U.S. strategy in Persian Gulf

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By DAVID McREYNOLDS

Traq’s invasion of Kuwait is easier to
understand than Bush’s response. Iraq had
two real issues of merit. One, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia were heavily invested in the
West and therefore saw an advantage in
selling oil at a lower price; and second, a
recession that might be caused by higher
prices would cost them heavily from lost
profits on those investments.

Iraq (and Iran) do not have massive
Western investments. Profit comes largely
from the sale of oil, and Iraq was hurting
from Kuwait’s cheating on the OPEC
quotas and selling oil at low prices.
Second, the disputed oil field, largely
under Iraqi territory but being drilled by
Kuwait from the tip which ran under their
border, provided a reason for some kind of
legal action.

Invasion, however, is not the first
recourse a state should take, however, and
certainly the left should not find itself in a
position of being an apologist for Saddam
Hussein merely because George Bush is
no longer his good friend. And annexation
is not defensible, especially since Saddam
has wavered back and forth on this, first
saying he was not going to invade, then
that he had come in to support a
revolutionary movement, then that he had
annexed Kuwait “forever”, and then
making it clear the matter could be
negotiated.

I take to heart the words of the late
Kathleen Gough in CrossRoads pilot (June
1990) issue: “We know that armed states
and blocs of states — a 5,000 year
institution — are obsolete and more
dangerous than we can ever conceive of,
but we do not know how to create a
united, post-state world society.” One may
not know how to do this, but how not to
do it is fairly clear. You do not begin to
find excuses for intervention, whether
Bush in Panama or Hussein in Kuwait.

It is one thing to find Saddam Hussein
in the wrong, and a very different thing to
argue that his invasion of Kuwait demands
that we send even one American soldier
there, let alone nearly 200,000 men and -
women. This world is filled with things ~
which should not be, but which the U.S.
cannot set right.

Even as I type the final copy of this,
news comes of the dreadful slaughter of
Palestinians in Jerusalem. Occasion,
certainly, to cut off all military and
economic aid to Israel, but not occasion
for sending in American troops.

As for Bush, he has managed to
disprove the notion he is a wimp but he
has replaced it with the notion that he is
stupid. Here are some of the problems
Bush will face — and in some cases, all of
us will face — because of the U.S. action:

¢ He has destabilized the area,
undercutting King Hussein of Jordan,
Mubarak of Egypt and, of course, the
ruling family of Saudi Arabia. By rushing
in allegedly to defend the rights of
self-determination, he inevitably raises the
question of why the people of these
countries — not just the ruling families —
should not have a voice in determining
national policy.

* He has almost certainly edged
Western Europe closer to an open break
with the U.S. He has reminded Western
Europe, by the unilateralism of his action,
that interests which are vital to Europe
may be at the mercy of a less than fully ~
rational U.S. administration.

¢ He has quietly frightened the hell out
of Israel, which finds itself not consulted

8 ¢ Pacific Tribune, November 26, 1990

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g renewed instability

U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER... drumm ing up support for U.S. military against Iraq.

— and in fact being asked not to give any
public support or even advice — about
matters central to Israeli security. It may
have dawned on the Israel that if it comes
to a choice between oil and Israel, for
Washington there never was a question of
which choice to make.

No wonder the Israelis quietly urged a
quick “surgical” strike to assassinate or
otherwise remove Saddam, because the
longer Bush delays, the more likely he will
find himself forced into some kind of a
deal, while a “quick strike” would turn the
whole Arab world against the U.S. and
leave Washington no possible ally in the

Bush has quietly
frightened the hell out of
Israel, which finds itself
not consulted — and in
fact being asked not to
give any public support or
even advice — about
matters central to Israeli
security. It may have
dawned on the Israelis
that if it comes to a choice
between oil and Israel, for
Washington there never
was a question of which
choice to make.

area but Israel. But unless. the idea is to
destroy all of Iraq — or to send in an army
for an endless occupation and endless
casualties —Washington must accept the
fact that however much it might dislike
Saddam, things would not improve

’ without him.

¢ Unless I’m very wrong, we have
edged the Japanese into a discussion of a
new military role, probably including the
building of nuclear weapons. All of
Japan’s oil comes from outside of Japan.
Most of it comes from the Middle East.
Japan is a “super” industrial power totally
reliant on imported oil (plus such internal
energy sources as nuclear energy and
coal). With the U.S. already issuing
assorted threats about Japanese economic
penetration of the American market, it is
inevitable the Japanese will now get even
edgier. If the U.S. insists on the right to
defend resources it doesn’t even need,
what do we expect the Japanese to do?

e Saddam wanted oil to sell for $25 a
barrel. Now it’s over $35 a barrel and
every motorist is paying a “tax” for the
Bush policy. Every homeowner who uses
oil for heating is also paying a tax. The
living standard must go down even if Bush
hasn’t pushed us into a recession by
driving up the price of oil.

The reason for the U.S. going in is
rooted in old policies which have never
been rethought. When the Vietnam war
ended, having nearly bankrupted the U.S.
(it had to devalue the dollar), the “think
tanks” run by the elite realized the ruling
class couldn’t do this kind of thing again.
Not only did it cost too much, but before
the war ended the resistance it inspired
had caused a widespread questioning of
just what kind of a system needed such
interventions.

Therefore U.S. interests were to be
defended by proxy. In the Middle East, the
proxies were Israel and the Shah. But the
Shah fell, Iran liberated itself from U.S.
control, and the forces of Islamic
fundamentalism were unleashed.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan,

Carter, and later Reagan thought in terms
of some alternative — which took the
shape of a “Rapid Deployment Force.” I
don’t think the invasion of Afghanistan
was the first step toward some broader
Soviet move. But Washington and the
Defence Department wanted a way to
move large numbers of troops into the
area quickly. They had pressed Saudi
Arabia for bases and had been rejected.
No Arab state dared risk having an
American base, given U.S. policy
regarding the PLO and the relationship to
Israel. But the Saudis did agree to build a
network of “American bases without
Americans,” manned entirely by Saudis
(and in the case of Saudi Arabia,
“manned” is the correct form of the verb).

Thus when Iraq moved into Kuwait,
Defence Secretary Dick Cheney and the
hard-liners had the excuse they had been
looking for. The Saudis may have been
correct in fearing Iraq would invade them
next, or they may have had their arm
twisted by Cheney, but in any case the
Saudis did ask the U.S. in and in the U.S.
went.

Just how effective those advance bases
were can be seen from the fact that in the
two months from early August to early
October, the Pentagon moved nearly
200,000 men and women into the region.

So, at least in my view, the U.S. went
in less for oil than for bases, and having
gone in we will find ourselves invited to
stay —not only because occupying armies
historically have been able to arrange such
invitations, but because it is very likely
that the U.S. will have so irritated the
Saudi population that the ruling family
will be safe only with a U.S. bodyguard
close at hand.

How much the U.S. finds itself now
longing for the Cold War, when each
nation acted within some limit! Back in
1956, when Nasser took a gamble and
seized the Suez Canal, and found himself
immediately invaded by the Israelis, the
French and the British, it was the Soviet
Union, even though it was itself in