; 4 G a The incidents continued. In September of 1994 the skyline broke and a joint report revealed that it was yarding too much wood, including a 62’ fir that was 8-1/2’ in the butt. Later in November, during a routine safety tour, the inspector noticed that the longline crew was working in the bight. Then it took until June of 1995 for the company to warn the workers that they would be disciplined for working in the it. Be that same meeting, where it was said that WCB rules and regulations must be adhered to, MB informed the crew that it would approach the WCB to get a variance to allow the skyline crew to work in the bight in some instances. “MB's move to seek the variance was totally ir- responsible,” says Kachanoski. “If the men are in the bight and something lets go in the back end in the standing timber, it can knock down a tree and something can come down the hill.” What MB was seeking was the WCB’s permis- sion to allow the rigging crew to walk less dis- tance before going ahead on the turns. “The reason that WCB regs and job safety break- downs say that you don’t work in the bight in that people got killed doing so in the past,” adds Kachanoski. At the end of the June meeting, feelings were so strong that some of the union crew voiced their opinion that MB management was trying to hide unsafe work practices. After the meeting a WCB inspector reviewed the setting and issued the following order, based on Section 60.18 of the WCB occupational health and safety regulations. Tt read: All workers shall clear the bight of any running line under tension. Whenever possible, no worker shall remain within the bight if any running line under tension, nor in a position where a worker could be struck by a line were it to break or come loose. Then later in the same month a chokerman on the long line crew refused to continue work, say- ing he was in the bight. A one day suspension was given out to the hooktender after he and the chok- erman were trying to cross under the lines while the turn was in the landing. All of the above incidents happened prior to the Clark fatality. INVESTIGATION OF CLARK FATALITY As outlined in the Ready report the joint union- management Accident Prevention Committee in- vestigated the fatality and pointed to seven con- tribut factors as follows: 1. By logging the road on both sides of the sky- line, which was normal practice, the crew placed themselves in a hazardous position (bight) directly opposite of the sling shot effect. 2. Turn size - the tun was too large to be lifted by the sky car. 3. Hooker and chokerman were unable to see the turn because they were on the low side of a small ridge that the skyline was situated over. 4, Management and crew’s inability to under- stand that they were in a hazardous situation be- cause logging on both sides of the skyline was an accepted practice. 5. Angle of the sky car to the turn created a sling-shot effect. 6. Pulling too hard on the turn. 7. Rigging slinger inexperienced at shotgun Brother Kachanoski says that when the com- mittee went down the hill to investigate the ac- cident scene it found several broken chokers, which is a sign of im- proper logging. “There were broken chokers and a broken bull hook,” he says. “There's no reason for having so many broken chokers on the hill. If you are picking out your turns properly, you'll break the occasion- al choker.” Following the APC in- Vestigation, the commit- tee spelt out specific recommendations to ee from happening again. = It included the follow- ‘ing suggestions. » the crews must not ° Ola Rabien slinger. e management needs to be more active in ensur- ing that safety is the highest priority. e when yarding heavier turns, position car to help in easiest breakout to eliminate sling shot effect. © rigging slingers must be trained. A separate report following an inspection by the Board of Directors of the WCB revealed that the “go ahead” signal was given before workers were in a safe position, away from moving logs, saplings, chunks etc. that might be moved by rig- ging or turn. The signal was given without assuring that workers setting the cold chokers were in the clear. In addition supplemenatary work instructions referring to skyline logging with hot and cold chokers were not developed and the employer did not ensure adequate instruction of the rigging crew. The crew did not receive adequate intruc- tions on safely doing alternate procedures with skyline operations. SAFETY CONCERNS RUN DEEP IN Y & L DEPARTMENT In addition to the safety concerns around ° Gordon Clark ¢ Eino Manninen In February of 1994 the long-line yard crew ex- pressed concern to management that they were being pressured to produce high volumes of wood or get laid off at the end of 1993. MB had told the crew that it would only run the yarder if a loader could be kept busy. The union’s response to this concern, written in -the minutes of the meeting, was “that the company make a decision to either keep (the yarder) ma- chine running or shut it down without pressuring or threatening.” By September of that year, the APC noted that there was a complaint that inexperienced people where not properly trained on backspars. Manage- ment agreed that there were problems and that “more training will be done.” By the fall of 1994 the company APC reported that a training side would be started in 1995 and an acknowledgement was made that hooktenders were needing more time with new employees. REPORT’S RECOMMENDATIONS Since Vince Ready issued his report with seven recommendations, the company and the union the skyline yarder it- self, the safety history at Kelsey Bay’s Y & L department reads like there has been a steady worsening in unsafe conditions and person- al injuries, as was pointed out in the Vince Ready report. The culture of safety-first at Kelsey Bay had been eroded because of management's emphasis on productivity have taken action on all of them. Ready’s recommenda- tions say the following: 1. Accident Preven- tion Committee - the APC’s process of tours, meeting, recommenda- tions and action should be the subject of a meet- Ready noted that the yarding and loading de- partments “accident record is particularly striking when compared to other departments in the oper- ation.” Examining documents from the Accident Pre- vention Committee and WCB inspection reports, Ready highlighted numerous incidents including needless personal injuries. In the fall of 1991 a slackline tower fell over frontwards while the crew was pulling slack dur- ing a rig up. There was a close call in June of 1994 when a faller was sent back to fell a tail hold and the log came into the setting about 100 yards from the crew below. The crew was not in the clear. WCB reports revealed that, at one time, the grapple yarder was being used without the use of guylines, which was a clear safety violation. ing of senior MB brass, Local 1-363 officials, APC reps and the WCB. The APC must address all safe- ty related issues. 2. Training - a program must continue to train all employees on all facets of skyline logging. 3. Working in the Bight - the prohibition on not working in the bight must be complied with and enforced. More effective supervision must be put into place. 4, Working on both sides of the line - strict supervision must assure that this does not happen. 5. Construction of the back and tail lines - this must be done properly as construction of tail lines may be a factor in an unforeseen incident that may result from a setting’s terrain. 6. Segregation of crews - management, the Continued on page fourteen " ¢ Logging setting where Gordon Clark was struck with log chunk, while rigging crew was working on both sides of skyline. Point A is rigging near where chunk landed, flying over 56m across setting to strike Brother Clark. Chunk broke approximately 20m from skycar. LUMBERWORKER/SEPTEMBER 1996/9