Announcement of terms of the Canadian - U.S.

By NIGEL MORGAN

agreement. for development of |

Columbia River water-power in:southeastern B.C. confirmed what every well- informed

political observer has suspected for weeks: that the Diefenbaker Tories have betrayed :
the courageous and patriotic stand of General MacNaughton and those fighting for a ?

“Canada. First” policy, and joined: with B.C.’s Socreds in approving:-one of the most
scandalous sell-outs of Canadian resources and job-opportunities yet to be recorded.

Sixteen years of discussions,
J.S2 pressures, top level dip-
lomacy.and = secret . negotiat-

ions with Victoria and then

with Ottawa have culminated |

in an agreement which con-
cedes to the
their main:.aim:
loss.to Western Canada .in per-
petuity of hydro electric pow-
er which if not ail
immediately; -will certainly
be desperately needed in’ the
future.

One thing stands out from |

the, welter of conflicting, fig-
ures and statements coming
from Ottawa, Victoria and)

Washington:
bia deal, in spite of its positive
aspeets and some concessions
U.S» interests have been com-
pelled to make to placate Can-
adian public opinion, means at

its tore further economic ‘“in-
tegration” with the United
States.

It means surrender of Can-
adian control over this vital
Canedian,resource,.and an: ex-
tension of the North-South tie-
up instead of the start on a
wast all-Canadian power grid
which

complex highly
with United States monopol-
ies, _providing thousands of
new Canadian ‘jobs.
we
Pioneer explorer David
Thompson could be excused if,

when he came down the Coi-|

umbia’s turbulent waters. in
1811, he failed to realize that
this. river’s mighty watershed

was. destined to become: the
centre of one of the most cru-
cial. _“‘independence”’ _ strug:
gles in the first century. of
Canadian nationhood. Not so
Prime Minister Diefenbaker
or Premier Bennett in the
year 1960. For the
stake that British Columbia
and all of Canada has in con-

trol: and development of the |
vast hydro potential is |

river’s

United States
It .means: the |

required |

that the Colum- |

could have provided |
the basis for a vast industrial |
competitive |

massive |

fe

| today: widely recognized.

It is estimated that the riv-| percent as in the

co of the North American

continent are capable of pro-
| ducing about one fifth of the
| world’s. total. hydro power.
And the Columbia alone, is
|capable of supplying thirty-
three percent of this fifth if
fully harnessed. The columbia
equals the great Volga-Don
i system of the Soviet Union in
| its possibilities, providing its
development is based on the
;|maximum power generation
/on the Canadian side and that
storage on the Canadian part
of the river is utilized to the
| full for. the benefit of Canad-
jians before being released to
the US.

The Columbia has a capac-
ity of 34,000,000 kilowatts—
five times that of the St. Law
rence. An estimated hundred
million dollars worth of hydro-
electric power annually is at
stake — enough to _ operate
one hundred pulp mills or
similar industries. More than
| enough to supply a hundred
and fifty cities the size of
Nanaimo, B.C., Weyburn, Sask.
or Fort Francis, Ont.

Combined with the rich and
varied supply of mineral,
wood, oil and gas resources

the headwaters of the Colum-
bia. originate, it could easily
provide 75,000 new jobs. It
means to Western Canada
what the St. Lawrence Sea-
way means to Eastern Canada.
Its potentialities stagger the
imagination. Loss of a broad
base for large-scale, low-cost
energy will undoubtedly han-
|dicap and retard industrializ-
|ation of the West for years.
| And, any mistakes made to-
| day will be magnified a thous-
and times tomorrow.
Electricity, as a percentage
|of the total value of manufac-
turing, varies .all_ the way
from 12 percent, as in the case

found in the Kootenays, where.

natural resources, this large

projects are needed .

about B.C.

. AND WHAT ABOUT B.C?

The U.S. negotiators who worked out the details of the
Columbia deal said this last week ina written report:
. Of great significance to the conservation of all

the U:S) time for solving ‘problems relating. to fish, wild-
life and other factors so that the impact of large storage
dams in the U.S. on them, may be lessened by the time such

k One is prompted to ask: And what happens to B.C.’s
resources, fish, wildlife and flooded agriculture lands des-
jtroyed by huge water storage for U.S. power dams? The
answer of course, is: The Americans don’t give a -damn

block of power provides (for

|

|
}

{

I

| donment, has been upped to

of aluminum, to less»than 1}
case want’,
manufacturing as a whole. In-
itially the aluminum type. in-
dustries would be

of

scale . supply

put would ‘be about. 8 ‘times
that of the power. Ultimately,
as other lines of maufacturing
come in behind the aluminum
and other primary processing
industries, the total value ‘of
manufacturing would: increase
it is estimated to something
like 100 times the value of the
power.
6

Snow and ice contribute
most.of the water that makes
the Columbia flow. For a
third of each year the freshets
of the Columbia flood over
the top of every dam— turn-
ing no turbines, providing no
power. And for at least an-
other third, each’ winter,
there -isn’} - enough. flow to
meet the power needs. This is
the nub of the power problem
of the U.S. installations on
the Washington side.

Possible storage sites, es-
sential for correction of this
problem, are located almost
exclusively on the Canadian
section. Ever since the early
days of the cold: war U.S: in
terests have been trying by
hook or by crook to gain con-
trol of this rich Canadian ‘re-
source, to get extremely valu-
able ‘downstream benefits”
in perpetuity for the least pos-
sible cost, and.to. the .extent
possible lessen the Columbia’s
potential for building up in
Western Canada an industrial
complex competitive with
their own expanding North-
west.

The original 20% Canadian
to 80% U.S. sharing of ‘“down-
stream benefits” pushed by
the Bennett government until
public opinion forced its aban-

ee
a

50-50 division. The 1954 pro-
posal of the Bennett govern-
ment to turn the Columbia
over to.Kaiser Aluminum for
a paltry $1-million has _ also
been drastically revised. That
was- the deal. which sparked
the launching of. the. Labor-
Progressive Party campaign
“TO STOP THE U‘S. GRAB
OF B.C. RESOURCES”

and}
so disturbed B.C.’s newly-elec- | What Premier Bennett didn’t |

|

‘ing at

: ae
attracted | ft

|by a-readily. available large- |}
relatively ||
cheap power. Then the annu- | ee
al. value of manufacturing out-

tee

RRaOR
LAKE

ted Socred Premier that he
screamed in a banner headline
across the front page of the
Vancouver Province of Nov.
2nd. 1954 “Communists Fight-
ing B.C. Dam.”

Since then the criminal na-
ture of Bennett’s give-away
to Kaiser Aluminum has been
fully exposed. Liberals,
CCFers, trade unionists and a
wide range of people’s organ-
izations as well as the provin-
ce’s daily press and the Fin-
ancial Post, joined in the pub-
lic outcry against the Kaiser
deal. Thousands signed the
Communist petition denounc-
ing the giveaway. Finally the
Kaiser deal was tied in a knot
by passage of the Internation-
al Waters Act — the Ottawa
Liberal government. bowing
to. widespread public clamor.

Because: the deal’ was thus
halted, U:S: bids for Columbia
waterpower had. to. be inereas-
ed. At* the 1956 Session, the
B.C. Legislature was told that
Kaiser Aluminum was willing
to pay $18 million for water,
which Premier Bennett and
his jailed ex-Minister of Lands
Robert Sommers, had tried
their best to convince the peo-
ple of B.C. they would be sell-
“4a fine bargain” for
$1 million just a year prev-
iously. Then the Puget Sound
Utilities Council offered to
build the Mica Dam for “free”
providing they could get con-
trol of .storage waters behind
the dam. A two hundred and

| fifty million dollar dam ‘“‘free’’

announced Premier Bennett,
trying to promote the deal.

| Sellout |

tell the people of B.C. then

was the real value of control
of the waterflow, which, if
that deal had gone through,
would have paid for the init-
ial outlay in three years while

the waterflow would have
gone on in perpetuity.

@
While actual terms and

many important details of the
new agreement are still a clos-
ely guarded secret, enough is
already known to show that
B.C.’s and Canada’s interests
are being sold short. Finaliz-
ation of the proposed agree-
ment will:

1. Surrender Canada’s right
to freely develop headwaters
of the Columbia and regulate
water flow to get the best out-
put from Canadian installa-
tions on what is Canada’s big-
gest single power project.

2. Rob’Canada of the advan-
tages of the Kootenay Diver-
sion, a major source of power -
itself andthe key to develop-
ment? of the. whole’ Columbia
system. By. giving’ the. U:S:
the long-sought clearance t0

build a dam at Libby, Mon- ;

tana, Canada is virtually
abandoning a project that
could produce, according t9
General MacNaughton, Canad
ian Chairman of the Interna-

tional Joint Commission, three

times as much power as Lib- . *

by at one third the cost.

3. Giveaway downstream
benefits that should acrue t0~-
Canada in the form of’ blocs of
cheap power’ for reduction of
B.C: hydro“ rates,;:if) the Koot*
enay River were to ‘be joine

COLUMBIA, pg. 3

October 28, 1960—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 2