| China

teiet Union, Britain and
sd -States have suffi-
or considering the de-
jer possible in 1943,
Sritain and the United
sufficient bases for
ithe defeat of Japan
t year ...”
eiresting to place this

=

5

oe

“Gy Over Japan In 1944
us

om the statement is-
® Gentral Committee of
#iist Party of China on
Wiversary of China’s war

reek by General Doug-
ur, Allied commander
@ast Pacific theater.

opping, with extrava-
and slow progress—
-areports indicating vic-
¥ied as Jong as 1949—
Jiea of how to end the
| and cheaply as pos-

meral MacArthur stat-
should be “massive
geost main strategic ob-
ilizing surprise and
fiking power support-

“massive strokes” are
)28 seems certain from!
ment of Lord Louis

~ eet.” 1B

against the statement

Be

Mountbatten to command Allied
forces in southeast Asia, but this
does not alter the fundamental
needs of China, the main_center
of the war against Japan; as set
out in the Communist Party’s
statement.

“In the present international sit-
uation, the Chinese war of resis-
tance is confronted with two prob-
lems:

1. To win time to overcome dif-
ficulties in order to win final
victory over Japan.

2. To achieve complete agree-
ment between all parties on
questions relating to the pres-
ent war of resistance and post-
War reconstruction in order to
defend our counttry better
and consolidate our forces for
its post-war reconstruction.

“In other words,” declared the
statement, “it is a problem of time
and unity.”

The statement further declared
that “the military and civilian pop-
ulation of China must unitedly sup-
port Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek” as the leader of the war of
resistance and stated that the
Communist Party “recognizes the
Generalissimo, not only as the
leader of the war of resistance
but also of the reconstruction of
post-war China.”

Post-war China, it asserted, must
be “an independent state, living in
a family of nations on the basis
of equality and not as a colonial,
semi-colonial or vassal state.

“Post-war China must be a unit-
ed and peaceful state and not torn
by internal strife. It must be a
democratic state, neither dictator-
ial, semi-feudal, nor soviet, nor
socialist.

“Post-war China must make pos-
sible the economic wellbeing and
prosperity of the entire population
and not merely one section of it.
It should not confiscate land or
factories by force.

“Post-war China must be a dem-
ocratic republic on the basis of uni-
versal suffrage and the coopera-
tion of all parties. In short, the

; new order in post-war China must
;be built on the principles of San

Min Chui, Sun Yat-sen, on the
Koumintang program for resist
ance and post-war construction.”

1 United States

AWA Endorses Fourth Term

aE in New York the

adyention of the United

Radio and Machine
Bei@), representing 500,-
4° in US war factories,
4 exchange of delegates
= lish Amalgamated En-

Mion and the Metal
mon of the Soviet Union
CI@ President Philip
ake action to collabor-
© British, Soviet and
misphere trade union
' resolutions the UER
for a speedy attack on
= ope, endorsed Presi-
felt for a fourth term
‘ ited labor’s no-strike

ig the urgent need for
@ labor cooperation, the
asked Murray “to in-
al delegates from the
fet and Western Hem-
© union movements to
conventicn of the CIO”
dther CIO metal work-
#0 join in establishing
with British and Soviet
Rank and file delegates
?Hnion shops.

ding an immediate land
| Western Europe, the
@ resolution declared:
£st strength and assur-

4
‘
}
j

ance of victory in this peoples’ war
lies in the combined strength of the
United Nations. United, full-scale
military action against our common
enemies gives the greatest assur-
ance of early victory. Therefore we
call upon our government and the
fovernments of the United Nations
to speed the day when the full
weight of the military power of the
United Nations will be brought to
bear against the Western as well
as the Eastern and Southern gates
of Hitler’s European forces.”
Galling attention to reaction-

ary attempts “to sabotage the war
effort by creating partisan polit-
ical division and strife,” the con-
vention enthusiastically endorsed

President Roosevelt for a fourth
term as the “outstanding figure
around whom the American peo-
ple can rally for the uncondi-
tional surrender of the Axis.”
The action was the first of its
kind adopted by a major US

union.

All the international officers
were re-elected. They were: Presi-
dent, Albert J. Fitzgerald: secre-
tary-treasurer, Julius Emspak: and
organizational director, James
Matles. It was announced that
Matles will enter the US army
later this month, to join the 110,000
union members already in the
armed services.

Red Army General
Replies To ‘Experts’

By Major-General Galaktionov

This article, written before the unconditional surrender of Italy, is condensed from the
Soviet trade union magazine, War and the Working Class.

= biggest military operations and battles in the summer of 1943, as in the preceding
two years, are being fought on the Soviet-German front.

In the course of the summer our Allies have carried out landing operations in Sicily
which are now ended in the complete possession of the island. They continue to bomb
Germany, Italy and certain districts occupied by the Germans. Such is the general pic-
ture of the military operations conducted in Europe over the summer.

The New York Times military
observer, Baldwin, while recog-

nizing the Soviet Front is the -

“biggest and most important in
Europe,” is of the opinion that
the operations in Sicily constitute
a second front, and the war in
the air over Western Europe a
third front.

If one were to reduce the whole
Situation to a question of arith-
metic, without taking into account
the real strategie significance of
the military operations, such an
enumeration could be continued,
and it could be said that the sub-
marine warfare, for instance, is a
fourth front, etc.

Taking this position, Baldwin
declares that the Soviet Union,
in failing to recognize the exis-
tence of second and third fronts
in Europe, thus underestimates
the war efforts of Britain and the
United States. Baldwin's concep-
tion is that not only is there a
“second” front in Europe and
even a “third” one, but that the
Soviet front is able to hold out
only thanks to the existence of
these fronts; that without them
the Red Army woud not have
been able to pass over to the of-
fensive:

UT what are the facts? In 1941,

when Germany attacked the
Soviet Union, Britain did not
have the necessary means even
for home defense in the event of
a German invasion; the United
States was not at war at the
time. The Red Army was com-
pelled to withdraw in the face of
Superior enemy forces.

The Red Army nonetheless beat
off the enemy with its own forces
and routed the Germans at Mos-
cow in 1941, The Red Army thus
saved the Allied cause and se-
cured the time to build up the
armed forces of Britain and the
United States.

The difficult circumstances un-
der which the United States en-
tered the war in December, 1941,
and the decisive role played by
the fact that the German army at
the time was completely tied
down to the Soviet-German Front
are known.

“In 1942 the Red Army again
engaged in heavy struggle against
Ilitlerite Germany and its allies.
And again it held its ground with
its own forces. Again, in 1942,
the Germans’ main forces were
concentrated on the Soviet front,
and it was able to dispatch to
the African theatre only a few
divisions. Due to the shortage of
reserves Rommel was compelled
to halt his offensive on Egypt.
Possessing time to train their
armed forees and carry out un-
hampered action, the Allies most
successfully effected landing op-
erations in North Africa.

Would our Allies have succeed-
ed in realizing these operations

so successfully had Germany
been able to dispatch in May 20
to 30 divisions from the Soviet-
German Front for the operations
in Africa? By no means. Once
again the German armed forces
were pinned down to the Soviet-
German Front where the Italian
expeditionary army, composed of
Mussolini’s crack divisions, was
routed. 7

The very possibility of carrying
out the landing operations in Si-
cily was to a considerable extent
afforded by the severe battles
waged by the Red Army and its
splendid victories in the incred-
ibly difficult winter conditions.

The Allied operations in Sicily
are naturally of great importance,
hut they by no means can be
regarded as constituting a sec-
end front. This is obvious from
the solitary fact that these oper-
ations not only did not divert a
single diyision from the Eastern
Front, but what is more, did
not prevent Hitler from  con-
siderably increasing the number
of his divisions on the Soviet-
German Front. The Red Army
is now opposed by a larger num-
ber of German divisions than in
1942.

RECAEOING Baldwin's third
front, that is, the air front:
Both Baldwin and the Scripps-
Woward correspondent, Simms,
commenting on the American
bomber raid on Ploesti in August
and the losses sustained by the

American air force in this raid,
write that these Josses are ex-
plained by the distance of the
African bases from Rumania. It
would be more convenient to
carry out raids from Black Sea
bases, but the Russians, Baldwin
and Simms state, refuse to place
these bases at the disposal of the
Allies. After this, Simms, un-
abashed, circulates the false state-
ment to the effect that the Rus-
sians allegedly are stubbornly op-
posed to haying British or Am-
erican troops fighting shoulder
to shoulder with the Red Army.

Here again it is best not to
indulge in fictitious stories and
instead to look at the facts. What
are the facts? Only in one case
did the Allied air force directly
help the Soviet army and Soviet
air force on the front of struggle
against Hitlerite Germany. That
was at the time when a small
group of the RAF operated in
the Murmansk area in the autumn
of 1941.

Neither the British nor the Am-
erican air force ever participated
in any other military operations
on the Eastern Front, and cer-
tainly not because anybody in
the Soviet Union was opposed to
this. Even more, despite the re-
peated proposals from the Soviet
side, the Allies, contrary to the

assertion made by Baldwin and
his kind, not once expressed a
desire to have their troops fight
shoulder to shoulder with the Red
Army and aireraft on the Soviet-
German Front.

If in the autumn of last year a
proposal was made for Allied air
bases in Baku and Thbisili, where
no operations could be conducted
against the Germans, is it not
clear that it would have been
more appropriate to station Al-
lied ameraft nearer to the front
in the North Caucasus or on the
Central Soviet-German Front,
where it would have been able to
help the Soviet troops? However,
the authors of the aforemention-
ed proposal rejected this.

Can a proposal to withdraw
the Soviet troops from the Trans-
causasus and dispatch them to
battlefields on the Soviet-Ger-
man Front and in their place
bring other non-Soviet troops to
the Transcaucasus be regarded
as a desire to fight shoulder to
shoulder with the Soviet troops?

When both Baldwin and Sim-
mia strangely enough, now con-
fine Allied assistance {6 the use
os Soviet bases only for Allied
air raids on the enemy’s rears,
they thus emphasize how little
they are interested in the par-
ticipation of the Allied air force
in fighting on the Soviet-German
Front, where the Soviet army
and Soviet air force continue to
bear the full weight of the
Struggle against the main forces
of the common foe.

As is shown, the Allied air
raids and the other military
operations carried out by them,
despite their importance, have
not forced the Germans to
withdraw a single division from
the Eastern Front. What is
more, Hitler’s main air forces
have remained and continue to
remain on the Soviet-German
Front. Hence the Allied air
raids in Europe: by no means
substitute for a second front
in Europe, regarding which
the Allied pledge still awaits
fulfillment.

Wothing remains of Baldwin’s
thesis, according to which the
Red Army is able to advance
only because of the existence of
“two other fronts in Europe.”
Baldwin favors a drawn-out,
protracted war, a war of “at-
trition.” Why should he be in a
hurry to have the war over with,
seeing that this war is not being
conducted on the territory ofthe
United States?

In the Soviet Union, however,
Baldwin’s arguments cannot but
be vigorously rejected. They are
just a little too reminiscent of
the “philosophy” of Moore Bra-
brazon who, as is known, saw
nothing amiss in the fact that
in this: gigantic war not only
Germany, the enemy of the Al-
lies, was being exhausted, but
also the Soviet Union, a member
of the anti-Hitler coalition.

ats