Delegates rose from the floor to interject impromptu sugges- or self-serving speakers were ‘applauded’ off the rostrum, leading figures — including political bureau members — were criticized by name and urged to resign, few votes were unanimous. 4 « Pacific Tribune, July 20, 1988 Continued from page 1 ew observers were prepared for the astonishing display of diversity within unity that the con- ference developed in- to. Though it opened with some of the stiffness and cant associated with past Party gatherings, by the second day the face had cracked: dele- gates rose from the floor to interject impromptu suggestions and criticisms, long-winded or self-serving speakers were “applauded” off the rostrum, leading figures — including political bureau mem- bers — were criticized by name and urged to resign, few votes were unanimous. On the final evening, a tough three-way exchange between reputed “radical” Boris Yeltsin, reputed “conservative” Yegor Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev, did much to lift the shrouds of mystery and speculation from these three personalities and reveal them as three-dimensional and full-blooded in their different approaches but common commitment to the cause of perestroika. Declared Gorbachev, without over- statement: “This Palace of Congresses has never known such discussions, comrades. We do not err from the truth by saying that nothing of the kind has occurred in this country for six decades.” The public responded with more intense interest than they have evinced in any Party forum in a very long time. Most of the conference proceedings were televised — part of it live — and all speeches were printed in the press. On the day after the conference closed, huge crowds formed in front on newspaper kiosks, waiting for the morning papers to arrive. “That’s the only kind of line-up it gives any pleasure to see,” quipped one editor. Seven action resolutions were adopted defining the main lines of the perestroika drive up to the next congress in 1991. They are: on expanding perestroika, on demo- cratizing society and reforming the political system, on ethnic relations, on glasnost, on legal reform, on-combatting bureaucratism, and urgent measures to implement political reform. These will certainly be widely published, analyzed and remarked, for there is much in them that is new and sweeping. They can hardly be summarized in a few words. Yet it probably should be pointed out that the one which is considered central at this stage, the one upon which all of the others hinge, is that which deals with political reform. Gorbachev himself found it necessary to make ‘this clear several times, most mov- ingly in an impromptu speech he delivered on the conference’s third day. Describing the enthusiasm, raised hopes and genuine potential that accompanied two previous reform attempts, in 1953 and 1965, he asked: “Why did they fail?” All of “those past efforts ran into the x CPSU Agenda for change, unity of purpose FROM MOSCOW political system with its administrative methods of social management,” he ans- wered. “So I am telling you now: If we do not remodel our political system, all of our undertakings and all of our momentous projects will just falter ... “My-position is firm. If we do not involve the people in management, on apparatus (and we already have 18-million people in it and spend 40-billion roubles annually for their upkeep) we will never be able to cope with the task. The apparatus has failed pre- cisely because the system of economic man- agement and government as a whole needs radical changes,” said Gorbachev. Measures taken by the conference in this regard amount to revolutionizing the Soviet conference: political superstructure. First, to ensure the supremacy of elected bodies — the Soviets, or Peoples’ Councils — over executive ones, many steps were taken to broaden Soviet powers, guarantee their budgetary authority and provide means for them to fully exercise all of their constitutional func- tions. More controversially, it was decided that Party first secretaries will be obliged to stand for election as Soviet chairperson, each at his or her particular level. Many delegates found thts recommendation confusing — 209 voted against it — and some thought that it violated the goal of separating Party and state that had been advanced by the conference. However, Gorbachev argued forcefully and repeatedly — based on his own long experience as Party first secretary in Stavropol — that “to make the Soviets workable, their authority must be backed up with the Party’s prestige.” To those who ~ felt that separation of Party and state func- tions meant the Party should take a com- pletely “hands off” approach to the Soviets, he answered: “‘We’ve got nothing to feel shy