&

©

Lessons of the federal electio

An analysis by TIM BUCK, LPP national leader

T= political situation and relationships in which the federal

general election was carried through, and the vote recorded
on August 10 was mirrored perfectly in editorial comment by
the financial editor of an influential daily paper on August 11.
The headline that he put over his comment was by itself
enough to make every reader sceptical of his advice. It was
as follows:

“Ottawa Held August Election to Get in Ahead of
Possible Recession in the Fall but’is Setback
Really Inevitable and Can it Possibly be Dodged?”

The thesis belatedly put forward by that gentleman, al-
most buried in ambiguities, was as follows: “Those advisers
who led the Ottawa government to settle on August 10 as
election date were generally believed to have suggested a date
so inconvenient to voters with the idea that there might be
a recession in the second half of 1953. It has long been a
matter of faith with cynical election strategists that popular
votes during a recession are notoriously adverse to the party

in power. ‘Therefore they advise ‘Get the vote over to avoid
the whirlwind’” ... “Were the government’s alleged advisers
right?” (Maybe yes, maybe no, but) “Referring to the

present situation, the August Letter of the National City Bank
of New York suggests that. . . . The flow of U.S. capital and
the outgo of both U.S. and Canadian exports to other markets
has been narrowing. . ..” “However, there is a great deal
of purchasing power about the world... .” “The hopes for
expanding trade . . . meet heavy obstacles which need states-
manlike action in the foreign field. British exports have made
slow progress and other Empire countries are having balance
of payments difficulties®. . .” “Canada has to begin to get
into action at once and steadily maintain it.”

*
Now the significance of the mass of verbiage which the
above quotations express, the essence was not in what the
financial editor had to say but in the fact that he refrained

from saying it all through the election campaign, but rushed
it into print the day after the people voted. He certainly

knew St. Laurent’s reasons for calling the election when he

did and something of what those reasons should have meant
for Canada. He could have used his knowledge to the ad-
vantage of Colonel Drew and the Progressive-Conservative
party, which his paper supported. But, ‘instead of securing
advantage for the party that he favored, he and all.the editors
employed by the capitalist press and radio services cooperated
with St. Laurent, Colonel Drew, M. J. Coldwell and Solon
Low, and maintained a discreet silence about the unpleasant
possibilities which might have caused concern among the
investing’ public and the electorate. The questions upon which
the election should have hinged were literally kept secret from
the majority of the voters.

The contrast between the propaganda which dominated the
election campaign and the real political and economic situa-
tion confronting’ us was striking. The main content of the
Liberal campaign was to the effect that “things were never
so good, we are glad that we’ve been so successful but you
must co-operate with us to keep thing this way. Our aim is
peace and expanding prosperity and we have things well in
hand but don’t run the risk of a change. .. .”

Neither the Progressive-Conservatives, the CCF nor Social
Credit challenged the basic premise upon which the Liberal
claims were based. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say
that the most characteristic feature of each of their campaigns
was their effort to convince voters that they would do all the
things that the said voter liked the Liberals for, better and
more generously than a Liberal government would. Yet, while
they were competing with each other in the making of dazzling
promises, the real situation confronting Canadians was such
that the electorate should have been aroused about its poten-
tialities.

Starting shortly before St. Laurent announced the date of
the election there had, been a serious decline of industrial
construction. The immediate background of the slowing down
of industrial expansion was evident in the extending contra-
diction between production and sales. In spite of attempts
to keep sales abreast of production by selling on the basis of
“no cash down and two and a half years to pay,” there was an
enormous accumulation of unsold products at all levels of the

“ne 7 . . . . . D ;
Put Canada’s trade with Britain on a sterling basis . .. make Canada’s future one of national independence and all-sided development 1953 ~

country’s economy, from raw material produce
chants. Aggregate inventories have continue
while credit_has been expanded to the unpr@
of $1,500,000,000. :

Capitalist “overproduction” was evident
ed throughout the intervention in Korea 4%
boom. At the same time the government am
party leaders knew that a truce in Korea W®
indeed they knew that a truce could have ©
April but for the unscrupulous obstruction
States government. They knew that the B
had protested against that and had warned
truce negotiations should break down aS #77
United: Kingdom would consider itself #€* ~
its further action should be. ant

In that situation the St. Laurent govern
to help the Eisenhower administration in its am
a truce in Korea from being a decisive step
through the negotiation of outstanding issues:
signed a provocative military pact commit cell
vance to go to war in Asia again in certal? is
stances in the event that certain undé
demands are not met.

The statements made by Pearso
the United States. government announce
correspond with the statements made PY nts
authorities about the scope of the commitmer” it
But, it is a striking commentary upon the and !
ment’s attitude to the people of Canada fact ©
character of its election campaign that the het
had signed the pact was kept secret £0
U.S. announced it.

At the same time there was in
Canada’s “overproduction” and the gathering iii?
in Canada’s foreign trade were the resus | «ite

not immediately unavoidable. For exala of

d its Og
the

of)

4 of
ins
crea : jou

whether Canada would be the main sun 1953
United Kingdom during the crop year °

aa

al,
PACIFIC TRIBUNE — AUGUST