History Of Test Ban Talks Show $.U. For Realistic Ban Special The record shows that the Soviet Union has worked consistently for a world- wide ban on nuclear tests, and has advanced realistic proposals to achieve this end. to the Pacific Tribune The West has placed ob- Stacle after obstacle in the Way of such agreement. It is the West which has changed positions during negotiations, thus preventing conclusion of a test-ban treaty throughout the three-year history of test- ban talks at Geneva. Most recently they had Seized on one modification put forward by the Soviet Union, - Corresponding to present politi- cal reality, on the control ma- ' chinery to police a ban. The West has distorted both the ‘intent and actual content of tthe Soviet proposal, and has raised the false issue of this containing a threat of Soviet! “veto.” ; The continued _ intran- Sigence of the West on agree- - ing to a test ban prompted the Soviet Union to propose that thé test-ban talks be merged with negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Here again the Soviet Union has proposed a three-stage plan which would rid- the world forever of all arms po- _tential for war, and has stated it will accept whatever con- trols the West proposes as long as the West agrees to such dis- armament. The West has flatly rejected such a merging of the test-ban talks. -It has consistently re- fused to agree to the simple Soviet proposal that the world disarm. And despite state- ments on controls, it has not .yet taken up the Soviet offer to it to propose a con- trol system for general and| complete disarmament. Instead it has stalled the talks at Geneva. Hs recent “new” proposals at these talks contain little that is really new in the way of concluding agreement for -a_ test -ban: treaty. vices and also ships, planes and mobile inspection teams. But the West has always put forward obstacles in the way of implementing this control. The Soviet Union consistent- ly tried for a complete ban on all tests. When -agreement seemed near on this, it was the West that introduced the idea of excluding explosions under 20 kilotons on the grounds these could not always be de- tected. : The Soviet Union: agreed to such: exclusion but asked for a four or five year moratorium on smaller tests during which | time -a- research program - could be carried out to devise effec: tive measures. The West con- tinued. with a proposal for a two-year moratorium, but with. no guarantee that the ‘tests would not be continued if the research program was_ unsuc- cessful. Other differences occurred over the number of. inspec- tions, composition of the con- trol commissioon and the in- spection teams. However, before the last series of talks at Geneva, 17 articles, or two-thirds of the proposed treaty on test bans, had been agreed to. FRENCH TESTS In the meantime, however, France had. begun nuclear tests, thus endangering the success of the talks. Semyon , Tsarapkin, Soviet delegate at Geneva, said it seemed that the U.S. and Britain, by “spin- ning out the conference,” had given France the time to carry out her tests by “a kind of division of labor.” At Geneva, the areas of dis- agreement had boiled down to six main. points..These includ- ed: the composition of the con- trol organizations; the number “dure in the Control Organiza- of inspections; the composition of the inspection teams; the length of a moratorium on’ tests; the type of research to be carried out; the area of a country to be opened for in- spection. It was on the first of these that the West has been making such a fuss and deliberate: falsifying the issue. To begin with, no one has proposed at Geneva that there should .be any. voting, or any veto on the pperedon Of in- spections. : From the very beginning: the inspection quota was .to .be free from any voting . proce- tion, and inspection would not depend upon the agreement of the country suspected. THREE-MAN COUNCIL What the Soviets have pro- posed is that the executive leadership of the Control Or-|. ganization should not be a single administrator — as pre- viously envisaged by both sides — but a three-man ad- ministrative council, consist- ink of one from the Soviet side, ‘one from the American- British side and one from a neutral country. The Americans wanted to stick to a one-man administra- tor, and they have. made very much of the change in Russian position. It should be underlined that the role of the administrator or administrative council, is], executive—that is, the carry- ing out of the provisions of the treaty and the directives of its supreme body, the Control Commission. . CONGO EXPERIENCE There is a close similarity here between the role of the Secretary - General of the United Nations and that of the “Who is résponsible for the, fact that after nearly three years of discussion, there is no. such treaty? The facts speak for themselves. THE RECORD ‘The Nuclear Tests Confer- €nce to negotiate a treaty for »banning tests opened in Gen- €va on Oct. 31, 1958. It was attended by representatives of the three powers possessing muclear weapons at that time —the United States, at SMe and the Soviet Union... SES the time, the © abpen ; inhiuers agreed to a 12-month _ Moratorium on nuclear tésts. “This was subsequently extend- ed. by each. Prior to the Geneva talks, a United Nations scientific com- mittee warned of the dangers from nuclear. tests. The Soviet representative on the 15-mem- ber committee urged that it call for the cessation of nu- clear tests, but the majority of the committee, including the U.S. balked at making this recommendation. In 1959 this international conference, including Soviet, American, British and other scientific experts, proposed an extensive system of control, including 170 control posts equipped with the latest de- Pres, Kennedy prepared to choose nuclear war Presiden: Kennedy is prepared to nuclear war, This is the conclusion that emerges from an article writ- ten by Joseph Alsop in the; Aug. 5 issue of Saturday Re- view. Alsop describes how the US. president, returning from} ‘Vienna after his meeting with . Khrushchev, discussed his}. choice. Alsop sums up the problem . as Semneas sees it in _ these terms: “It is right to risk something close’ to national). suicide in order to avoid a de-} cisive national surrender?” Alsop defines on Berlin as giving up “the freedom of the city and free- dom of access routes.” No- where does he acknowledge that Soviet proposals do not threaten either of these free- doms. How does Kennedy answer the question posed? The alter- native as seen’ by Kennedy would be a world-wide “Com-| ‘ munist victory” followed by “underground resistance” by and to run the risk of national suicide for the United Siates rather than ‘ “surrender” on Berlin, “surrender” | plunge mankind fats ’ PRESIDENT KENNEDY + + + would be prepared to press the button. the supporters of the present American Way of Life. Alsop quotes Kennedy as saying that ‘in order to resist this kind of charge in our society, then the best choice is the risk of war.” |point of the quota UN Security Council and Gen- eral Assembly, |The experience of the Con- Zo has shown just what can happen to frustrate and distort a Security Council decision when the Secretary-General is under the influence.of a par- ticular group of powers. Since. the principle of parity had been agreed to for the Control Commission, the So- viets .asked why this same principle could not be applied to the executive head: of the rorganization. HOW MANY INSPECTIONS? As to the number of inspec- tions: that should be allowed per year, the Americans pro- posed 20. while the Soviet Union maintains that. three are sufficient. Inspections would take place of explosions greater in size than 4.75 megatons. The Americans claimed that the number .of such suspected. ex- plosions. that would occur in a year would be 100. The So- viets maintained that this esti- mate is too high, and added that in any case the whole idea is political and not technical. British Prime Minister Mac- millan had originally proposed the idea of the quota as a political solution to a problem Over which the conference was deadlocked. The Americans eaaed for inspection teams composed of nationals other than of the country that is being inspect- ed. In the’case of an inspection in the Soviet Union, the team would have been all American and British. _ The Soviet Union ietntain ed that the teams should be half Americans and British and half Soviet citizens. In ad- dition, the person responsible for getting the team to it des- dination should be ‘a_ national of the country in which the in- Spection is taking place. TO AVOID SPYING The Soviet position would i Safeguard the inspected coun- try from uncontrolled espion- age under cover of the inspec- tion and for practical reasons transportation and supplies would ‘have to be in the hands of a citizen of the country being inspected. But the Soviet Union agreed that the deputy leader of the team should be from the other September 15, 1961—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page ? | side, that scientific observ ‘tion should be main'y in ; of people from th a hands other side and findings of members of the team should "i : transmitted to the memb? 7 states of the organization. - The Soviets wanted a mol torium on tests of five yeal | the Americans wanted one % J three years. Further the 5%” ; viets asserted that at the en? J of five years should be reviewed and - moratorium extended to cove a: smaller tests if necessary. AREA FOR INSPECTION the positio® ] On the size of the area be inspected, the Conference? Experts, which met before ee | opening of the Geneva confeh ence in 1958, agreed upon 2 fir 4 yhe | gure of 40-80 square miles. Soviet were sticking to this | figure. On the basis of technical 2” guments, with which the 5% viet disagreed, the Americal? were insisting that the ag i should be at least 200 squat’ f miles and in some cases eV? J 2,000 square miles. PAST PROPOSALS At the latest Geneva meet ing, Arthur Dean, -hief Ug delegate, made proposals de@™ ing with the moratorium op small on the crucial questions of the control machinery and inspe™ | tion he declared that the 5% viet position was “complete unacceptable.” Afterwards Soviet delegaie, told reporte!s that the United States h@ ' made an effort to solve one % the nuclear testing problet “seperately from general armament but the problem a nuclear test ban and of 8 eral disarmament are intert” lated.” He said that the “only way out of the stalemate” was L merge the nuclear negotiatio? in talks on general and com plete disarmament. “Tt is impossible to continue these negotiations without pay ing attention to internation® events,” added Tssrapkin. “phe pace of armament is increasi®. more and more. Military pre?” arations are growing. underground tests, De i” Tsarankin, the 5 of "We are ready io sign a | agreement on general complete disarmament imme” diately and to accent whateY® controls the West wanis to & tablish,” he concluded.