HE publication of the resolution of the Infor- mation Bureau on the mis- takes of the Central Com- mittee of the Yugoslav Com- munist Party came as an un- pleasant surprise to the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the Yugoslav people in general. The reas- on for this was the complete absence of any inner party dis- cussions of fundamental. ques- tions of politics in Yugoslavia. Upon receipt of letters of critic- ism from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union last March and May, the leadership of the Yugo- slav C.P. proceeded to set the stage for the suppression of any criticism of their policies among their own membership and for a defiance of the comradely critic- ism offered by the CPSU and the other European parties in the In- formation Bureau. > ‘Hence the frameup charges against two leading members of the Central Committee and the sovernment, Hebrang and Djuye- vic, while the real reason for the expulsion and arrest of these two leaders was their open disagree- ment with the policies of the Tito Rankovich group. A regular campaign of terror: ism was introduced in the CP of Yugoslavia with a view of re- moving all honest elements who stand on a position of. Unity with the USSR and the New Democracies, and of ‘intimidat- ing the weaker elements. | The preparations for the 5th Congress of the Yugoslay CP and the Congress itself, were a farce. There was no possibility for any open and frank discussion of the. problems confronting the people of Yugoslavia. Instead there was intimidation and a whipped-up: nationalist frenzy. The cry was: “We are being slandered, our war effort is being deliberately un- _derrated,” etc. U Yugoslav partisan oslav events The Yugoslav people paid too dearly for their freedom from | Hitlerite fascism to trade it away for a mess of Wall Street pottage, even though an erstwhile ‘patriot’ may attempt the deal. Clearly in the first few weeks. after the . publication of the Bureau resolution it was possible for the Tito group to create a false impression among large sec- By OLIVE SUTTON EY will write harsh words about Eduard Benes, even now that he is dead. They will say that he died because he was broken by the tremendous ad- vances of his people in Feb- missing the fact that he re- signed the Czechoslovak presi- dency bekause of ill health, which had harassed him ever since the shameful days of Munich, in favor: of the claim that he could not bring himself to sign the new constitution, With such distortions, they will try to claim Eduard Benes for their own ends—the promotion of World War III. Union. This record is set forth in the Memoirs of Eduard Benes, pub- lished in part in the Nation in six articles from June 19 to July 24. It will soon appear in book form. e In the closing passages, Beneg expressed his deep concern — not for Czechoslovakia under its democratic coalition — but for the worsening conflict between East and West, Early in his Memoirs, Benes recalls that Czechoslovakia es- tablished contact with the So- viet Union in 1922, and declares: “I never agreed with the policy of the western democracies which isolated the Soviet Union for a long time and excluded it from European and world coop- eration,” . ruary. They will persist in dis-. _ reflected. “. . Benes sought to avert the catastrophic growth of Nazism in Germany and to persuade the western European countries. that alliance with the Soviet Union was their only hope, because - without the USSR they would all be crushed by Hitler. He turned down a Nazi pact proposal in 1936, He knew even before the rest of the world shrieked* “purge,” that Hitler was seelx- ing negotiations with the an- ti-Soviet conspirators, Tukha- chevsky, Rykov, etc, “The whole European _ situation would truly have been altered had he succeeded in 6verturn- ing the Soviet regime,” he wrote. “But Stalin acted in time.” j / “Yet until ‘the day of Munich I never gave up hope,” Benes . At Munich... our state and people were club- - bed on the head.” He described . himself as he awaited the mo- . ment to go into exile “com-. pletely exhausted mentally and- physically, my heart, filled with indescribable emotions, my mind with dark thoughts of the ter- rible political and moral catas- ‘trophe that had engulfed Eu- rope and might eventually de- stroy it.” When Daladier forme tha French government in 1938, which was later to capitulate to the Nazis, Benes noted: “Thus only the Soviet Union and our- selves were left in the camp of those who were basically and, Openly anti-fascist and anti- Nazi.” And he tells how “in vain” he tried to persuade the USSR to equip its Navy.” Benes’ Memoirs are harsh on The credo of Eduard Benes tions of the Communists of Yugo- slavia. Despite all terror and intimidation, even in the pre-Con- gress discussion, there were many Yugoslav Communists who agreed —— PHILLIPS —— In July the Com- munist Information Bureau expressed the conviction that heal- thy elements in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia would arise to oppose and remove the Tito lead- ership. Since that time, the growing re- volt against the pres- ent Tito clique and the statements of powerful leading fig- ures in Yugoslavia, have served to bear out the truth of the Bureau’s statement. By | PAUL with the criticism of the Infor- mation Bureau, most of these crit- icisms were completely kept from the public, but some managed to break through. Thus, at meetings of Commun- nist students at the Belgrade, Uni- versity there was open criticism voiced of the Central Committee. It took plenty of trickery and in- timidation (including the compil- ing of a list of hames of all stud- ents who were in any way critical of the Yugoslav leadership and x ‘ the US diplomats who helped engineer the Munich betrayal. Of William C. Bullitt, then our Ambassador to France, Benes wrote: “Bullitt himself let it be known , . . that he considered Prague too harsh toward the German minority; President Benes an irreconcilable anti- German chauvinist, and Benes’ EDUARD BENES “policy a threat to European peace. His attitude in this period and later was dictated chiefly by his personal opposition to the Soviet Union. . , .” The U.S. Ambassador to Ber- lin, Hugh Wilson, close associ- ate of Herbert Hoover since, es- poused the idea that “Goering did not desire war and was clearly working for peace. . ...” During those years, . Benes taught for a while at the Uni- versity of Chicago, travelled to London, and eventually to Paris. He spoke with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, with Winston Chureh- ion would now orient itself sole- tage ‘and security. . . .” ill. He exerted every effort to prepave them for the time he knew Hitler must attack the USSR. He was pleased to find Roosevelt in agreement. His comments on events that shook much of the rest of the world show him consistently alert to the forces working in Furope, which made World War II finally a people’s war of a.0eration, : “The Soviet-Finnish war,” he wrote, ‘seant that the Soviet Union . . . wanted to insure itself against Germany and was prepared to take the con- sequences . . . I insisted to my coUaborators . . . that they must not give in to the anti- Soviet propaganda then being spread abroad from America.” He was prepared for the So- viet-German pact: ‘I’ regarded the Soviet-French-English con- versations as definitely ended, and believed that the Soviet Un- ly according to its own advan- In 1942, Benes concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union. “Our treaty with Russia,” he de- clared, “the first of its kind dur- ing the war, partially broke down the barrier between the Soviets and the Western world. At once a sharp controversy arose about it. Conservatives in England and in America and in some other countries attacked us, : ; “German Propaganda, poured out fire and brimstone telling our peaple that I had sold my homeland to Stalin.” Today it is Washington which pours out “fire and brimstone.” But before he died, Benes saw Czechoslovakia’s future secured, ’ PACIFIC TRIBUNE—SEPTEMBER 24, 1948—PAGE 4. : the handing over of those names to the “security organs”) before the leadership managed to obtain a vote of confidence in the Central Committee. e With every day and week since July, the treacherous position of _the Yugoslav Party leadership is becoming more evident. The fight of the honest elements against the treason of their leaders is now widespread in all provinces of the country and in all branches of ' public life—the army, air force, ~ indus- , government departments, try and the educational institu- tions, The murder of General “Arso- Yovanovich brought to light the extent of the Rankovich terrorism against honest Communists in Yu- goslavia, Yovanovich was the chief-of-staff of the Yugoslav Arinfy at the time he was mur- a dered, yet even a person of his rank was unable to express his. opinion and was compelled to flee the country. He was ambushed and murdered at the border by Tito agents. The shooting of Yo- vanovich, a hero of the War of Liberation and one of the fore- most military leaders of Yugo- Slavia aroused masses of Yugo- slavs to a fight against the pres- ent leadership. @ It is impossible to enumerate all the cases of resistance, but some of the more important deserve mention. General Pero Popivoda, who, according to his statement, supported the present Yugoslav leadership during July, decided to join the fight for a Socialist Yugoslavia and in a letter to the Moscow newspaper Pravda of August 18 denounced the treach- ery of the present leadership. The bulk of the Yugoslaw del- egation to the UN and a con- siderable number of members of the Washington Embassy staff took an openly critical position against the Tito group. They were recalled and chose’ to re: main in Prague where they are now actively exposing the misdeeds of the Tito-Ranko- vich Djilas clique, . The news is gradually breaking through to the people of Yugo- slavia, despite censorship and in- ' timidation, People are finding out that British spies are tolerated in. high government positions—that General Velebit, exposed as a Bri- lish spy, is Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; that Diilas de- serted the front during a critical period of the war of liberation. and his friends are covering him; that the same Dijilas made open anti-Soviet statements at inner meetings of the Yugoslay Central Committee. ' The awakening of the Yugo- Slav people against the traitors among their leaders is so wide- spread that the Tito regime is constantly carrying on purges and government changes, Various ministers of the individual repub- lics have been removed. Talented leading people, such as the head \of the Telegraph Agency, Sima Balen, has been removed and iS now imprisoned. The resolution of the Commun- ist Information Bureau expressed confidence that the healthy ele- ments in the CP of Yugoslavia will force their leaders to correct their mistakes, The present de- velopments in that country prove that the healthy core among the Yugoslav people generally, are continuing this relentless struggle and will ultimately succeed in ré uniting Yugoslavia in friendship with the mighty USSR and: the family of New Democratic states. The great hopes of world re- action, under the leadership of American jmperialism, to find in Yugoslavia an ally of imperialism and world reaction will be shat- ‘tered against the rock of Yugo- slav resistance, .