World The legacy of Maurice The last time I saw Maurice Bishop, the late prime minister of the People’s Revolu- tionary Government (PRG) of Grenada, was two months before he was tragically murdered, along with several other PRG ministers, in the days prior to the October, 1983 U.S. invasion. I had gone to Bishop’s residence over- looking St. George’s harbour on an assignment for the PRG’s newspaper, Free West Indian. U.S. singer and civil rights activist Harry Belafonte and his wife, who were visiting the island at the time, were there. In a conversation with journalists, Bishop gave no indication of the infighting then going on within the governing New Jewel Movement (NJM) party. Speaking in the same house where within weeks he would be cruelly chained half naked to a bed while under house arrest by the ultra- left elements who had seized control of the NJM_ Central Committee, the Bnitish- trained lawyer nevertheless spoke about advancements under the PRG. He looked tired. His eyes were drawn. As usual, he was smoking like a chimney. He spoke briefly. Later, however, Prime Minis- ter Bishop would fill in between the lines about what a publication of the Caribbean Conference of Churches called “a bold, new social experiment,” which had started with the revolution on March 13, 1979. On the economic front, Grenada had the typical three sectors of most of the develop- ing Caribbean islands: tourism, agriculture (mainly nutmeg and bananas) and small manufacturing. The manufacturing sector was quite modest in Grenada, which is often referred to as the Spice Isle. The island’s economy was_ further stunted by years of neglect, mismanage- ment and corruption during the years of Norman Faria FROMTHE CARIBBEAN eee AR a rule by the Grenada United Labour Party of Eric (later Sir Eric) Gairy. Under the PRG, things immediately improved. In early 1982, the government released World Bank figures showing there had been substantial growth since the popu- lar insurrection three years earlier. In the agricultural sector, where half of the 30,000 work force were employed, the value of exports increased considerably. The PRG had also moved to encourage agro- industry, in the process setting up a plant to turn out products from mangoes. Through the wise balance of state and private sector involvement, the economy’s rejuvenation led to benefits for ordinary Grenadians. More people were working. Reliable data showed that the sky-high job- less figure of over 50 per cent under the Gairy regime had been brought down to 14 per cent by 1982. A popular PRG slogan of the day said “Idle Hands to Idle Resour- 2 This reduction was undoubtedly helped by the UNESCO-lauded literacy campaign. As well, part of the overall plan to improve the island’s infrastructure was the building of an international airport capable of taking big passenger aircraft and cargo jets. This was needed if Grenada’s export and tourist sectors (23,200 stay-over visitors in 1982) were to make significant improvements. Sadly, with the opening ceremonies only six months away, the almost-completed airport was one of the first facilities seized by U.S. paratroopers. Subsequently opened by the U.S.-installed Blaize administration and called Point Saline Airport after the 8 « Pacific Tribune, March 20, 1989 Bishop MAURICE BISHOP... his death a pretext for U.S. invasion of Grenada. area in which it is located, the airport was the scene of heroic resistance by hundreds of Cuban internationalist workers and Gren- adians. More than 40 lost their lives during the week of resistance. President Ronald Reagan said he thought it would have been over in a day or two of fighting. As part of the psychological campaign in the U.S. and abroad to pave the way for invasion, Reagan had described the airport as a military base. PRG leaders, however, pointed out that communication and ground service equipment were for civilian use only. The revolution brought vast improve- ment in health services. For the first time, islanders had access to free medical and dental care at a string of clinics. Among the dentists were several Cuban internationalist workers, one of whom treated this corres- pondent back in 1981. Perhaps the most important of the changes for the better under the Bishop government was the development of new political institutions. The new arrangement meant that the island’s six parishes were divided into a number of zones with democratically-elected councils set up. What was remarkable about the system was that any official, including PRG minis- ters, could be called by the people to meet- ings to explain something, or to hear councils’ recommendations and issues and policies. This alternative form of demo- cratic participation, which also extended to trade unions and co-operatives, was clearly a coming to terms with the limitations of the Westminster model. And it was in stark contrast to the corruption, mismanagement and opportunism which obtained — and still continues to do so — in such regional nation states as Antigua and Guyana. An important dimension of the PRG administration was its foreign policy. Unlike the case in several other Common- wealth Caribbean countries such as Barba- dos, foreign policy formed a significant part of PRG pronouncements and _ practice. There were frequent references to solidarity with the Palestinians, Nicaraguans, South Africans and with other peoples struggling for or building their own democracies. Among Third World leaders who visited Grenada during the almost four years of PRG government were the late President Samora Machel of Mozambique and Nica- raguan President Daniel Ortega. It is sometimes asked why, if the PRG was so popular, it didn’t call national elec- tions? In retrospect, there are few regional political commentators who would deny that the PRG would have handily won any vote. There was virtually no opposition, or they were in disarray or discredited. And there was no national leader as popular as the charismatic Bishop. It is clear, however, that the PRG was cautious because of CIA activity within the island, as well as open threats by Reagan. A bomb, planted in the stands during a 1980 PRG rally, killed three and injured more than 100 people. Fragments revealed the bomb could not have been manufactured in Grenada. The most frequent and vociferous refer- ences to the lack of elections came from Washington, with U.S. Information Service regional offices busily sending out state- ments to journalists and media. Political analysts such as those in the Puerto Rico- based Caribbean Project for Justice and Peace, and political scientists at the Univer- sity of the West Indies such as Dr. George Belle and Dr. Neville Duncan, argued that political and other changes underway in Grenada could have serious repercussions in the rest of the region. It had to be nipped in the bud, was the way Washington saw it. The murders of Prime Minister Bishop, Education Minister Jacqueline Creft, For- eign Minister Unison Whiteman and others by ultra-left elements provided the excuse and gave, as Jamaican analyst Dr. Carl Stone was to observe, the Grenadian revo- lution to Washington on a platter. As the growing popularity of the present opposition party, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, led by Dr. Terry Mar- ryshow, indicates, it is not so easy to erase a people’s appreciation of an administration which genuinely and selflessly helped them build a better society. Pact offers NATO 3-siage reduction By TOM MORRIS A concrete, three-stage proposal for deep cuts in conventional and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, put forward on behalf of the Warsaw Pact states by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Vienna March 6, appears to have caught the attention of the European and world public as well as NATO officials. Speaking at a meeting of foreign minis- ters before the start of formal negotiations on March 9, Shevardnadze, in outlining the Warsaw Pact’s plan, said that “a mutual image of the ‘enemy’ that used to pervade both Western and our propaganda is giving way to a more objective and serious look at each other.” According to news reports, the three- stage plan includes: Stage one: lasting two or three years in which NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce their troop strength and conven- tional arms to levels 10 to 15 per cent below the lowest level currently possessed by either side. This should include tactical fighter air- craft, tanks, combat helicopters, armoured troop carriers, artillery, multiple rocket launchers and mortars. Stage two: lasting another two or three years, would see troop levels and weapons systems reduced a further 25 per cent. Stage three: each side’s armed forces would achieve a strictly defensive character, Shevardnadze also proposed that separ- ate talks begin immediately to eliminate short-range nuclear missiles from Europe, and that special non-military zones be set up along the east-west border. In his first major task as President Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, while wel- coming the Warsaw Pact’s proposals, limited himself to generally outlining Washington’s overall views while avoiding setting out specifics. The growing problem faced by NATO in responding to the intensified peace offensive and specific proposals by the socialist states was evident in remarks by British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was given the unenviable task of speaking on behalf of the Western alliance. Howe welcomed those parts of Shevard- nadze’s plan which called for reduction in areas where the Warsaw Pact has the advantage (tanks, artillery, armoured troop carriers, tactical missile launch systems), but flatly rejected putting on the bargaining table weapons in which NATO has the edge (tactical aircraft, naval forces, combat helicopters). The NATO spokesman was particularly vehement when defending NATO’s plan to modernize its 88 Lance nuclear missile launchers stationed in West Germany by the mid-1990s. When asked by the media if NATO should examine Shevardnadze’s proposal to eliminate short-range nuclear missiles, Howe replied: “No.” This NATO attitude, backed by present U.S. policy, presents a major difference between the — sides, as seen in Shevardnadze’s reaction. The British foreign secretary made it clear that NATO will refuse to discuss lim- itations on tactical aircraft and/or naval forces and, ina strange turn of phrase when speaking of arms reduction talks, said NATO would not be drawn into “a compet- itive striptease” with the Warsaw Pact. Clearly months of tough bargaining lie ahead. New thinking, as expressed again — and again in the bold initiatives advanced across the board by the USSR, has yet to _ find a willing partner in NATO, which — appears ready to welcome serious disar- — mament in words but not yet in deeds.