Close tf HE Congress of the Communist Party of France was a remarkable demonstration of that party’s power and very close connections with the people, particularly with the work- ing class. There were 788 delegates from the various federations. of the Communist Party of France in all parts of the country, as well as fraternal delegates from 40 countries. a fact which attests to the importance given to the congress by the world Communist movement. At the same time the press coverage of the. congress, even on the very closely government controlled TV,,. showed that the enemies of the Com- munist Party and the labor movement ‘in no way underestimated the impor- tance of this particular congress. Le Monde, which is the most re- spected daily, the paper that would correspond to the New York Times, and which together with l’Humanite form the two papers that serious read- ers of the press read every day, gave the congress about two pages daily. The main reason for this, I think, is that the Cmmunist Party, as a result of its success in achieving an electoral accord with the democratic and Social- ist left, as it is called, and also with the “unified Socialist Party, while the Congress was on, projected the Com- munist Party in an entirely qualitative- ly different way into the legislative elections which are to take place in March. The Communist Party and its allies — and associates in the electoral pact which was concluded on Dec. 20, just before the opening of the Congress, mow represents a real threat to the personal power of De Gaulle and the monopolies that stand behind him. The whole speculation and discussion in the press and in the country as a whole was on the effect the pact would have on the election result itself. First, about the electoral pact, which was discussed in great detail during the Congress. The Communist Party . had proposed to the democratic and Socialist left, which is a grouping of- various parties of the left, the largest of which is the Socialist Party led by: its general secretary, Guy Mollet, the conclusion of a pact the centre of which would be a common program on the main questions of foreign and internal policy in France, directed against monopoly and the, personal power of De Gaulle. The Socialist Party and the demo- cratic left as a whole did not accept the idea ofa common program on the grounds that, although they have many points in common which are specified in ‘the electoral agreement, the adop- tion of a common program could lead to the impression that there was agree- ment on basic questions of policy be- tween. the Communists and the non- Communist left which in fact is not the case. And this is laid down in the communique itself. This, of course, is a matter of great concern not only to the Communist Party but to many who follow the Communist Party and who in the Thirties were supporters of the Popu- lar Front. They feel that it is impor- tant that the basis of unity should be as clearly understood as possible. in view of their.sad memories of the betrayal of the Popular Front by Leon Blum. A further distinction between the position of the Communists and the democratic left has to do with those constituencies in which, after the re- sults of the first round in March come in, the left does not appear to have a res with the workel good chance of defeating the candi- date of De Gaulle. In those constitu- encies the Socialists do not agree that there should be a policy of withdraw- al of the candidate of the left who did not receive the highest vote of the left candidates instead they think such a candidate should withdraw in favor of the candidate of what is generally called the Democratic Centre, led by Lecanuet. Lecanuet disagrees with De Gaulle on the latter’s European approach. He has a pro-American approach on for- eign policy. The Communist Party re- gards him and his party not only as an anti-Communist party, which it is, but as a reactionary right-wing party which uses the name “center” and is ~ entitled to use it’only because it differs with De Gaulle on that aspect of De Gaulle’s policy which is of the greatest interest to the working people of conclude an electoral pact, that finally the democratic and Socialist left agreed for the first time in 20 years to a meeting with the Communist Party. . It is interesting to note that: it was Guy Mollet who seems to havé been the first in the leadership of the demo- cratic and Socialist left to propose to Mitlerand that such meetings should take place in order to conclude a for- mal pact. Guy Mollet has the reputa- tion of being a right-wing Socialist—a reputation which is deserved, in view of the fact that it was he who went to De Gaulle and urged him, begged him, to become the savior of the nation, and in view of his position on Algeria, where he was for the continuation of the war. But the fact that the Socialist Party still has a working class base, particu- larly in the north among the miners SAM WALSH was a fraternal delegate at the recent congress of the Communist Party of France from the Communist Party of Canada. In this interview with the Tribune he discusses the current poli- tical situation in France and gives some of his impressions of the congress. France, so that in some respects he appears to be to the right of De Gaulle. The attitude of the democratic and Socialist left is that alliances may be made with anyone who is opposed to De Gaulle. They also laid down in the communique that, in cases where the left alliance does not appear to stand a good chance of defeating the Gaullist candidate, they would support the can- didate of Lecanuet’s party. In respect to the agreement made between the Communist Party and the Unified Socialist Party (a small group of people that split from and is to the left of the Socialist Party), and a rather diverse group of Republican middle-class people led by Mendes France, there is agreement that, in a constituency where it does not appear that a candidate of the left might win on the second round, there should not be withdrawal in favor of a candidate of the Lecanuet group. But this group is a very small minority group, that gets a very small percentage of the vote and is not likely to lead the poll on the first round in many constituen- cies. 5 A very important aspect of the con- clusion of the electoral pact is the fact that it was made possible only as a result of a large campaign launched by the Communist Party to bring pressure on the democratic and Socialist left to begin negotiations. , The Communist Party had sent sev- eral letters to the left without any re- ' sponse whatsoever. It was only when large groups of workers in the big plants and mines sent “2legations to Mitterand, who was the presidential candidate of the left in the last election and represents diverse Republican groups, and to Guy Mollet, general sec- retary of the Socialist Party, and Wald- eck Rochet, general secretary of the Communist Party, demanding that they and others, turned out to be the deci- sive factor in making it possible to bring pressure on Guy Mollet and his party regardless of what his personal inclinations might have been. Guy Mollet also, when the pact was announced, was asked on a TV broad- cast to explain how the same Guy Mollet who was urging an electoral pact with the Communists was the same man who asked De Gaulle to come and take over power and run it as a one-man show. His answer was very simple. “I made a mistake,” “he ed. Another aspect of the Congress which I noted was the fact that it re- flected a very intimate relationship between the Communist Party of France and the working people in the Paris area. I was sitting in the car with a driver who was looking after some of the fraternal delegates, when a _ street cleaner went by. He glanced in the car and saw the delegate card of Marie- Claude Vaillant-Couturier on the dash- board. A big friendly grin spread all over his face._He lacked many teeth and was no Hollywood star but it was a beautiful look on his face just the same. He asked us to roll down the win- dow. He told us he had always sup- ported the Communist Party. He had never. been a member, but he had al- ways supported them in the days -of Marcel Cachin and Maurice Thorez and was very happy to see that when they passed from the scene there were cadres ready, as he said, to take their place and to stand at head of the working class in France and to give a worthy account of themselves. Said he: “I’m not the only one that feels that way. I don’t really belong in the Communist Party because I can't said. The answer was very well receiv- really make the kind of comlll that a Communist should may don’t let anybody touch the nist Party because France Cl without the Communist Party: | The same kind of relation’™ tween the Communists and tt ing people was seen even im By a shopping expedition for 8) with the Mayor of Ville Jullé) relationship with the people |) street of his municipality—w a. all knew him and 65 percent | municipality vote Communist (5 both easy and respectful, 1) the close relationship with the) ing people at least in suburbaly which is one of the main bas?) Communist Party. In Paris, U™ cities of North America, it is fy ing class that lives in the sublul) only a small portion of workels) in the city where the rents) high and where unfortunately no Communist deputies. But SU ing the city the number of CO™) mayors and deputies hasn't eV) counted, as there are so many 9) The Congress seated 788 Ce out of a total of 801 choset .| federations. Women formed cent of the delegates, althoug™ / last congress they were 25 - The average age of the delegat 35 years, the same as the gress. F, The youth of the congress was noticeable. It was also ex) noted and commented on in they There were 28 delegates UN) years of age and 87 from 21-2 i A total of 73 percent of the a were under 40. The Congress, of course, paid a deal of attention io the support, French people for the cessall” bombing in Vietnam and the ™ of U.S. troops from Vietnames? 4 formed a big part of the rel. Waldeck Rochet on behalf of © going central committee. Th ¢ ences in all the federations % i formed an important part of the tribution of every delegate wh” It was very clear that the my in support of peace and the 1 self-determination in Vietnam P| widespread, Of course the fact that the Dé regime, as a result of its oW"y a “ences with U.S. imperialism, 4, it necessary in. certain aspects | policy on Vietnam to come oul % the Americans, has created 4 sh where the resistance to the U» in Vietnam is almost una among the French people. i But it is to the credit of thé Communist Party that it hasaly ed De Gaulle to be the only ex?) or even the main expression resistance of the French peor was clear from all the discus*) the Congress, the Communist * | very actively engaged in gettitey port for the policy of U.S. withty and sending medical aid to Vi" and demonstrating in every Pi way its hostility to the U.S. im ist’s attack on Vietnam. i Fraternal delegates to the ©% from the Republic of North V& and from the National Libts Front paid tribute to the sol actions and moral and mateti@ they were getting not only ff? French Communists but from) French working people. They mm major point about this and pr the Congress with a flag from tn namese people expressing w!4) obviously very sincere gratitl” | the help that they were gettie: ff February 3, 1967—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—?™ y