Max Werner Writes—

oviet \Winter

ensive Marks

Beginning Of End For Hitler

INOW we see the pattern of victory. The successful defense of Stalingrad and the
Anglo-American offensive in North Africa marked, in Churchill’s words, the end

of the beginning.

. The Russian counter-offensive, with all its immense implications, marks the be-

ginning of the end.

“A real war of coalition has now started. There is now the closest interrelation be-

tween the Russian and the African fronts, and both are offensive fronts.

T am convinced that the
magnitude of the Allied action
in Africa was a surprise and
a shock to Hitler. His immedi-
ate reaction was to try and
counter this southern blow by
shifting part of the. Luftwaffe
from Russia, and perhaps also
shifting some land forces ac-
tually out of Russia.

But without overwhelming air,
power Germany cannot wage
offensives in Russia. Hitler thus
Jost the possibility of further
offensives on the eastern front.

At once the Red Army com-
mand used this weakening of
the enemy, even. though it may
have ~been slight, .to launch
counter-offensives the implica-
tions of. which are. difficult to
exaggerate.

Unquestionably this counter-
offensive has been planned from
early summer, certainly from
the moment the Russians were
sure that Hitler's entire strat
epy was directed against Stalin-
grad and the Caucasus. The
kernel of the entire plan was
that Stalingrad must be held;
for while it held Hitler would
attack, and while he attacked
he could be steadily weakened.

When the Russian counter-
blow fell, iprobably. timed in as-
sociation with the Allied com-
mands, Hitler received his sec-
ond major shock.

But now his offensive power
in (Russia is crippled.

The defensive capacity of the
Wermacht is being tested. It is
clinging desperately to terrain,
preferring large losses and grave
risks to thé loss°‘of a single
square mile. 2
““"[Dhis  dfense is “much less
elastic than during “the winter
patties on the central front last
year. In the long run it is more
difficult to defend the fronts
along the Don and the Caucasus
than it was to defend the shorter
front lines between Rzhey and
Bryansk, which had excellent
communications with the Ger-
man rear last winter.

Because of considerations of
prestige, Hitler will seek to
squeeze the last drop from the
Wermacht rather than regroup
his forces. S

_ dust.as the. African cam-
paign, by relieving Russia
from the full weight of Ger-
man strength and reserves,
facilitated the Russian offen-
sive, so the Russian offensive
in turn, by the tying up of
German forces, facilitates the
task of the Allies in Africa.
For the first time in this war,
the. Anglo-American and the
Russian fighting forces direct-
ly bolster each other.

e e ro)
2 pes ‘way is’ now paved for

- an intensification of this
war of coalition which has be-
gun so auspiciously. Hitler's
prestige is now invested every-
where—in Africa, before Stalin-
grad, in the Caucasus and in
the Russian central front. Every
withdrawal now, every defeat,
must have fatal military and

ip

psychological consequences for
the German army as a whole.

To save his prestige, Hitler
rushed forces to the Mediter-
ranean, only to find that more
than prestige was in danger on
the banks of the Don and the
Volga.

Purely from a military stand-
point, Africa is an outlying pos-
ition for Hitler; but on the
Russian front, his main forces
and his future are terribly in
danger. The grave risks which
he took in concentrating in
Stalingrad and the Caucasus—
justifiable only by victory—have
become a terrible reality. For
three months at the gates of
Stalingrad, Hitler has been de-
luded by the belief that he held
the Initiative. In fact, he tied
up his finest fighting forces and
allowed the Russians to exhaust
them while the Red Army mob-
ilized its strength beyond the
Volga for a crushing counter-
blow.

Today, Hitler faces in Russia
nothing less than the possibility
of the destruction of the core
of the German armies massed
on the southern front while his
enemies take up positions on the
continent from south to west

Hitlers own visions of this
coming winter have proved a
dream. There will be no stale-
mate, no successful, relatively
easy, defensive strategy.

For the Allies, the problem is
one of maintaining both offen-
sives, mopping up quickly in
Worth Africa, and going on
from there by clearing the
Mediterranean and knocking
Italy out of the war, while send-
ing maximum supplies to Rus-
sia to maintain the Red Army’s
offensive strength.

e e e
HE occupation of North Af
rica and its use as a
springboard for attacks on Eur-
ope wrecks Hitler's ealculations
and puts his entire European
defensive system in jeopardy.

The Allies have a wide base
for offensive operations on the
threshholad of the continent.
They have outflanked Hitler's
defensive system.

Thus one of the decisive
4asks facing the Allies has
been solved; they have free
space for marshalling their
armies whence they can hit
Hitler in the most vulnerable
spot they choose. For the first
time the German strategy of
“rreat spaces” is confronted
with a similar strategy by the
Allies. Hitler-ruled Europe is
encircled and a coordinated
offensive from the northwest
—SBritain—and the south is
possible and inevitable.

Furthermore, offensives in
Africa and Russia help to over-

come the crisis of confidence
which was a heavy burden on
the Anglo - American - /Russian
coalition thtoughout the sum-
mer and fall.

e e e

ERIOUS miscalculation and

deviations in the field of

Allied strategy are no longer
possible. False military doc-
trines, errors and miscalcula-
tions in planning will now be
eliminated by experience. The
doctrine of a one-sided exclus-
ive air war has collapsed, be-
cause it is refuted by the facts.
We see what happened in Af
rica. The occupation was car-
ried out by the cooperation of
all arms. The British victory
over Rommel was a model of
effective attack, and it was won
by the coordinated use of vari-
ous weapons.
Exclusive air war is not only
a negation of total war; it is
not even total air war, for it
artificially limits the fighting
to the zerlal forces, plus long-
range bombing. It omits the
vital function of aviation,
which is hitting the fighting
forces of the enemy and de-
stroying his military machine.
Exclusive air war would have
been a suicidal self-limitation of
military operations based on the
technical error that Germany
can be bombed into surrender.
It is now obvious there will be
no exclusive air strategy, but a
great coordinated offensive
against Germany. Let us hope
that North Africa and the pres-
ent battle of the Don have re-
futed this dangerous and super-
annuated doctrine permanently.
The North African campaign
puts an end to independent na-
tional strategies. It proves that
the narrowly interpreted secur-
ity of the British Isles is not
the determining factor of Brit-
ish strategy. The American Ex-
peditionary Force in Africa is
the spearhead of the U.S. Army,
and Americans face the Euro-
pean continent from Britain and
Afrita. This is the greatest com-
mitment of American strategy
in the Second World War.
S e ° .
HE North African offensive
means that a definite choice
has been made as to the main

direction of Anglo-American
strategy. No confusion about
which is the main theater of

war is now possible.

That means, not that we un-
derestimate the war in the Pa-
cific, but that we make a clear
decision for global war. A great
offensive in the Pacific in 1943
is impossible; but one can be
realized in Europe. To disperse
forces would not help materially
in the Pacific, but it could crip-
ple the Allies in Europe.

Axis defeat in the Mediter-
ranean will mean Japanese
defeat as well, for the issue in
the Pacific can be forced only
by the victory of the anti-
Hitler coalition in Europe.
Thus North Africa brings re-
assurance.

But there must be no minim-
izing the Allied task in 1943. The
offensive must be waged on a
scale corresponding to the forces
of the enemy. The task is fayv-
ored by the overstretching and
exhaustion of the German army
and by the prospect of its» piece-
meal destruction in Russia.

Mastery

ie IS an undeniable and heartening fact that big as it stil)
the Luftwaffe is on the slippery slope of decline. Neit |
in numbers nor quality of machines and crews is it as sir)

as it was a year ago.

The first cracks are beginning to
appear in the armor. Substitute
metals metals are at last finding
their way into aircraft; training
time has been cut down for crews
because Germany has been eating
into its reserves and has urgent
need of replacements, and because
it meeds every drop of available
highgrade petrol for operational
flying-

Even a mammoth air force be-
comes small and ineffective when
it is stretched to the limits of the
Luftwaffe. Hitler knows as well
as any of our strategists that if
an air force is to gain victories it
must be concentrated at its maxi-
mum strength for one job at a
time.

And now, thanks firstly to the
brilliant tactics of the MRussians
and secondly to the Allied offensive
in Worth Africa, it finds itself
forced to fight on three fronts si-
multaneously, and, in addition, to
patrol and hold down thousands of
square miles of territory smoulder-
ing with hatred of the oppressors.

Consider the tasks confronting
the German Air Force today.

Hitler has to keep* some air
strength in the north of Norway
to harass convoys going to and
from Russia. He needs other men
and machines in Scandinavia for
reconnaissance and for defense, in
case the Allies strike from the
north. He must keep night fight-
ers at home in some strength, be-
cause of Allied attacks.

Without an adequate foree of
day and night fighters and a solid
bomber force in Northern Europe,
his armiés in France and the Low
Countries would be helpless to hold
an Allied invasion, and Germany
would be wide open to day, as well
as night, bombing.

If supplies from the United
States are to come over un-
molested, there must be long-range
bombers stationed on the Biscay
coast to act as the eyes of the
U-boats and to attack Allied ships.

If the present Soviet advance is
ever to be stopped, and if the
morale of the German armies in
the east is not to be broken, then
it is imperative to keep bombers,
dive bombers and fighters in Rus-
sia. More air power is needed in
the Balkans and in Crete. Without
some measure of overhead pro-
tection, Rommel’s remnants cannot
hope to reach Tripoli or Tunisia in
anything like fighting shape.

Wow, with the Allied offensive in
North Afriea, comes a new call for
airplanes. -Bombers, fighters, dive-
bombers and transports have stead-
ily been moved south during the
last fortnight, and today the Axis
air forces in the Mediterranean
represent well over half of the
total.

They are based in Italy itself, in
Sicily and in Sardinia, as well as
on a number of Tunisian airfields,
notably El Alouina, the airport of
Tunis.

2 e e

AS so Hitler, who swore in his

Mein Kampf never te be jock-
eyed into the position of having to
fight on two fronts at once, finds
himself engaged in crucial air bat-
tles in two places in Africa and
in three directions in Europe.

The Red Air Force, which Goeb-
bels assured the world many
months ago had ceased to exist,
seems well able to hold its own.
The RAF is growing at a splendid
pace.

Within the last week or so it has
been stated officially that October
was a record month for aircraft
production and that our output of
heavy bombers this year is three

=

Of Air |

LONDON |

For the enemy another disq §.
ing fact is that the United Si F
seems likely to get somewhere §
its goal of 250,000 aircraft in
One reason why the Luftw#
is declining is that Hitler cou’ ff.
his chickens in Russia before ~
were hatched. He clearly gam ¥,
on defeating the Soviets be €
now, and in order to “make s: #2
as he thought, aircraft, pilots”
crews were squandered in a 1.5.
prodigal manner. Germany ~
forced to take a short-term ~
of requirements and to throw
the gaps machines which were
their best in design and men
were not fully trained. {
Some of the Luftwaffe pilots £
crews shot down over this cou
this year were still pupils of ti
Ing schools in Northern Franc
few were actually instructors i &
the same schools. That is ea
into resources with a vengea.
2 e e |
Bose raids on Germany !}
undoubtedly played havoc §
the enemy’s war production.
making of aircraft is such a « @
plicated matter that it can
hampered in many ways.

if the RAF hit blast furnace
the Ruhr the necessary steel is
forthcoming. If an aero-engine
tory is put out of action hund }
of good airframes remain inof?
ive carcasses on the ground
stead of forming part of a-stri
force in the air. Attacks on :
munications, such as raily
coastal shipping, and barges,
only cause long delays, but
use up tremendous stocks of \
able petrol, for urgent sup:
must then be carried by air o:
road.

Aviation spirit is likely to p |
one of Hitler's major headaxc ™
He has not captured the Rue
oilfields on which he was dep
ing and today has lost virt:
every prospect of doing so. 7
believed that in order to econor
German night-flying trainine
Western Europe has been stor

e e -¢

OW the air position
changed for Germany <¢ |

the days of the Battle of Brit
Then, the Luftwaffe had he’
the German Army to sweep 5

all opposition in France, and

comfortably installed on bases

its only target — Britain.
whole might of the then.scar
damaged Luftwaffe could be
ected against one front. :

The Battle of Britain cost ¢
many at least 3,000 aircraft. A ~
mendous number have been los
the Russia front, and perhap:
000 more in the Middle East
in abortive attacks on Malta.

A high proportion of the si
numbers of raiders sent aga
Britain during the last year fF
been destroyed; training lo
have been high, due to “cramm:
the syllabus; so have losses in ;
ties against our shipping since
building up of the British Coa
Command.

Germany started the war 1
about 8,000 operational aircr
today it is doubtful whether
total is more than half.

Production has declined st
ily due to the call for manpo
for the army; due to the
that Germany must arm and et
both a big air force and a
army; due to our bombing;
due to communications and
materials supply difficulties. f
ain, with its ereat Commonwe
Ajr Training Plan in Canada,
ample stocks of excellently tra
pilots and crews.

At no ttime in the war has
-air position been more promi

times that of last year.

than now for the United Nati