HE main thesis of

Miao’s address was that
the basic demands of the
hinese people are for ‘‘the
unification of all parties and
gtoups and non-party repre-
Sentatives in a provisional
democratic coalition govern-
ment, in ord=r to carry out
democratic reforms, mobilize
and unify the forces of resist-
ance, collaborate effectively
with the Allies in fighting and
defeating the Japanese aggres-
sor, and secure the thorough
liberation of the Chinese peo-
ple.” .

China needs a coalition gov-
ernment not only during the
war but also after the war, he
declared. “After victory in the
war of resistance, a National
Assembly based on a_ broad,
democratic foundation should
be convened to form a regular
democratic government of a
coalition nature, embracing all
parties’ and_ groups and non-
party representatives. This
Government will lead the liber-
ated people of the entire nation
in building up an independent,
unified, prosperous, and strong
-new country. After a democra-
tic electoral system has been
established, the Government
should be a_ coalition working
on the basis of a commonly ac-
cepted new demorcatic pro-
gram, no matter whether the
Communist Party is the major-
ity or minority in the National
Assembly.”

Mae laid great stress on the
necessity for the imniediate
formatien of a coalition gov-
ernment, declaring that the
one-party dictatorship of re-
actionary elements within the
Kuomintang is not only “a fun-
damental obstacle to the mob-
ilization of the full strength of
the Chinese people in the war
of resistance but is also sow-
ing the seed of civil war.”

“If. this dictatorship is not
abolished and replaced by a
democratic coalition govern-
ment, “not. only will it be im-
possible to carry out democratic
reforms within the Kuomin-
tang-controlled areas, and to

mobilize the people and armed
forces in those areas for ef-
fective collaboration with the
Allies, but it will also lead to
the calamity of a civil war.”

Which Road For China?

By Mao Tse-Tung

A textual summary of Mao Tse Tung’s address to the

seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, as

broadcast by the Yenan Radio on May 1

AMPELEYIN G his remarks

concerning the threat of
civil war, Mao pointed out that
“the principal ruling clique. of
the Kuomintang is still advo-
cating the reactionary policy of
dictatorship and civil war.
Many signs indicate that they
have been and are still prepar-
ing to launch a civil war and
are only waiting until Allied
troops have driven the Japan-
ese from certain parts of
China. They are also hopeful
that the Allied commanders in
China will play a role similar
to that of General Scobie in
Greece. They hail with approval
the repressive policy of General
Scobie and the reactionary
Greek Government.”

The promise of the Kuomin-
tang authorities to convoke “a
national assembly to return the
reins of government to the peo-
ple,” while at the same time
they refuse to allow the estab-
lishment of a coalition govern-
ment, was termed by Mao a
“mockery of democracy.”

He described the reactionary
clique within the Kuomintang
as “being bent on convoking a
so called ‘National Assembly’
entirely under its control, which
will adopt an anti-democratic
so-called ‘constitution’ and thus
maintain the Kuomintang dic-
tatorship. This will enable it
to put up a show of ‘returning
the reins of government to the
people’ by placing a cloak of
‘legality’ on an illegal national
government imposed on _ the
Chinese people by a handful of
Kuomintang members. There
will then be an excuse for tak-
ing punitive action against any-
one who opposes this ‘national’
government.” :

Issuing a serious warning
against such action by the Kuo-
mintang authorities, Mao de-
clared that “popular heroes are

Hundreds. of former inmates watch as flames

consume

in danger of finding themselves
in a blind alley.” He empha-
sized, however, that “whenever
the Kuomintang Government
abandons its erroneous policy
and consents to democratic re-
form, we are willing to resume
negotiations with it. But such
negotiations must be based on
a policy of resistance, unity,
and democracy. We can never
agree with any measure, propo-
sition, or other empty talk
which departs from this general
policy, no matter how well it
may sound.”

In order to promote the es-
tablishment of a coalition gov-
ernment, Mao proposed that “a
conference of people’s represen-
tatives from all parts of liber-
ated China should be called in
Yenan as soon as possible to
discuss measures for unifying
the activities of all liberated
areas, giving leadership te the
anti-Japanese democratic move-
ment among the people in Kuo-
mintang-controlled areas and
the underground movement of
the people in occupied areas,
and promoting the unity of the
entire country and the forma-
tion of a coalition government.”

[NX analyzing the development

of the war against Japan,
Mao pointed out that for a long
time there had been two dia-
metrically opposed policies in
China—“‘the policy of the Kuo-
mintang Government which op-
presses the people and is pas-
sive in the war of resistance,
and the policy of the Chinese
people who have awakened and
united to carry out a peoples’
war.” .

In making this point, Mao
compared conditions in the lib-
erated areas with those under

‘Kuomintang rule as follows:

buildings of the Belsen

prison camp in Germany. British who captured the camp used flame throwers to burn
away every last vestige of the horror.

PAGE 12 — MAGAZINE SECTION

“The Chinese liberated areas
now exténd over 906,000 square
kilometers, with a population of
95.5 million. In these vast areas
all essential policies of the anti~
Japanese national united front
have been put into force, and

. popularly elected governments
have been set up or are in the
process of being set up, through
cooperation between the Chin-
ese Communist Party and the
representatives of other parties
and groups. ...

“Chinese liberated areas have
become a democratic pattern
for China and the center of
gravity for cooperation with our
allies to drive out the Japan-
ese aggressors and liberate the
Chinese people. The number of
regular troops in the liberated
areas has increased to 910,000,
and the people’s volunteer corps
to 2,200,000. These troops have
become the main force in the
war of resistance, and as soon
as they receive modern equip-
ment they will become st§ll
more invincible and will be able
finally to defeat the Japanese
agegressors.’’

N areas under Kuomintang

rule, on the other hand, as
a consequence of the anti-demo-
cratic policies of the Kuomin-
tang authorities, “there have
been military defeats, the loss
of vast territorities, and eco-
nomic and financial crises. This
has given rise to a serious pop-
ular discontent, frequently ex-
pressed in open revolts, while
the Kuomintang troops have
been reduced by more than half
their original strength.”

As for

conditians on the

battlefronts in Myomintang.
controlled areas and libefated™.

areas, Mao declared that‘ since
1939 the Japanese aggressor’s
bayonet had been pointed main-
ly at the liberated areas. In
1948, 64 percent of the Japan-
ese forces in China and 95 per-
cent of the puppet troops were
opposed by troops in the liberSx
ated areas. oe

In 1944, the Japanese launch-
ed a campaign to establish an
uninterrupted line of commu-
nications on the continent and
found Kuomintang troops de-
void of the power of resistance.

‘It was only during this period

that there was a change in the
proportion of Japanese forces
directed against the two battle-
fronts. However, even at pres-
ent, the troops in the liberated
areas are opposing 56 percent
of the Japanese forces in China,
as well as 95 percent of the

puppet troops, numbering about
800,000.

Mao also stated that the ma-
jority of these puppet troops
are composed of units that went
over to the Japanese under
Kuomintang officers, or ‘were
organized by Kuomintang offi-
cers that had already gone
over. The reactionary elements
within the Kuomintang have
supported these puppet troops

, the Japanese aggressors,

t,csally “and voluntarily dev

ie PY.

attacks on the Chinese libe}
areas. i
In addition, these same
ments mobilized a large nv}
of regular Kuomintang tf
to blockade and attack |,
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia -B,
Region and other libet
areas. These troops at one}
numbered 797.000 and evers,
they have not been substa |
ly reduced.

Many Chinese and forei:'§;
are umaware of this se;
situation, Mao declared,:
cause of the severity of!
Kuomintang news censoi
“Many people know that f
is. a Mikhailovitech in VE
Slavia,” he commented. }
they do not know that ther 10
scores of Mikhailovitche £"
China.” ;

Concerning the two line?
policy represented by Kuc
tang and Comunist contre
areas, Mao drew the folle d
conclusion: :

“One is the course of vic
in spite of the fact that
carried or under such ad é
circumstances c
areas, with absolutely no {
side hep. The other is}.
course of defeat, even thf
it is carried on under suclf
tremely favorable conditioy

exist in -the Kuomintang 4},
trolled areas which .are tBu
by foreign supplies.” « (ddl

[X the latter part of his rc

to the Party Congress,
Tse-tung put forward a
gram for the decisive defez

ment of a new, democ #
China. Stressing that t&
must be no compromise

called attention to the gs
understandings and dealing hha
tween the reactionary elen. 4
in the Kuomintang Goverm
and the secret emissarie’ {
Japan, and declared that 3
Chinese. people should der je
that the- Kuomintang Gor §
ment flatiy reject any for §
compromise. f

“At the same time, the (RB
ese people should expand
strengthen the Highth Rt
New’ Fourth. and other pec |
armies; Moreover, wher |
the enemy has penetrated.
Chingse. people should un }
anti-Japanese armed fi ie
ready to cooperate directly - plat
our allies in the war agz#
Japan.”

To those reactionary |
ments that seek to prevent 1)
from offering armed resist
to the Japanese. “the Chi
people should in self-defk
deal a counter-blow after ff
monstrances have proved f
tile.’’

With regard to popular Iq
ties, Mao pointed out tha’
the struggle for freedom,

first and main effort of tM
Chinese people is dire Emo
against the Japanese ag¢h tn

sors.
*“But the Kuomintang ‘fe

anese. ... The people in G
liberated areas have ga)
their freedom and the peop!.s
other areas can and shoul: fe
the same The more free jp,

—Continued on next p

SATURDAY, JUNE 23, '§