i

| ten.

262, the

@ wage rate of the

‘age Tate adjustments
other classifications of
‘the transit service.

sceturning to work the
jailwaymen have re-
imany congratulations
fferumental cireles and
§ public on the orderly
5 i their ten-day strike
-tonically enough, from
ofuicials.

he first day: of the ‘tie-
is the stated policy of
4 Railwaymen’s Union
i for an early setile-
td to reduce public in-
fice, and especially war
* to an absolute mini-

fyer departures were
Pm this policy, were not
fhe recommendation of
isory Board. This was
bir at a meeting of the
yr Trades and Labor
on the discussion of
(7 transportation for
ters, and the cancelling
# vevious policy that had
anced by officials of
urging workers not to
les to work, implying
9 so would be a form
Fine’ upon the street

*“policy” advanced by
e trade union officials,
on by CCE opponents
no strike pledge, could
one objective—to ex-
strike into a general
i tieup war industry,
‘process put the gov-
-on the spot.”

pI e

“ARE A number of
*S in relation to this
hich every serious
forker must study—
some conclusions. The
istry—transportation”
only one.
‘aring the last days of
as a “misunderstand-
that Is a gross over-
jon. It is no accident
most yocal elements
no-rides” campaign,
are the same elements
2mm fabor’s no-strike
“playing the game of
| and dome the work
ized employers-” (Ar-
Sr, ©CF-MLA, Town
January 19th). The
‘enis who, through the
i the: union “publicity”
‘were able to advocate
wWation and extension
ke right up to its last
dless of the danger to
Mumbia’s war effort,
sentiment. :

J be imeorrect to say
CF publicly advocated
‘@ of the street rail-
‘Strike into a general
t. British Columbia
aocrats are a bit too
expose themselves by
iwightness, but it is

‘tellowers in Division
A other unions, were
Sciferous exponents of
“the strike. Their

_ 50 on.

qilwaymen and approy—

sn’s strike. The “logic”

It was dis-

€-than-a coincidence -

“were that “we must —
Fovernment they can-~

By TOM McEWEN

day. strike of Division 101 of the Street Railwaymen’s
vi-car services in Vancouver, Victoria and New Westminster, is ended. By a vote
ecided to-adopt the recommendations of the union’s Advisory

ndations proposed Sub- -. net play around with us”, and
jto the “Regional “War
(oard forzapproval- of: a.
Eperhour increase in

s In other words, hoping
that through the medium of the

“ Strike, it could be extended to
. the point where war indusry on
_ the Pacific coast would be erip-

pled, and to use this industrial
paralysis to flogz the war gov-
ernment of Canada! ‘These al-
leged “Socialists” differ very lit-
tle from their Tory antigoyvern-
ment crusaders.

No one denies the fact that
the Labor Department and the
NWLB acted with the grossest
stupidity in dealing with the
Wage negotiations of Division
101. For a period of 10 months
they bickered and delayed com-
ing to a decision. The B.C. Elec-
trie very cleverly pictured the
issue through its high-pressure
publicity campaign, as one be-
tween the men and the govern-
ment, and like Pilate, sancti-
moniously washed its hands of
the matter.

IM the public estimation how-
ever, it bears the greatest share
of the responsibility in tying up
transportation in three of he
province’s key* war industrial
centres. Behind a pseudo-pa-
triotic smokescreen of publicity,
the B.@. Electric strained every
effort to. obstruct a speedy set-
lement. It played the Tory
game of seeking to obstruct the
wax-effort under the pretense of

defending it.

[ee STRIKE could. have been

avoided; the exertion of
greater moral pressure upon the
BC Hlectrie and the govern-
ment, through maximum labor
unity and public support to the
legitimate claims of the street
railwaymen. By such means
the need for strike action could

have been eliminated with its -

consequent threat to the war
effort of British Columbia’s key
centres. The ultra-leftist desire
to toss ultimatums around, is
not in keeping with labor’s no-
strike pledge to the armed
forces and the nation, neither
is it the hall mark of sound lead-
ership, which subsequent events
clearly showed.

Grievances against the em-
ployer or incompetent and pro-
erastinating government offi-
eials and Boards may be legiti-
mate in every respect, and satis-
factory adjustments long over
due, but labor’s No. 1 grievance,
which must take precedence
over all others, is the defeat of
Hitler fascism. Anything that
endangers that victory is
against the interests of labor.
Labor’s ultimatums must be di-
rected at Hitler and not against
its own interests as an inegral
part ef the nation.

e
| \CoOBDENG to CCF spokes-
men, Jabor’s no - strike

pledge is all haywire. It can
even be “proved” by references
to~ trade union constitution.
Here is how the question is de-
veloped by Arthur Turner, CCF-
MLA at a Town Meeting over
station CJOR; Mr. Turner does
not agree with labor’s no-strike
pledge (he claims he agrees
with a. no-strike policy) and
like Mr CGoldwell on the con-
seription issue, seeks to make
a very fine distinetion between
a policy and a pledge. “A

In Analysis of the BCER Strike

Union, which tied up

pledge”, says Mr. Turner, ‘“‘is
something you get in a pawn-
shop when you turn your coat
in.” This learned Social Demo-
cratic hairsplitting will fool no
one. Mr. Turner is asked the
question, “What would happen
to our boys overseas if supplies
ceased to go forward? (as a re-
sult of strike action)”. Answer:
“Well, the war would stop.” In
the hubbub that followed this il-.
luminating reply, Mr. Turner
elaborated further, “well,” it
would stop on our side anyway.”
“Our side” of course is the Al-
lied Nations, and if our side
stops, it can only mean a victory
for Hitler. :

Perhaps Mx. Turner, like his
German Social Democratic pro-
totypes in 1933, has an idea that
his CCE philosophy would be ac-
ceptable to Der Feuhrer. Seemt
ingly Mr Turner and his col-
leagues are prepared to wreak
labor unity and laber’s pledge
to Canada’s armed forces in this
hope. It is more than a coinci-
dence, that in the street rail-
waymen’s union and in other
unions, the vocal) minority for
the extension of the street rail-
waymen’s strike into a general
strike, held the same views as
Ma. Turner.

Unlike Ma. Turner however,
these elements hesitated to de-
clare that their actions were in
line with CCF policies. We are
at least indebted to Mr. Tur-
ney for his stated objections in
opposing labor’s no - strike
pledge. -

The lessons of the street rail-
Wwaymen’s strike are crystal
clear, as are the dangers.

Labor’s no-strike pledge is a
pivotal point in. labor-manage-
ment - government relations:-—
not something to be barganed
away across the counter, but a
guide to policy. Through inde-
pendent trade union political ac-
tion (PAC) many questions can
be resolved in the field of legis-
lative dema'nds, while wage ad-

justments and other problems —

before government Boards can
be hastened, corrected and set-
tled, through more adequate
labor representation on such
Boards, with a maximum of
labor unity and public support
as the motive force to make such
demecratic _machinery work.
The decisions of such Boards as
well as the efforts to secure
such decisions, must be govern-
ed and subordinated to the one
Major task of the nation—the
one major task of labor . . . vic-
tory over Hitler fascism.

“EASY WITH THE SLEDGE HAMMER, BOYS -
WE CANT GET ANY MORE FOR DURATION® © —~

Saturday, January 27, 1945 — Page 5

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A Vital Question

“WHAT is the secret of the Russian success in drives like the one now
in progress?” This question was asked of me a few days ago. Many

people are asking it all over the world. The erushing advance of the :

Red armies, to many, an amazing performance, as it sweeps like a tidal

wave across Poland, burying beneath it, the once mighty and terror-

inspiring: Nazi Wehrmacht and, as Churchill put it, “liberating Poland.”

But it is not so amazing when it is understood. Nor is it any secret
to those who know and understand the difference between the outlook
on the war of the whole Soviet people and some other of the allied peo-
ples. Organization plus singleness of purpose to defeat fascism is the
whole key to the victories of the armies under Stalin’s command.

While faint-hearts and scission-mongers like Wilson Woodside were
commenting and wondering why the Red Army was so (apparently)
inactive and what they were going to do, what was going to be their
next move, the Red Army generals (their purpose to defeat the Nazi
hordes already established) were organizing. They were piling up
the guns, the tanks, the ammunition, the food, to keep their armies
rolling across Poland.

This is the most important part of any war, insofar as one sector
of a war can be said to be more important than others—the organization
of campaigns; making available everything necessary down to the last
spoonful of soup or beans or bully beef, and for a sufficient leneth of
time to accomplish the objectives laid down by the general staff.

When armies were smaller, in the time of Napoleon for instance,
they lived off the country, except when they were faced with the scorch-
ed earth policy as Napoleon was in the invasion of Russia in 1812.
Purther back in history when they were smaller still, they carried their
food and weapons with them. c

After the battle of Bannockburn, when the Scots drove the Eng-
lish out of their country for keeps, the English king agreed, by treaty,
to pay a sum of money as reparation to the Scots. Fifteen years later it
had not been paid, so the Seots decided to collect. They sent an army
of cavalry into England. Every man had two saddle bags, one sack of

eats for the horse and one sack of oatmeal for himself. That was all

the organization they needed at that time. They collected too.

= The problem is more complicated today, for it has to embrace
everything from railroads to the buttons on the soldiers’? pants, but it is
essentially the same. In magnitude it is a colossal problem where tens
of millions of men and all their equipment are to be handled. It is too
big: in fact, for a nation or group of nations in which profit-mongerins
ereates divided interests—and consequently disorganization. Hiitler’s
armies are perishing on that rock.

The success of the Red Army is a proof of the superiority of the
Socialist form of society for getting things done efficiently over the
class forms of society, a victory of social unity over class divisions, an
answer to slander-mongers like William LL. White and Max Hastman of
the Readers’ Digest and Matthew Woll of the AFL who demands that
all restrictions be lifted off business so that the old dog-eat-doge style of
American cutthroat competition ‘that built our great industries” may
be established once again on this continent.

Financial or Physical?

LOCAL columnist, Bruce Hutchinson, locks horns with Perey Ben-

gough for a statement Bengough made recently about the possibility
of society to provide jobs for everyone after the war is over. Bengough’s
contention is that “what is physically possible is financially possible.”

Yo Hutchinson this is a meaningless phrase like the old gage that,
“if we had some eggs we could have some ham and eggs if we had the
ham.” This if flippancy of the worst kind. Hutchinson’s view is that
the statement can only be true if it is also politically possible: that it
has only been accomplished under dictators. 2

If this point of view is admitted. what is the matter with demo-
eracy? But is it correct? In the early days of the hungry thirties, in
all the democratic countries, the same kind of argument was advanced
by the small-minded elements in the city, provincial and federal sovern—
ments, aS a reason for refusing to provide relief for the unemployed.
There was no question about the physical possibility since the ware-
houses were bursting with foodstuffs; but according to the solons it
was “financially impossible.”

This is a natural approach to such a question in a capitalist society
by the people who accept things as they are, since those who own
wealth are restricted in numbers and are willing to part with it only
for a financial consideration. They talk vociferously about “service” to
the community but their talk is on a par with the claims of “service”
made by the B.C. Collectric.

Bengough is right despite Hutchison’s logical hairsplitting and
philosopical cheese-paring. Notwithstanding the “financial impossi-
bility”? of accomplishing the physical possibility of feeding the unem-
ployed masses during those lean and penurious years of the third decade
of the century, it was done. Certainly it was not on a Ghamber of Com-_
merce banquet style, but they were fed, and within the limits of capital-
ist democracy. It was. “politically possible” without resorting to So-
cialism, by the pressure of the people who had to be fed.

Today jobs have been found for everyone. The war has created a
manpower shortage. In the reconversion from wartime to peacetime,
if the “financial impossibilists” do not immediately provide work for all
who are demobilized from the armed forces and war industry, not only
guarantee it but provide it, the same kind of pressure will solve their
problems for them, again without resorting to Socialism—for it will be
jobs these men want, not Socialism yet. As Hutchison says “we are also
human.” :

For a Soft Peace

Now that the Allied armies appear to be winning the war, Dorothy
Thomson who started out to be a spitfire turns out to be only a
backfire. :