On April 29, 1984 Sudan's dictatorial regime of President
Gaafar Nimeiri imposed a State of Emergency on the country
following a series of mass strikes and open popular discontent.
This action coincided with U.S. arms delivery and the deploy-
ment of 12,000 troops under a 1977 joint defence agreement.

In a recent Tribune interview with a member of the Com-
munist Party of Sudan, several misconceptions about the
situation in his country portrayed in the western media were
challenged. He also provided this background to events in
Sudan and the region.

* * *

One misconception is that the general popular move-
ment in Sudan is simply a reaction to the imposition of
Islamic law by the Nimeiri regime in September 1983.

Rather than being, as the Western press suggests, a
“religious conflict’’, the development of the popular
movement, especially since January, 1984 reflects its
rapid growth largely due to the efforts of the Communist
Party (CPS) resulting in the broadening of the National
Democratic Front and the trade unions.

At the same time, the armed movement in the south
has declared its Marxist-Leninist orientation and its
open relations with the CPS.

Another misconception is that the problem in southern
Sudan was, is and remains a separatist, Christian, pan-
African movement which functions in complete isolation
from the movement in the north.

The movement in southern Sudan has always been
called a separatist movement in the western media. This
was true from 1956 until 1972 when some concessions
were given and some autonomy granted.

However, disappointment soon set in as it became
obvious to the people that nothing had changed. The
pan-African leadership in the south soon found itself
incorporated into the regime and isolated from the
people.

In 1976-77 a new leadership emerged in the south
around the slogan of a united, socialist Sudan. They
called for close ties with the CPS and the National
Democratic Front. They made it clear they were not in
favor of separation and were opposed to exploitation and
U.S., Saudi and Egyptian intervention and mobilized the
people around these aims.

Thirdly, the role of the U.S. in Sudanese politics is
glossed over, as is the joint defence pact signed in 1977
between the U.S., Egypt, Sudan and later joined by
Somalia and Oman.

This ‘‘defence pact,’’ originally aimed against the

People’s Democratic Republic of Yeman, is now being
employed to prop up all participants’ regimes in the
region, all of them extremely shakey, and without popu-
lar support. It was this ‘‘defence’’ agreement that was
used in April, 1984 to save the Nimeiri regime from its
own people.

These developments created a new, difficult situation
for the regime. On March 17, the government fabri-
cated a ‘‘Libyan bombing”’ incident and on March 18,
under the joint defence agreement, 12,000 joint forces
troops were deployed — 6,000 in the capital, Khartoum,
and 6,000 in the south.

These are the real reasons for the State of Emergency.

Process of Polarization

The popular movement in Sudan started in 1971, the
moment the regime shifted to the right. In that year there
was a massacre of left forces. Three-quarters of CPS
members were executed. The rebuilding process began
and lasted until 1977. In that year the popular movement
grew and matured as did the trade-union movement.

At the same time, in 1977, the United States, through
Egypt’s Sadat, began to put pressure on Nimeiri to unify
all right-wing forces and this was achieved under the
name of *‘ National Reconciliation’’ which incorporated
the main right-wing parties into a single ruling party, the
Sudan Socialist Union.

This marked the beginning of a clear polarization in
Sudan. All right forces were within the regime and only
the left forces remained in opposition.

1977 also witnessed an increased U.S. hand in
Sudanese affairs. That year the joint defence pact was
signed. Also in 1977 we saw the first open involvement of
the International Monetary Fund in Sudan.

Classic IMF Recipe

The IMF issued classic orders: no state-owned agri-
culture and industry; trim the public sector; open the
economy to foreign investment. The IMF has been shap-
ing Sudan’s economic policy since 1977.

Today the people see that the economic collapse of
Sudan’s economy is due to IMF and U.S. policies and
penetration. Here are some concrete results:

e The Sudanese pound has dropped by 82 per cent

since 1978;

e Sudan’s foreign debt has risen to $14-billion (U.S.)
from $1-billion in 1976.

e 68 per cent of the country’s export earnings today
go toward foreign debt payment;

Kberouc *

SUDAN |

e Large tracts of land, formerly used to produce food
have been turned over to cotton production causin
mass peasant displacement and growing hunger;

e The currency devaluation and rising import prices
have caused a dramatic rise in consumer prices.

This U.S.-IMF penetration and the ensuing econo
collapse has, added to the political-military penetration, |
contributed to the polarization of Sudanese polities
today. :

Regime’s Dilemma

This is the background to the April 29 State
Emergency imposed by the regime. It was due to
acceleration of actions co-ordinated by the Nation
Democratic Front — strikes, demonstrations and othe
open popular actions both in the cities and in the cou
tryside.

It also coincided with the speed-up of U.S. arms d
liveries to Sudan and deployment of joint defence forces,
The regime is faced with a dilemma. The politic;

crisis, coupled with an ever-deepening economic cri
continues. The regime is losing support daily, even
within the Muslim Brotherhood upon which it is based. —

The fact is that neither repression prior to the State of
Emergency nor the repression imposed afterwards has
succeeded in weakening the popular movement, which
moving ahead with some tactical changes due to the ne
situation.

So today the regime and its allies are faced with a
strong popular movement in the north co-ordinated with
astrong, armed movement in the south. They are unable,
as in the past, to play on north-south divisions and sp
the people’s struggle.

For the first time the slogans: are the same, the aims a
the same. There is an integration of purpose. This is th
process, the real reason for the massive U.S. inte
vention in our country.

a

How did Bahamian Prime Minister
Lynden Pindling come to spend $4-mil-
lion (U.S.) over a seven-year period
when his salary was only $500,000 for
that period?

Witnesses before a just concluded
Royal Commission of Inquiry say the
government head as well as other offi-
cials of the ruling Progressive Liberal
Party on the 700-island archipelago in the
northern Caribbean, were given pro-
tection pay-offs by drug smugglers and

police as far back as 1979 as having con-

Bahamian PM linked to drug trade

From the
Caribbean

TV network ABC. The program was re-

transit point for the smuggling of cocaine
and other drugs from South America by —
organized crime. The country’s police
force and coast guard is undermanned
and cannot or — as some testimoney
suggested — is unwilling to intervene.
Meanwhile, one of the figures in the
drama has turned out to be U.S. lawyer |
F. Lee Bailey, best known for his de-
fence of ‘‘revolutionary’’ cum thrill
seeker Patty Hearst Bailey took notice to
serve as Pindling’s defence counsel. * |

big time criminal elements.

Since the Commission is only empo-
wered to recommend further action, the
release of the findings is expected to have
little immediate effect on the 17-year-old
regime whose top brass have fattened
themselves on the island’s sleazy eco-
nomic base of gambling casinos, off-
shore banking and drug smuggling.

The island nation state, which got its
political independence from Britain in
1976, is also a tourist attraction with an
estimated 2.5 million visitors last year.

Testimony before the Commission
charged that Pindling pocketed $100,000
a month in protection money from no
less a person than U.S. fugitive financier

tacts with reported Colombian drug
kingpin Carlos Ledher, has been a fre-
quent visitor to the islands where he has
several properties.

In his 1975 book, “The Infernal
Money Making Machine’”’, investigative
journalist Michael Dorman says that the
Pindling government refused to have
Vesco extradited to face charges in the
U.S. of looting millions in funds from an
investment company. Dorman also
claims that Vesco provided Pindling with
a private jet and made ‘‘generous contri-
butions’? to the Bahamian politician’s
political campaigns.

Some of the money that Pindling is
alledged to have received was to come

even fingered by the Bahamian aired last September on the American

sponsible for the Commission being set
up.
The ABC story also.said the same
amount was paid every month to several
PLP cabinet ministers by Ledher, who is
currently on the run from U.S. author-
ities who want him to answer cocaine
smuggling charges.

Among. the politicians named during
the Commission’s proceedings was De-
puty Prime Minister Arthur Hanna, who
received a cool $600,000 to turn a blind
eye to a multi-million dollar drug smuggl-
ing operation through the Bahamian out
island of Gorda Cay. Hanna, like Pindl-
ing and the others, has denied the
charges.

The archipelago, which sprawls over a
10,000 square mile area is an ideal in-

_As Bailey put it he took the case for
free because he thought Pindling’s
government had brought “‘stability’’ and

that Pindling himself was ‘‘clean’’.

However, in addition to owning a pala-
tial residence on the island, Bailey is a
member of the Board of Directors of the
U.S. corporation Chris Craft which has
investment plans there.

Whatever the outcome of the findings
of the Commission, the whole scene re-
confirms the suspicions of Caribbean
citizens and visitors that without a
government based on people’s democ-

racy and a sound economic foundation —

freed of multi-national corporate control,

there will always be charges of cor- |
‘ruption, graft and other criminal activity

by politicians.

LS TIRE Es 8M i IE TT TET OAT ETO AE OTE GOL it eg ED ETD CT TATA TG EE TA NTT ETE OTE TROT ETI TERED ES

8 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 10, 1984

and swindler Robert Vesco. Vesco, who from Ledher, according to the report