of the Civil War and intervention imposed upon the newly- born country; 112,000 were killed by the White Guards and the interveniion- ists in prisoner camps and in jails. Three million were left homeless.- The total damage was estimated at 50,000,- 000,000 gold roubles (about $26,000,000, - 000 at the exchage rate of chat time). By late 1920, Russia’s industrial output stood at 20 percent the pre-war level and agricultural output at 50 percent. A Passage to Peaceful Construction In 1920, Russia’s Electrification Plan was adopted. It had been worked out by a State Commission set up specially for the purpose, which included more than 200 prominent specialists. The electrification program, abbrevi- ated GOELRO, from the first letters of its Russian name, covered for the first time in Russian history, not only the centre of Russia, but also the Urals, the Volga area, Middle Asia, the Cau- casus, Siberia and the Far North. The fulfilment of this plan was the chief factor that enabled Russia to re- habilitate most of its economy by 1925 when the gross output reached 90-95 percent of the pre-war level. In 1926 this level was surpassed. On the whole, Russia’s economy was rehabilitated after the Civil War under the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP), which lifted the war-time re- strictions on private trade, small and middle sized capitalist enterprizes. The agricultural surplus requisitioning sys- tem was replaced by a fixed tax, which permitted the peasants, once the tax was delivered, to sell surplus products freely. This led to the tightening of economic links between town and countryside. Although some freedom was given under NEP for capitalist elements, the big industry, transport, the credit and monetary.- system and an unlimited right of control and regulation re- mained in the hands of the state. The NEP and the fulfilment of the GOELRO plan paved the way for the industrialization of the economy of Soviet Russia, a course which was adopted by the Party’s 14th Congress in 1925. The fact that this course, was adopted permitted Russia to avoid de- pendence on the West and, as history was later to demonstrate, to win the war with Hitler’s Germany. By 1927 Russian industry was e€x- pending at an annual rate of 18 per- cent. Successes in industry permitted the launching of vast socialist transforma- tion in agriculture. The program, known as collectivization, was adopted by the 15th Congress of the Party in December 1927. © as, ~ N SEPTEMBER 1, 1939 Germany, by her attack on Poland, unleash- ed the Second World War, which was immediately joined by France and Britain. At that time the USSR and Germany were bound by a non-aggres- sion pact, which the Soviet Union had been obliged to conclude after the British and French governments had deliberately disrupted the Anglo- Franco-Soviet negotiations for collec- tive security“ in Europe. It was no secret to Moscow that sooner or later the German fascists would attack the USSR, since aggres- sion against the USSR was inherent in the foreign policy line of the Third _ Reich. But to refuse under those cir- cumstances to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany would have been to bring grist to the mill of those forc- es in Britain, France and the USA who plotted to plunge the USSR and Ger- many into a war with each other. Be- sides, the conclusion of the Soviet- German treaty in a way obviated the danger of the formation of a united front of the fascist powers with the most reactionary forces of the West- _ern countries. But Hitler was not long in breaking the agreement with the USSR. On the night of June 22, 1941, German forces, without. declaring war, crossed the Soviet borders. At the same time Luft- waffe planes began to rain bombs on border garrisons and peaceful Soviet cities. Taking advantage of the surprise factor, the Hitler armies began to ad- vance deep into Soviet territory. From the very first hours of the war the Ger- man army encountered more deter- mined resistance than on any of the earlier fronts. A case in point was the heroic defense of the Brest fortress on the westernmost frontier of the USSR, whose few survivors now traditionally meet in Victory Day on its ruins to honor the almost 3,000 men who died in its defense. The German forces rushed against the fortress outnumbered its defenders 10 to 1. The nazis launched the storm of the fortress in the morning of June 22, soon bringing up fresh troops and air units. But even on June 30 they still continued to meet with bitter re- sistance from the few Soviet soldiers who had not fallen victim to artillery shelling and air bombardments. Being better prepared for the war, with the resources of virtually all oc- cupied Europe behind it, the Hitler army scored substantial gains in the first stage of the war. Putting down the resistance of the numerically weak- er Soviet forces, the nazis continued to march on eastward, towards Mos- cow. Causes of early setbacks What were the reasons for the un- preparedness of the USSR for the war with Germany in June 1941? The an- swer cannot be limited to the personal errors made by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet High Command of that time. There were other, more weighty and objective reasons for the early reverses suffered by the Soviet army. The Soviet defense industry was just beginning to take shape when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Before that the entire resources of the country had to be used to restore its economy ruined by the First World War, the Civil. War and the intervention of the November 4, 1967+—~ PACH T _in the whole of the war iP th Western powers in Russia afte October Revolution. Ct At the outbreak of nostiliti® cake ny enjoyed a great prepot 1 tt ‘ armed forces. Against a SOV. asam of 4.2 million men, Hitler BA agi™ lion troops with two yen we ind tH me perience in Europe beh 4 plat ey h factor of surprise too ha part. On the very first June 22, 1941, some 900 fi were destroyed on Soviet fields and many lines of com r) were cut, interfering with we interaction of the Soviet fo% The winter campaign % 7 Measures to reinforce — jf The German High Comm me Germans but taking UP sc! offensive. The victory at ‘ important not only militat! ve more so from the point 0” | sali effect on the morale 0 he ring sides. For this was t man army sustained a 5€ (During the nearly thre? 9 fighting near Moscow the | on | es put out of action 38 ors sions.) e This success was largely a Dm strong effort made by thé, ay | ernment to mobilize all i the ae resources for the needs ©) alli) Women and children took pall the men leaving for t as | The peasants in the ets gions put in a double ame ast, to make up for the lost acre ne used to yield almost half Ti al i harvest and an even Di of dairy products. we New industrial centres \s ily created in the 18 Siberia, Kazakhstan a? Republics of Asia, with plants in the territories i the enemy evacuated ther 1942, the Soviet rear more than the whole r) A fore the war. - 108 Ae The first year of the “ ne ot ie ilitary plans ae. only the military p dots : t i] temporary reverses of ¢ e the Russian rear failed peasantry, far from in8 against Soviet power t0_ 14 DY fh collectivization, manifest gov their total support of ¢ La effort. ~< of oh From the very outbre? 4 yp? a partisan and underBror’ realy sprang up in the en€™? "inf jf summer of 1942 no pe man divisions had t geal from the front line 1 ress! partisans, The prutal es, ticed by the forces © Pe. strengthened popular eS despite the fact that a hanged every Soviet cl tive of sex and age, of aiding the partisa? down complete village |, their population. In th. anian village of Pirch ed and all women, men were burned alivé During the whole ° than a million people