Browder’ S Revisionism’ A Page of Discussion Open To Men Of The Labor-Progressive Par 3B Before considering: some By F. J. ey of the special problems raised by the discussions eentering on Browder’s revisionism, let us first emphasize the need for clarity in the jeanne’ of words. The vulgarization in terminol- i " ogy that has “crept into our : “every day’ language only makes the Be blems we are.considering OL: difficult. -Undoubtedly, some ‘of the misunderstandings that have arisen have been caused by a misuse ofthe term “policy,” a term that is fre- quently. used in a broad. sense | with~ no Z ever. ; that it leads to:further and. more serious ones. Policy means} =spe= cifically, ‘the Pango es which a, course of action is> bas- ed,” it does not mean “‘*a course of action,” nor ean it be used to describe the results of that action. A tree generally has many branches; likewise with the pol- iey of a political party. We can speak correctly, by using quali- fication, of a “trade union pol- icy,” an “election policy” or a ‘foreign policy,” to mention only a few; but in doing so, we must remember that these are ‘only. branches, they are in no sense whatever the tree. If any further -elaboration were neces- sary on the need for clarity in terminology, we should consider the word “Socialism.” Here is a term that today, without qua- lification, is entirely unintel- ligible; we clarify its meaning by studying the user’s biogra- phy! A COMMON TENDENCY The tendency to “discover” re- visionism by applying the yard- stick of “popularity” to past and present policies is a common one. We are all familiar with the arguments: that many “old” comrades did not trust the new qualification whatso- ‘policy; that the “man in the street instinctively distrusted it; that the Communists had turned “yellow,” etce., etc. Thus, ipso facto, the party was guilty | of revisionism. What kind of childish patter is this? Does our party formulate policy on the premise that it. must, in the first. place, be a “popular” policy? Naturally not. The policies’ of a Marxist party are formulated only after an exhaustive’ and = scientific analysis of the objective condi- tions that prevail at a given time, as related to the political and class relationships that. ob- tain; such, of course is a trite- ness. The important point is. this; that the formulation of a correct policy does not preclude the possibility that such a policy might be termed “unpopular.” It is always more simple to satisfy prejudice than wunder- standing, and to illustrate our ' point, we would point out that, in. the recent street-car strike, it would have been a _ simple matter for our party to have led a general strike to assist the strikers in their just demands. Such a course would have been simple, and it would have been “popular.” It would not have been correct! In seeking the revisionism in our policies, then, let us at least know the mechan- ics -involyed. Let us at least ‘This is a serious error, in+ BS on |: F. J. ANDERSON know the starting point for the search, Undoubtedly, jthis discussion on revisionism will be used by a great many persons as an occa- sion to hold up their hands and to utter piously, “I told you so.” There will be rejoicing among the ‘master dialecticians’ over the ‘fact’ that they “knew all along that the (policy) of our party. was incorrect.’”- Naturally it is a simple matter to be wise after the évent, and there is little hardship involved in being a great “Monday morning quar- terback.” But. are these gentle- men being ‘wise’? Should “what they knew all along” form the basis of our discussion? INTERPRETATION Ps This tendency towards over- simplification is -dangerous in that it leads to the imputation of motives and the consequent lack of objectivity in our arguments. Therefore, I believe it is neces- sary at this time to assert flat- ly that the policy of our party is correct and that it has been correct; that the task before us is, not the task of formulating a new and different policy, but the task of interpreting that: policy. correctly in our day to aay struggles, and the task of erasing: certain glaring mistakes that have been made in that interpretation. This reaffirmation of the cor- rectness of the Teheran per- spective as applied to the post- war years is not superflous for the simple reason that many people already have questioned its validity. Why they have done so is another matter. Perhaps they were filled with aprehen- sion by the actions of the Churchill government in Greece, Belgium, and Italy. The Polish “episodes” must have disgusted them. And undoubtedly the very recent “thunder from the right” during the period of the San Francisco Conference could only tend to confirm their worst fears. But to claim that the ship is headed for rocks and that the crew should jump overboard is sheer nonsense. ; No one will deny that the PACIFIC ADVOCATE — PAGE 3 aberrations between the stated The Validity Of Teheran In The Light Of Revision: policies of the Gapitalige signa- tories of Yalta and Teheran and the carrying out of those policies |Jeaves much to be desired. But did: we believe that the signing of’ an: agreement would liquidate at-once the fascist tendencies Within these states? Did we ex- pect the Fascist scum who direct the barrage of world hate to crawl into a hole and pull the earth in after? Let us ask these questions, and let us consider the fact that the material conditions that made Teheran accord “pos- sible are not incompatible:,with the. conditions that make further strengthening of that pEcOrS de- sirious and necessary. BROWDER’S ERRORS The question is’ asked, \how could Browder have made such gross errors in political theory, from whence began his point of departure from reality? In my estimation, his first error was in interpreting the policy of Te- heran as a denial of the class struggle during the period of the war against Fascism. From this point, it seems, he proceed- ed logically to his next and greater error, his denial of the class struggle during the post- war years. On the basis of these two fundamental errors, Brow- der then proceeded to erect a co- lossal superstructure, all very logical and all very correct when we consider the premises on which it was based. Unfor- (Continued on page 7) See VALIDITY ‘This week we-cont- cussion through our on the basis of Tin statement on Revisig its effect on the Li urge that contribut . kept short. 74 A discussion Carg along the right lines, in a constructive m do much to clear up standings and confusi; ed by interpretations ward through the pag; bourgeoise and soci - cratic press. The contr on this page express {]: of the writers and a sarily those of P.A- For A Stronger Party 5. ten The present historic situation, durifig which it has just been necessary to destroy first the Third Reich before cr ushing the Jap imperialists, is characterized as a period of transition from total war to total peace. come Home every week. Taken in the light of the present crisis in most Marxist parties in the western hemisphere, this pro- vides a breathing-spell in which to review the disastrous possi- bilities inherent in Browder’s postwar perspective. Here in Canada the CMA trusts have begun an offensive already, as witness the disputes cf the packing plants, BCElec- tric and American Can Co. against union shop, ete. But the most immediate threat, consider- ring the approach of provincial elections, is rather the baseless self-righteousness claimed by the CCF as they accuse our party of having followed during the war no other pclicy than ‘to wipe out-the CCF as a political force.” “(Grant MacNeill, CCF News, July 26.) ° COALITION POLICY Clearly our main strategy in the past election was summed up in our slogan: Defeat the Tor- ies! And we were successful too, insofar as keeping out of office the most reactionary political bloe of the trusts. In order to clear up confusion, however, it is essential to admit the mistake of posing a coalition of Liberals and Labor members, as to policy and to means of arriving at that policy. Following CCF rejection ef such a coalition the strength of labor in such a government would have been so small as to have left such ministers doing business for the big bourgeoise. What MacNeill refuses to rec- cgnize is that nearly every sec- tion of monopoly capital was compelled, to varying degrees, to join the anti-Axis struggle. The Communists throughout the war realized that even such par- ticipation in the war was depen- dent on two things — national unity at home and the second front. We had no illusions about the trusts waging war right to unconditional surrender, but ra- ther accused them of desiring a negotiated peace, thus providing their German flunkies with a chance to beat the Soviet Union. All they did, themselves, was to keep the factories open while the people did the fighting. Thousands of Canadian vets NO STRIKE PLEDGE. 3 Consequently, together with the overwhelming. majority of the unions, we Communists sup- ported labor’s no-strike pledge. And never forget that this pledge had to be fought for against provocations by employ- ers who were willing to use it to their advantage and sabotage the war effort. Let MacNeill and social-democrats like Arthur Turner admit where they stood on this question: if “the boys everseas were aware of their strike tactics they never would have supported such impostors to any great extent. But again we cannot deny our faulty extension of the no-strike pledge into peacetime. We can, however, také credit for having organized and led the unions in the basic indus- tries — woodworkers, miners — | and war the AFL industries, particularly in Quebec. And take credit for being the only party with guts enough to ask the Quebecois to vote yes in the con- i we scription plebisctite in the name | of Tim Buck. Resulting from exceptionalist tendencies, which Lenin warned the British workers against in connection with bourgeois parlia- ments, errors have crept into our line imperceptibly. The seeds may be traced as far back as in applying the United Front pol- | icy, but with the Teheran Dee- laration, we fell in to such a morass of reformism ‘that we rlace the parliamentary fight ahead of the economic fight. We formed a mass party in 1943 but we overlooked the basic unit of a Leninis party, the industrial hranch. When MacNeill states, how- ever, that he knew all along that Teheran was “a desirable inter- national accord, but not a com- rlete platform for class collabor- ation” he is a liar. The social- democrats feared Teheran simply because of the presence of Jead- ers of the Communists of the Soviet Union and the rising strength of -resistance move- ments all over Europe. CCF statements about the poor little London Poles and slanders | partisan | precisely by ignoring @ ; | Judging from, federal 3 against life ande gover der socialism in the U§ their true intentions. — REAL PURPOSE I do agree with Mr; when he admits that in « policy of “socialism or | does not apply, due te | possibility of getting 4} reaching reforms in | } province. But here he ex : 1eal purpose in: accusing of wishing to wipe out i ° by proposing that we ourselves «as a parli; — force. ““Working class. position to CCF candid: . eeffct a declaration of bh } CCF policy is not ini] est of the working cj : goes on to say that? nominate in every rida Besides being a beat: | ognition that there ist. one influential wor party, MacNeill here & | “position. of # | ieft parties will-be ae ; increase the 29,000 7) received in B.C. on Jw 1 posals by the Winches» { Neills. Let the CCF make ne i coalition is twice as str ly as CCF and LPP: and will be far from a’ A Our party must run th : dates having a reasonat of being elected, so tha have beaten the Torit CCF government is it” see social-democracy fo. : . We can see whether go very far to impleme gemands or not. And — portant, the widest sé the workers will alsi form such legislation as § ed as well as from the : and capitulation to big} that will accompany it. § IMMEDIATE PROGRA This poses the need £ mediate program in th fighting program wi forge labor unity on iron of, struggle. Dei confusion spread by — bosses the workers wil: gether to fight for t a needs. ah (Continued on paéf See PARTY — SATURDAY, AUGUST }