~ in Canada. . in Canada is wrong. The follow- Jacques Duclos On T The serious import of _onr failure te question the correct - ness of Comrade Browder’s proposils or of the populariza- tion materials can be appre- ciated only when the strong influence of the U.S. Commu- nist press upon our party is - borne in mind. For various reasons an important section ef our party members and sup- porters read more United States leftwing publicitions than Canadian. On the basis of our endorsement of Comrade Browder’s proposal for the “New Course’”’ our endorse- ment of “Teheran Our Path in Peace and War” and our fail- ure to question even the popu- larization materials, these party members and supporters based their thinking mainly upon what they read in the United States Communist press. Any attempt to mini- mize the importance of this fact would weaken, if not nul- lify, our effort to evaluate the bearing of Comrade Duclos’ article upon our own work. A large part of Comrade Brow- der’s general conception and sev- eral of his concrete proposals became integrated in our think- ing about political problems. Formulations expressing his point of view appeared in several of our articles. I accepted his proposal for Anglo-United States agreement upon division of ex- port markets without: a thought of the elaborate revisionist con- cept of world and class relation- ships upon which it is based and irged that Canada should sup- port such an Anglo-U.S. agree- ment. It must be recognized, frankly, that we identified our- selves with the Communist Poli- tical Association in support ' of Comrade Browder’s “New Cou- rse” and our evaluation of the bearing that Comrade Duclos’ article has upon our own party work must start with this fact. {T would be a serious mistake, however, to ignore the fact that there was a distinct and in some respects deep-going difference between what we did in Canada and what was done in the Uni- ted States. The tendency to over- look this fact must be combatted. If we make the mistake of as- suming that our practical poli- cies, slogans and activities have been generally wrong we shall inevitably swing to erroneous policies as a result. It is im- portant that this matter be stu- died on the basis of our own party documents, program and statements and our actual work The assumption too readily made by some comrades, that all criticisms appearing in the U.S. Communist press apply ing examples will illustrate some of the differences which are vital. : Comrade Duclos criticizes Com- rade Browder for interpreting the Teheran Accord as a plat- form of class peace. We in Can- ada did not intepret it as a plat- form of class peace but as a platform of democratic struggle. In our statement on the Teheran Accord we wrote as follows: “The ‘Teheran. agreement durable peace and far-reach- emphasized, however, that it dees not by itself guarantee these things. It’ establishes a democratic men and women should unite; but if the demo- cratic forces fail- to unite. re- _ actionary forces may succeed. In that event: the world would not simply revert to the condi- tions prevailing in 1939; we would face disaster’ Comrade Duclos, and Comrade Foster in, the United States,. criticize Comrade “Browder: for his assumption. that. monopoly capitalism will voluntarily aban-' don imperialist policies, In our program or struggle for policies based upon the Teheran Accord We warned Canadians that: “In Canada as in Britain and the - United States, Tory ele- ments representing sinister anti-democratic interests are opposed to the domestic poli- cies which alone can make the international policies envisag- ed at .Teheran possible. These interests are prepared to de- stroy national unity te secure narrow class or party advan- tage. Powerful influences among them still base their at- titude upon the aim of secur- ing imperialist advantage out ef the war.” J Comrade Duclos, and before him Comrade Foster in the Uni- ted Sittates, criticized Comrade Browder for painting an idyllic picture of class peace and -ef- fortless social. progress and for negating the idea of working class struggle. ee We put forward a program for Jobs, Social Security, Civil Re- establishment of our fighting men, Protection for our Farm- Foreign Policy based upon the Teheran Perspective, ‘far-reach- ing Constitutional Changes and abolition. of the social. and eco- nomic inequalities suffered by the masses of the people in Que- bec—as the minimum program upon which national unity can be maintained. Comrade Duclos concluded that the dissolution of the Com- munist Party of the United States reflected Comrade Brow- der’s erroneous estimation of the postwar perspective. We did not follow the American example; on the contrary, the Communist Party being outlawed by ‘the King government we. established the Labor-Progressive Party, with a Marxist program and: ut- ilized the possibilities and the widespread progressive senti- ment to strengthen our party and extend its influence. Comrade Browder is criticized for his categoric insistence upon a long perspective of capitalist relations in the United States and virtual exclusion of all con- sideration of propaganda for socialism. We, in our program of action for policies based upon the Teheran Accord, declared: “National unity around poli- cies in accord. with the Tehe-_ ran agreement will not elimi- nate the historical necessity for organization of those who are dedicated to the struggle for the principles of scientific socialism. “The trend of development is towards tremendous and far- opens up the possibilities for a ing social progress. It minst be rallying ground upon which all | ers, Opportunities for Youth, a]. | B fr TIM BUCK: because of that fact and ‘the increasingly important that the labor movement must ‘play in shaping national poli- cies Canada needs a party based firmly upon understand-* ing of the historic role of the working class—a party which has no interests separate and apart from the interests of the working class as a whole and, now more than at any previous period in our history, the in- terests of the working people represent the best interests of | the overwhelmingly: majority of the people, the highest in- terests of the nation. “Now more than ever be- fore, class conscious Canadians need a party which, in the various stages of develop- ment which the struggle for Socialism has to pass through, always and everywhere repre- sents the interests of the work- ing class as a whole. Now more than ever the Canadian working class needs a party which, , while defending its every interest today guards its future interest also. Such a party is our party,° the Labor- Progressive Party.” [" has been suggested’ that our advocacy of governmental ac- tion to maintain exports was of a similar political character to Comrade Browder’s proposal for giant foreign development cor- porations. A little consideration will show that such is not the case. Comrade Browder proposed giant American corporations which would organize and carry through the actual construction jobs in other countries, owning the railways and industries in those countries after they. were built... We proposed that the Do- minion government ‘should. ex- tend loans or credit to the gov- ernments of the liberated and other democratic countries to en- able them to buy our products, to construct railways, and indus- tries to be owned by themselves. There is a basic difference be- tween the two proposals. action to maintain a high level of exports is at once a key ques- reaching change. Precisely: PAGE 6 — PACIFIC ADVOCATE tion of national unity in Ganada role : | domination. The ‘question of government. ' {ments in the liberated countries | ment is seeking a credit of eight | tical realities, to pose the ques- ‘cided is of the terms and condi- | | tiéns under which they. will''be (the people’s governments of the ‘tween the practical policies that ‘of class peace and our approach .in the government as the sole he Revision Of Marxism and a key question im the fight for world policies in accord with the Teheran perspective. | ‘The war has brought ‘tremen- ‘douse changes. Productivé ca- “pacity, in Canada and ‘the Uni-. ted) States, ‘has’ been almost doubled. Loans and credits to en-| able other countries to buy our goods there surely will be, the | question that is yet to be. de-! granted. Concentration of pro- duction, centralization of con- trol and the rising organic com- position of capital has proceeded continuously. The lower average rate of profit that will be one of the marked consequences of this development will be a powerful factor urging’ monopoly capital to» seek opportunities for super profits but the peoples’ govern- of Europe will not permit re- establishment of the old policies of imperialist exploitation and Right now the British govern- billion dollars from the United States government. It is quite logical, and in accord with poli- tion: “If an eight billion dollar credit to Great Britain why ‘not a similar eredit to the USSR? If such huge credits should be extended to Britain and the USSR there is little doubt but that credits would be granted to liberated countries of Europe also. Such a development would exert a profound influence upon the policies ‘of finance-capital. Thus advocacy of direct gov- ernment loans or credits is in ac- cord with the Teheran perspec- tive. It does not open the door to the idea of super-imperialism ard it.does not involve any idea- listic assumption that monopoly- capital will lead the fight for policies directed to achievement of the perspective indicated in the Teheran and Yalta Declara- tions. What serious advocacy of such loans and credits does in- volve is understanding of the need for firm national unity of all democratic sections of the na- tion to defeat those imperialistic interests and their supporters who would sacrifice the real in- terests of Canada to prevent the development of policies based upon the perspective of world co- operation for secure peace and progress. The foregoing examples illus- trate the marked difference be- we have followed in Canada and the erroneous theoretical concep- tions that we failed to challenge and reject. The difference was sharpened by actions such as our Open Letter to the Prime Minis- ter on the question of the wage and collective bargaining legis- lation and our Signature cam- paign in favor of amendments to that legislation. The contrast be- tween Comrade Browder’s ap- proach to Teheran as a platform to it as a platform of democratic struggle was illustrated most clearly in our election program and the campaign which we fought entirely around the need te defeat the Tories and put labor means by which to ensure jobs, security and international co- operation after the war. not: suggest progress or,. ground for tion of the Marxist polit ty; on the contrary, we # sized the need for stren tical action and parliaz) representation. 4 why we proposed to nomi. candidates in the j tions exactly when the ec; in (oe through the dissolution (4 party. It is clear now t’ extent to which we avoi_ peating Comrade -Browdi” rors in our own practi¢: | was due:solely to our clos’ ‘tact with thé) workers 2 greater «sensitivity of: our to working-class ‘opinion, is a priceless” asset: In v othe. fact::that.-the--comrai the United States attribut failure to detect arid icorr errors: earlier:'to: lack of party democracyswe may | | ified—but ‘there *is- no’ ere complacency... The: factivis =’ failed to sreeognize: the: vr. ism in Comrade Browder' retical work, we .sleugh: the contrast between thec accepted and practical w - proposed, while the den initiative of the party n- in the clubs—which oft. pressed itself in criticism. crepancies between our at and Comrade..Browder’s toy cal concepts—did: not jolt: © realization of what was 7 | cord with the perspectiv ~ made practical at Teherai continue and ‘post-war fight for such + — will be, essentially, the fi ¢@ completely extirpate fas | that is the fight’ to exte | strengthen democracy. To — and strengthen democracy Ae the post-war period .we unite all democratic for 77 support of jobs, security i / ternational cooperation—= © the people’s governments: liberated countries and to reaction, and the bearers — action, at home. That will — post-war path of the strug the long term _ peace and perity that victory has possible. ‘Contin HUS,. despite weaknes, ‘estimate of the per opened up by the Teheraz 4 differed. -from- -Gomrade:| der’s in /that-ours did ni pret the. Accord ‘as. aiplai : class’ peace’'in domestic | or as thevend. of imperiali*# proposals for: practical program and slogans, : from those put forward A y ide Browder in that <¢ rade effortless independent working-cla: How is it to be explair | our action slogans and 5. activities were generally © expressing’ -a line of active: gle against reactionary b tal and fascist tendencie;: | we did not even questio: rade | tried to explain the contr at the time as a consequ ' the difference between co; | in Canada and the United : We argued that even to | Browder’s theories | federz the U.S. were ¢. y Our task now is to s:{ all our work, -theoreticz || practical, to a critica! searching re-examinatit the light of Comrade 1°; article. We must. root a § tendencies towards revii’ )} theories and eliminate ai { flections of revisionism 7 practical work without m the mistake of “throwin } the baby with the bath ¥ || The fight for policies strengthen: SATURDAY, JULY