Delegates rose from the floor to
interject impromptu sugges-
or self-serving speakers were
‘applauded’ off the rostrum,
leading figures — including
political bureau members —
were criticized by name and
urged to resign, few votes were
unanimous.

4 « Pacific Tribune, July 20, 1988

Continued from page 1

ew observers were
prepared for the
astonishing display
of diversity within
unity that the con-
ference developed in-
to. Though it opened
with some of the
stiffness and cant
associated with past Party gatherings, by
the second day the face had cracked: dele-
gates rose from the floor to interject
impromptu suggestions and criticisms,
long-winded or self-serving speakers were
“applauded” off the rostrum, leading
figures — including political bureau mem-
bers — were criticized by name and urged
to resign, few votes were unanimous.

On the final evening, a tough three-way
exchange between reputed “radical” Boris
Yeltsin, reputed “conservative” Yegor
Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev, did
much to lift the shrouds of mystery and
speculation from these three personalities
and reveal them as three-dimensional and
full-blooded in their different approaches
but common commitment to the cause of
perestroika.

Declared Gorbachev, without over-
statement: “This Palace of Congresses has
never known such discussions, comrades.
We do not err from the truth by saying that
nothing of the kind has occurred in this
country for six decades.”

The public responded with more intense
interest than they have evinced in any Party
forum in a very long time. Most of the
conference proceedings were televised —
part of it live — and all speeches were
printed in the press. On the day after the
conference closed, huge crowds formed in
front on newspaper kiosks, waiting for the
morning papers to arrive. “That’s the only
kind of line-up it gives any pleasure to see,”
quipped one editor.

Seven action resolutions were adopted
defining the main lines of the perestroika
drive up to the next congress in 1991. They
are: on expanding perestroika, on demo-
cratizing society and reforming the political
system, on ethnic relations, on glasnost, on
legal reform, on-combatting bureaucratism,
and urgent measures to implement political
reform.

These will certainly be widely published,
analyzed and remarked, for there is much in
them that is new and sweeping. They can
hardly be summarized in a few words. Yet it
probably should be pointed out that the one
which is considered central at this stage, the
one upon which all of the others hinge, is
that which deals with political reform.

Gorbachev himself found it necessary to
make ‘this clear several times, most mov-
ingly in an impromptu speech he delivered
on the conference’s third day. Describing
the enthusiasm, raised hopes and genuine
potential that accompanied two previous
reform attempts, in 1953 and 1965, he
asked: “Why did they fail?”

All of “those past efforts ran into the

x

CPSU
Agenda for change,
unity of purpose

FROM
MOSCOW

political system with its administrative
methods of social management,” he ans-
wered. “So I am telling you now: If we do
not remodel our political system, all of our
undertakings and all of our momentous
projects will just falter ...

“My-position is firm. If we do not involve
the people in management, on apparatus
(and we already have 18-million people in it
and spend 40-billion roubles annually for
their upkeep) we will never be able to cope
with the task. The apparatus has failed pre-
cisely because the system of economic man-
agement and government as a whole needs
radical changes,” said Gorbachev.

Measures taken by the conference in this
regard amount to revolutionizing the Soviet

conference:

political superstructure. First, to ensure the
supremacy of elected bodies — the Soviets,
or Peoples’ Councils — over executive
ones, many steps were taken to broaden
Soviet powers, guarantee their budgetary
authority and provide means for them to
fully exercise all of their constitutional func-
tions.

More controversially, it was decided that
Party first secretaries will be obliged to
stand for election as Soviet chairperson,
each at his or her particular level. Many
delegates found thts recommendation
confusing — 209 voted against it — and
some thought that it violated the goal of
separating Party and state that had been
advanced by the conference.

However, Gorbachev argued forcefully
and repeatedly — based on his own long
experience as Party first secretary in
Stavropol — that “to make the Soviets
workable, their authority must be backed
up with the Party’s prestige.” To those who ~
felt that separation of Party and state func-
tions meant the Party should take a com-
pletely “hands off” approach to the Soviets,
he answered: “‘We’ve got nothing to feel shy