Departures. From Berlin Decisions
_ Disrupted London .

a

course of. three weeks,

Coane of Foreign Ministers _

ers a result of the exchange
of opinion and viewpoints, the
ministers “were brought’ into
agreement on a considerable num-
ber of questions...Disagreement,
however, developed at the ses-
‘sion of: ministers <in regard ‘to
whether the decision of the Ber-
in ‘Conference on procedure for
.drawing | up. peace: treaties was
sto vbe carried out or not. “The
foreign “‘mimisters of “United
States and Britain “insisted that
pthe preparation of peace treat-
“aes »should include mot only~the,
puniries “which were signator-|

“Fes to the terms of surrender im-|

"posed onthe former enemy state:
» concerned, but also some other
“eountries. If this < - proposition
_ were accepted it would °*migan
>that states which had | not. ‘even
-declared war on Italy, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland
would be invited and would take

HE ‘Connel of foréign ministers, set up by desiod of the Berlin Conference of the
three powers, assembled for its first meeting in London on September 11. In the

the. council of ministers discussed. in detail a large range of
questions ‘rélating- to reparation peace. treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and
‘Finland, and also othér questions of postwar organization.

part in the drawing up “of peace
treaties. with these countries.

Such a proposition would be
patently contradictory to the de-
cision of the Berlin Conference.
It Was therefore obvious that the
Soviet delegation could, not
agree by..-reason of the Ber-
‘lin ‘decisions. “The Soviet dele

<consideration, that the ministers,
of course, ‘could not revise or
change decisions adopted in Ber-
lin by the heads of the thnee gov-
ernments: :

The”

question: pertaining . to. -the prep-
aration of {peace: ‘treaties.

The Berlin agreement stated:
“As its immediate importa-task,
the council ‘shail be: authorized
te’ draw up with a-view to their
submission to the United Na-
tions, . treaties. of peace with
Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, ‘Hun-.
gary and ‘Finland, and to pro-

pose settlements of territorial

gation .was also guided by the}

questions oustanding of term-
imation of the war in Europe.”

“For the discharge of these

tasks the Council will be com-
posed of members represent-
ing those states which were
Signatory to the terms of sur-
render imposed upon enemy
states concerned. For the pur-
pose of peace settlements for
_Italy, France shall be regard-
ed as a signatory to the terms
of surrender for Italy.”

It is obvious from this text that
the decision to invite France to
take part in the drawing up of a
peace treaty for Italy was taken
by way of an exception from the
rule adopted by the allied coun:
tries, according to which only
those members of the council
were to draw up peace treaties
who represented states which
were signatory to the terms of
surrender mpobed gn the country
concerned. .

The decision ‘of. the Berlin, Con-
ference that France should be re
garded as a state which signed
the terms of surrendér for Italy

was-a definite compromise, for

LPP Proposals -

juvenile delinquency, the LPP
has carried on a constant fight
for a government - sponsored
‘housing progam to mee _ the
‘real needs of the people. Hun-
dreds of thousands of returning
servicemen must also be provid-
ed for, and those now housed in.
converted garages, basements,
‘and slum houses must have de-
cent, well-planned housing made
available.

- .- FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
. » To assure sectrity to the
people of British Columbia, the
-- Labor-Progressive Party urged
_an. extension of social security
.,degislation, bringing social secur-
ity into line with the needs of the
times. There must be increased
compensation benefits for work-
ers, old age pensions at 60 years
of-age of no less than $50.00 per
month, and -an extension of
health services to meet the real
needs of the people. The archaic
educational ‘system of this pro-
vince must be brought into line
with modern standards, and the
provincial government must as-
sume 80% of the cost of educa-
tion to assure that highest edu-
_ €ational standards may be at-
tained.

... FOR LABOR
: LEGISLATION:

' The importance of proper labor
legislation, guaranteeing unions
the right to organize- free from
the interference of anti-labor
_ big- ‘business, -was stressed by
the _Labor-Progressive Party.
The Provincial government
must | support the legitimate de-
mands of labor for reconversion
pay, a National Labor -Code, the
40-hour week -with no reduction
“in take-Home ‘pays«theimmediate
reconvening ofthe --Dominion-
Provincial: conference with rep-
resentation from labor and man-

Faction. A
‘inability of the C@F<to--¢om®

agement to assure orderly re-

conversion., to peacetime produc-
tion. Recognizing that the na-
tion can go. forward only if pur-

chasing power is maintained,
the Labor-Progressive Party
urged maintenance of “wage

standardsand the -protection. of
wartime’ .-wage «gains “by . the
unions against the onslaughts
of reactiqnary, big business in-
terests.

Durie the course of the
whole campaign, the LPP warn-
ed against the conspiracy the
the Tories and Liberals to foist
a government off on the people
of British Columbia that, behind
the -cloak of phrases speaking
of “good, sound. .government”
and “progressive _ legislation”,
was prepared to sabotage the
future of this province as a new,
producing,’ industrialized centre
of Canada, and plunge the prov-
ince back into the’ backward-
looking, precarious economy
ruled by the ecaprices of mono-
poly. The LPP repeatedly warned

against the threat of domin-1

tion by big business, and aimed
their main fire at the unholy al-
liance of Maitland Hart  re-
action.

- .. FOR UNITY

While constantly. warning. of
the threat of the coalition, the
LPP also attacked the isolation-
ist position of the CCF:

Appealing to the CCF to heed
the requests of the organized
labor movement and progresive
people throughout the province,
the LPP asked that the CCF
ally itself with the trade unions,
progressive professional people,
People’s’ CCF, and LPP, to
achieve a solid front against re-
Pointing tothe factual:

mand enough electoral strength
to defeat the Coalition single-
handedly, the LPP proposed

PACIFIC ADVOCATE — PAGE 2

4

unity of labor and progressives
to asure suport of thousands of
sincere citizens, who desire pro-
gressive government in B.C.,

free of enslavement by big bus=]
riness. The LPP ceaselessly urg-

ed on the CCF the crying ‘need
for people’s unity, and all-em-
bracing unity that transcended
partisan advantage and would
constitute the weapon to crush
the bid of reaction for power. In
the press, on platform and radio,
the LPP extended countless in-
vitations to the CCF to meet
with other progressives to decide
a joint electoral policy which
would assure the success of pro-
gress.

The CCF, however, adhering
to the short-sighted opportunis-
tic line which led to the Ontario
debacle, the drubbing of that
party in the Federal elections,
and the landslide for reaction in
Manitoba, refused all offers of
unity. In a statement to the
press, termed by B.C. labor
leaders as _“discourteous”, the
CCF flatly rejected all over-
tures of unity, and reaffirmed
their determination to follow a
“CCF or nothing” policy.

As the people of British Co-
lumbia prepared to go to the
polls, it was crystal clear that
in fighting for unity of all pro-
gresives; the Labor-Progressive
Party was interpreting the will
of the mass of the people. Re-
gardless of the outcome of the
election, the future of the prov-
ince rested on presence in tha
new Parliament ‘of members
pledged to the fight for con-
tinuing unity. Through unity, and
unity alone, the people of Brit
ish Columbia could be assured
of. forward looking policies de-
signed'.-to .meet the - countless
problems which confront the |,
people as a result of victory over
world fascism.

Continued’

actually France had not Gened
that document. It was a conces-
sion on the part of the Soviet
Union, which agreed to this ex-
ception.

The present discussion is not
the question as to France’s place
in regard to peace treaties for
Germany’s former satellites. In
this connection, it is pertinent to

| recall certain facts.

FRANCE DID NOT SIGN

WEES Italy surrendered to the

allies in autumn 19438, there

j existed no united France. There

existed on one hand the real
France of Laval and Petain, and
on the other the potential France
of DeGaulle.

It is clear to everyone that the
France of Petain and Laval could

not take part in signing terms.

with Italy upon her surrender to
the allies in the autumn of 1943:
Petain and Laval were then Ger-

Foreign Minister Molotov
Soviet Representative at
the London Conference

many’s allies, that is, they sided

with the enemies of t:._ ‘lied
powers. It is well remen: be, A
that DeGaulle was then woriang
to unite those Frenchmen who
strove for France’s liberation
from the German invaders and
from their agents in the persons
of Laval and Petain. ‘

But DeGaulle could not then
claim to take part in the sign-
ing of terms for Italy’s’ sur-
render. Nor did General De
Gaulle make such claims-

Nevertheless, at Berlin,
Soviet Union did not object to
France being accorded the right
to take part in the preparation
of a peace treaty for Italy.

It was the sole exception made
by the Berlin Tripartite Agree-
ment. The Soviet government took
into consideration the fact that
despite “Vichy”, France, toward
the end of the war, had put into
the field one or two divisions
against Italy and had thus taken
part in the common effort of the
Allies.

But in Berlin no one raised
the question of France or any _
, other country being invited by

the allies to take part in the +

drawing up of peace treaties

SATURDAY, OGCTOE

cerning? the .

|in the fight agair :

{Sacrifices -and _ wag q

| delegation
on.

the.

*}reached among the 4
--ers. It was then reg =

striving for hari ®
| Operation among |
countries.

for other former .
Germany, with wig
was not: in 2a state

and Bevin. im!

part in drawing
treaties should be % 4]
the question cannot {f
only to France. An }
the question of Fr |
part in. drawing ©
treaties, not only f
for other. former —
Germany, must not | :
universally known
strug 4
Germany of - ‘other

- It sis ‘common ie 4

Yugoslavia made.

struggle against “the y

‘slévakia whose -9.)
“the fight again: ;
<-Germany are well’
is obvious that
grounds for this.

~ Tt is cléar after v
said that the stand:
American: and Brit
tatives: atthe firsi 4,
‘the ‘Council of Fore }
not only<contradicte
agreement, ~but: ma
the discussion .of zr:
which were never re
Council of Foreign

This would not h:
had Messrs. Byrne!
stuck to the Berl
agreement..

ms Siam ae Wali cileiaes poy oat et

all that. 4
in Lon 4

It was

Two years ago,

of the foreign 1
Great Britain, th |
States, and the § |

was held in Mosco
tions arose then ast f
observe or not obi |
ments of one kind J

understood that no #
tions must arise, #

The positive result

cow conference are

its parti
taken the line tha
sary - to strictly
- agreements -
the allies.