Imperialist “Dust” Stor

By JOSEPH STAROBIN
A DUST-STORM is kieking up

over the plains of Man-
churia, and it is not only blind-
ing tens of thousands of Chi-
but

nese spreading across
American and Ganadian edi-
torial pages It’s Something

like the Spy-scare; behind the
hub-bub are powerful forces
With dangerous motives.

The Soviet Red Army enter-
ed Manchuria last August by
agreement with the United
States and Great Britain. The
late President Roosevelt and
Churchill had agreed at the
Yalta Conference, that the
USSR would enter the war in
Asia within three months after
Germany’s defeat. :

The Soviet purpose was clear:
It took upon itself the job of
smashing Japan’s most power-
ful land foree, the Kwantunge
Army, which numbered half a
million picked soldiers.

The USSR was to share in
control of the Ghinese Kastern
and South Manchurian rail-
ways. Port Arthur and Dairen
were internationalized.

As a matter of fact, the
Soviet Union undertook. during
its occupation even greater
service to China and the cause
of peace. It uprooted the Jap-
anese feudal-fascist structure
and smashed «the intricate web
of Japanese “development cor-
Porations,” through which the
Japanese had inhibited Chinese
industry and enslaved the
Manchurian peasantry and
working population.

This involved not only the re-
moval of some parts of Japan-
ese ma@inery; it was a surgical
operation to clean out Japan-
ese influence from Manchuria
as a whole.

The Red Army did not impose
any particular government in
Manchuria. It did not encour-
age (or discourage) the 300.
000 Chinese Communist guer-
rilas in southern Manchuria
or the various independent, pa-
triotic Manchurian guerrilla,
formations.

And the Soviet troops, sched-
uled to leave on November its
1945, stayed on because the
Chiang Kai-shek government
asked them, for reasons of its
own. :

Both the Kuomintang and
American foreign policy were

-on the horns of deep contradic-
tions which are now coming to
the fore and explain the pres-
ent crisis. After the initial at-
tempt to impose the Kuomin-
tang dictatorship everywhere
in China by armed force, GChi-
ang Kai-shek was compelled to
come to terms with the Gom-
munists and lesser democratic
parties.

The most reactionary. open-
ly pro-fascist elements in the
Kuomintang (which organized
the anti-Soviet demonstrations
of the past week) oppose the

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truce with the Communists.
They are angry because they
could not prosecute unlimited
civil war. They are worried be-
cause the USSR has liquidated
the nests of Japanese espionage
and power in~ Manchuria. They
had hoped to integrate their
own speculators’ and grafters’
interests with the Japanese in
Manchuria. And so they are
behind the current uproar
against the Soviet Union.

They did not want the Red
Army in Manchuria, but they
could not help themselves. They
asked the Red Army to stay
because they feared the auton-
omous Manchurian democratic
gevernments would arise if the
Red Army left as per schedule.
They hope to fet enough armed
forces—now numbering 60,009
—into the Manchurian cities
(with American armed help).
They would then have a better
position from which to bargain
with the Chinese Communist
Party, whch of course stands
for rebuilding the Manchurian
administration from the bot-
tom up.

American policy, as repre-
sented by Gen. George G. Mar-
shall, is tor by similar dilém-
mas. On the one hand, the
United States knows it cannot
encourage civil war in China
and expect to win. It is com-
mitted by the Yalta agreement
to a recognition of the Soviet
position in Manchuria. Tt wants
to see the Communist-Kuomin-
tang accord ratified and hopes
Chiang will be able to take care
of himself with economic. and
concealed military backing of
the United States,

On the other hand. American
imperialism is itself hostile to
the Soviet Union, and has its
own aims in Manchuria. Ameri-_
can corporations hoped to pick
up the pieces of Japanese in-
dustrial empire themselves.

And there are imperialist
generals, like Albert GC. Wede—
meyer,- who speculate on war
with the Soviet Union and
would like to fight it on the
plains of Manchuria.

But neither the Kuomintane .

nor the American policy can
They can-
not. have normal, friendly re-
lations with the USSR, and ex-
pect to pour American troops
into Manchuria while Red
Army troops withdraw. And
because the situation is still so
fluid, the Soviet radio broad-
cast last Wednesday empha-
sized that some Soviet troops
remain until American troops
withdraw from Ghina as a
whole.

There lies thé real issue. Will
a democratic China be allowed
to emerge, and will all inde-
pendent influences be eradicat-
ed in Manchuria? Or does the
United States intend to stay
and entrench itself on the
mainland of Asia?

E

Phone PAc. 5831

PACIFIC TRIBUNE — PAGE 19

Indian seamen who mutinied against Royal India n Navy
insults and poor food. drive through street on command:

Swept Bombay when civilians joined nayal reyolt.

The Fuss In fran —— wy resinata 6

| Ea is a politically very im-

portant country for two rea-
sons: Her strategic
and her oil resources.

Britain has consistently tried
to bring Iran under virtual
British suzerainty, and strong
competition exists. there be-
tween British and American
oil interests.

In 1919, Britain’s Foreign
Secretary, Lord Curzon, tried
to bring off an Anglo-Iranian
agreement which was rejected
by Iran two years later. be-
cause of the extreme national
subjection which it implied.

The Soviet Union, on the
other hand, is deeply interest-
ed in making sure that Iran
cannot be made a jumping-off
round for attacks upon her—
as she was before, during the
British intervention in 1919.
WHAT ABOUT IRAN-USSR
RELATIONS?

N 1921 the Soviet government

concluded a treaty of friend-
ship with Iran. whereby the
Soviet Union renounced the col-
onizing policy of Imperial Rus-
Sia and declared all treaties
concluded with Gzarist Russia
null and void.

The Soviet Union renounced
the rights in the northern
Provinces previously secured by
the Czarist government on the
understanding that Iran would
not grant concessions and land
which they restored to her to
any third state or its citizens.

Since then, the oil of North
Jran has not been developed at
all, although for a number of
years representatives of Ameri-
can oil interests have been try-
ing te get in on it.

Representatives of the Shell
Group have been negotiatine
for these concessions since
1942.

Knowing
government

position

Soviet
the

this, the
approached

fj 1I©anian government in 1944 for

oil concessions, on uniquely
generous terms, offering guar-
antees as to wages to be paid,
housing conditions, and train-
ing for Iranian technicians;
and undertaking to return the
wells to Iran after an agreed
period. The Iran fovernment
was to hold 50 per cent of the
shares in the proposed Soviet
company.

At first this was welcomed
by the Iran government. but it
seems that British and Ameri-
Can oi] interests got busy and
as a result of their pressure.
the Iran government finally re-
jected the offer.

The Soviet government later
complained that concessions
had been secretly granted to
an American company, and
such was the feeling of the peo-
ple, that the then prime minis-
ter, Mahomet Said, was obliged
to resign.

Since then erisis has followed
erisis in Iran.

WHAT IS THE TUDEH

PARTY?

T= TUDEH PARTY is the
strongest of the organiza-

tions in Iran pressing for a

genuine advance to democracy.

It is the strongest in the
more industrial north of the
country, and the Iran govern-
ment uses this fact to pretend
that it is “under the influence”
of the Soviet Union and works
“under the protection” of the
Red Army and naturally ac-
cuses it of being “anti-nation-
alist.”

This, although the policy of
the Tudeh Party is for the ad-
vance of the Iranian people
toward democracy and a het-
ter standard of life instead of
exploitation and colonial Stand-
ards under the domination of
the oil kings.

A SERIOUS internai Situa-
tion has developed in Azer-
baijan, not owing to Soviet in-

because of Jong-continued discrimi
eered truck during height of noting

5 =

sas a

dgen

terference but because
one of the provinces most
hit by the refusal to gran
eoncessions to
Union.

It is also the wealthi
most populous province of
and has long been incre
restive over the behavio
local officials, appointed
scarcely controlled by the
tral government.

Therefore a local, roy.
government has been estah
ed there. to manage local
fairs, within the Iranian s

WHAT POLITICAL
DEVELOPEMENTS ARE
LIKELY IN IRAN?

Wa the democratic n
ment is strong and
ing in the north, and the oy
throw of the Iranian go I
ment immediately on its 53
senting its anti-Soviet case
fore UNO is a hopeful sign,
possibility of an attempt
reactionary interests to gs
power once more by f
should not _be ignored.

In southern Iran the p
tive. nomadie tribes (nu
ing between two and f#
million) present a real
ger.

As fanatical Moslems the
might well be rallied by a
magogue like Seyyid Zia j
cause which would be calli
“national.” :

Today they are supposed
possess 50,000 rifles, and
conference of their leaders
1945 the formation of a “Bh
Army” was discussed, by m ai
of which the supporters of Se
yid Zia might seize power
soon as the Allied troops |
evacuated Iranian territory,

From which it will be s a
that the way Iran goes in
near future is by no means
foregone conclusion.

FRIDAY, MARCH 15, is