LISBON — Major Ernesto Melo
Antunes is one of the Portuguese army
officers who led the revolt in the army
that overthrew dictator Marcello Cae-
tano last April 25. France Nouvelle,
popular. weekly political and cultural
magazine published*by the Communist
Party of France, sent two journalists to

Portugal on an extended tour of the -

country to find out what is going on
and what people are thinking. This
interview with Major Antunes is one
of the most interesting:
History has often proved that when
an army takes power, the people gain
little from the new regime. However,
in Portugal we see that when the
government in the armed forces
overthrew Caetano, they gained the
entire and enthusiastic support of the
population. People understood imme-
diately the idea of your movement.
What then, distinguishes it from a
military coup in the general sense of
the word?
A military coup, as it is generally
understood, is hatched by a half-dozen

high-ranking army officers who attempt ~

to seize power, first, without any
liaison with the mass of soldiers and
without any regard for the aspirations
of the people.

The armed forces movement in Por-
tugal is just the opposite. It was born
in the lower ranks of the army. It
looked to situate itself in the vanguard
of the profound aspirations of the peo-
ple, the different sectors of the work-
ers. It chose its leaders from among
the generals who firmly demonstrated
that they would act in accord with the
overpowering desire for democratiza-
tion.

* * *

With the installation of the Provisio-

nal Government, it is evident that

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, AUGUST 2, 1974—PAGE 4

you did not take power for your own

behalf.

Of course not! We did not have any
ambitions. We have only assumed pow-
er for a certain time, to enable the
transfer to legitimate civilian rule. We
have only taken power for.the defined
time that it is necessary to assure the
conditions from the transition from
fascism to democracy.

In this regard, what are your rela-

tions with the provisional govern-

ment?

The armed forces movement is not
a formal structural entity of the new
regime. What it really is, is the army
itself. Certain elements of the army
are in the Council of State, which is
a sovereign body, as are both the pre-
sidency of the republic and the gov-
ernment.

Relations between the army and the
government take place at the level of
the new institutions, notably the Coun-
cil of State and the military junta.

We are quite aware of the fact that
we must not interfere in government
activities. The government must have

its hands free to govern. But we are.

equally cognizant of the fact that it

-ean’t govern effectively without the

constant support of the armed forces
movement.

And what is the nature of your rela-

tions with the junta?

The military junta, at this moment,
represents the desires of the armed
forces movement. This is revealed by
its composition, the desire of the sol-
diers to have leaders who will move the
armed forces to the ends they have pro-
posed. Up until now the junta has
accomplished, within the general lines

set out, the responsibilities it assigned
"itself.

a * *
During. our stay in Portugal we have
observed in all areas of public life,
the desire to democratize the exist-
ing structures. If it is true that the
principal organizations of fascist
coercion have been dismantled, then
there would be little in the new
regime that has any resemblance to
the old. For its part, is the armed
forces movement considering any
reforms in the military structure?
Naturally the structure of the army
corresponded, in the old fascist regime,
to a certain form of the exercise of
political power. The army was effec-
tively one of the most important pillars
of fascism, and for that reason it had

Alvaro Cunhal, Communist Party leader, speaks from a tank.

an internal structure that corresponded

to the political exigencies of class do-,

mination — domination by a. class
allied to the large capitalist enter-
prises. I think that there’ will be pro-
found modifications in the structure
of the armed forces in the near future,
so that the army will represent the
expression of a new political current,
in harmony with the overwhelming
will for democratization.
* * *

Have you yourself participated in

colonial wars?

Yes, on three occasions.

And you can make some conclusions

today? :

It is really difficult to sum it all up
in the course of a single interview. It
was a terrible experience for all those,
like myself, who participated in these
wars and’ especially for those who be-
came aware of the colonialist fact. I
think that this: experience was the
essential factor in the degeneration of
the regime and led to the birth, within
the armed forces, of a powerful desire
for liberation.

You situate yourself in the vanguard,

not only of the armed forces, but also

of the democratic movement itself.

In your estimation, have you won

over the entire Portuguese army, or

are there still forces within it who

are hot sympathetic to these

changes? And how do they express

this? net

Of course there are still sectors
within the army who are way behind
_ the movement and naturally, there are
still a number of reactionaries. As you

~

_ment.

_that is truly democratic, not 0”

.ing created for the establishmer iy eI

-establishment of traditional >

are aware, after the 25th of April ma at
of the generals were eliminate@, rot
many colonels also discharge oust
active service. But this isn’t a cos
the army is still permeated w! opi
servative mentalities, reactionary | im. £
nions, which are now adapting. f un 4
selves to a society that they dom oad i
derstand. But the essential 15 alt ing
the accomplished fact. We are | on &
to help them become conscious- ror?
the other hand, the democratic
are in control of the developme?
the situation.

You are very optimistic .-- we jy.

Without being  Pollyannish- elt fh
can see the development of |
tionship of forces now in Portu,
is favorable to the democratic

a *

And from all this,
a conclusion?
I would like to say that our
bution is to have begun an im f the
step in the democratization He
country. But I must also state t
fundamental transformations a
to come. a
I feel that democratization
property of all the people, who se
terested in making Portugal 4 Cc

* t fhe
could you waste ¢

con

ae

the political and social point © vie” bre
but especially from the econom! Es

point. m
I think that the conditions af 4

democracy where the economy
truly democratically controlle -

I think that conditions are als?
created for the advent of a dem (4) &
with an advanced social connote is iD
don’t wish to say by this that s0t
is the program of the say away

a

Wi

democracy is not enough 10 fully
fy the aspirations of the people. nat
Also, we have studied the a h
Program of the French left, an of
read the Democratic. Challen8® snd
Communist Party of. France. wo
want to tell you that the latte jn
has given a number of people fot
tant people within the arme' is
an appreciation of the commun” sof
ties that is much different ont
positive than what they mig
thought before. '