.| of Sudan, stated in an inter-

What happen

By MARK SYDNEY

On May 25, 1969, an event
occurred in the Sudan which
appeared to have positive rami-
fications for all of the Middle
East and Africa. General Jaafar
Nimeiry came to power. The
Communist Party was represent-
ed in government. The Sudan
appeared to be the country that
could lead, by its example, the
progressive, democratic people’s
sentiments in the Middle East
to success. Yet, a little more
than two yars later, all this has
been drowned in a_ ruthless
bloodbath.

From 1956, when Sudan gain-
ed its independence, to 1964 the
country was ruled by the Right.
In 1958 the Right-wing parties
handed over control of the coun-
try to General Ibrahim Abboud
to deal with popular discontent
and the growth of the Commun-
ist Party, trade unions and pro-
gressive movement.

A period of severe repression
set in. The Communist Party
had already been declared ille-
gal by the previous government.
and now the trade unions were
banned by the military regime.
Workers’ leaders were impris-
oned.

The Communist Party of Su-
dan had been founded in 1946
by Abdel Khalig Mahgoub, its
late general-secretary, executed
by Nimeiry, and other young
Sudanese studying and working
in Egypt. The party grew rapid-
ly, through the work of Mah-
goub, outstanding trade union
ieaders like Shafei Ahmed el
Sheikh, and young lawyers and
intellectuals such as Joseph Gar-
ang, a Southerner. In the work-
ing class, intellectual, youth and
all mass movements the party’s
influence steadily increased.

By 1962 the Communist Party
was able to project the perspec-
tive of a general strike to topple
the military dictatorship. The
first action came from students
in October 1964. The police at-
tacked them ferociously, and
when a Communist university
student was shot during a pro-
test meeting, the people respond-
ed with mass demonstrations.
The trade unions, the Profes-
sionals Front and the Gezira
peasants joined with the stu-
dents to mount popular de-
mands for policy changes. The
Communist Party was active
among all four ‘sections. The
general strike was called for
Oct. 10 and it resulted in the
toppling of the Abboud govern-
ment. This mass pressure had
precipitated action within the
army itself. Young officers join-
ed with the Professionals Front,
the trade unions and the Com-
munists to force the-junta out.

Sudanese C.P.
not in ‘coup’
PARIS (TASS) — “Our party
did not take part in the July 19
events,” Izzi el-Din Ali Amer,

member of the Political Bu-
reau of the Communist Party

view with the newspaper
L'Humanité. The basic line of
the party was “to create a
front of democratic forces,” he
said.

On behalf of the party he
thanked the Communist par-
ties, the governments of so-
cialist countries, and progres-
sive people throughout the
world for condemning the re-
pressions in the Sudan.

When this photo was taken,

Sudan knew he was faced with death. It had already

were only there to legitimize the massacre.

But Mahgoub turned the trial around. Accused,

ed in the Sudan

Khalig Abdel Mahgoub, general-secretary of the Communist Party of
been decided in advance. The military judges

he became the accuser. His condemnation of the

Nimeiry regime and his own “judicial process” was so stirring that the judges were forced to adjourn
the public trial to behind closed doors because they feared the impact of his words on the Sudanese

populace.

The Communist Party, with
one seat in the cabinet, was
represented in the new govern-
ment for the first time.

Shift to Right

However, reaction was not in-
active. In February 1965 armed
tribesmen were massed on Khar-
toum, forcing the resignation of
the prime minister and a push
to the Right. Elections were
held that May on a restricted
voting system, and a Center-
Right coalition took office, al-
though the Communist Party
polled 73,000 votes compared
with 5,000 in 1958.

In these” elections there were
eight special “university seats”
where electors, in order to vote
in these constituencies, had to
have a certain high standard of
education. Although the Com-
munist Party opposed this idea,
it nevertheless contested the
seats and won all of them!

However, the shift to the
Right continued, and an attempt
was made to declare the Com-
munist Party illegal. In Decem-
ber 1965 the Constituent As-
sembly banned the Party, de-
prived the Communist deputies
of xtheir seats, and forbade the
“dissemination of Marxist
ideas.” The party appealed to
the courts and in December
1966 the ‘Khartoum High Court
declared the Assembly’s action
illegal.

Continued Drive

Nevertheless, the government
persisted in its attempts to
smash the party. Khalig Abdel
Mahgoub and the general secre-
tary of Sudan Federation of
Trade Unions were arrested and
the party framed on a charge of
plotting a coup, but popular op-
position prevented this frame-
up from being carried out.

Yet the party did not emerge
into full legality. Technically il-
legal, it- has always conducted
open activity. Even after the
coup of 1969, when Communists
were again included in the gov-
ernment, the party remained
under semi-legal status.
By 1967 the Right began cam:
paigning for an Islamic Consti-
tution which would have replac-
ed the relatively open demo-
cracy of the 1964 revolution

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, AUGUST 13, 1971—PAGE 4

with a tight dictatorship of
ultras, using the cry of Muslim
“religious purity” as a ruse to
crush the progressive movement.

The ruling party split over
the introduction of this new
statute. A political crisis arose.

Economic difficulties and so-
cial unrest grew.

Southern Problem

The government had also
failed to find a solution to the
Southern question.

The population of the South
is mainly black; the principal
religions are animist and Chris-
tian. The population of the
North is Arabic. Throughout Su-
dan’s history, the South has al-
ways been exploited and under-
developed, first by the British,
and after independence, by the
Northern bourgeoisie. The South
has never had equitable political
rapresentation in government.
As well, economic planning
since 1956 has given the South,
with about half the population
of Sudan, only 10% of its fiscal
allotment. As a result of na-
tional, religious, political and
economic oppression reaction
has been able to use the senti-
ments of the Southern popula-
tion in attempts to break up the
Sudan; a “liberation army” has
been operating in the South for
many years, financed by Amer-
ican, British, and Israeli capital.

The avowed objective of the
“liberation army” is indepen-

dence for the South, but its real

f

Z Me.
COL. BABIKER EL-NUR

consequence, just as in the Bia-
fra incident, would be to weaken
both groups, and leave them
even easier prey to imperialist
penetration. The overall solu-
tion proposed by the Communist
Party of Sudan is full regional
autonomy for the South, along
with massive government pro-
jects to speed its development.

All in all the government was
incapable of moving out of the
political and economic chaos
facing the country.

1969 Officers’ Coup

The Congress of the Commun-
ist Party of Sudan in 1967 warn-
ed against the view that the
only way out of the impasse
was a coup, which could upset
the balance in the revolutionary
alliance, cutting off the genuine
initiative of the people. Yet on
May 25, 1969 army officers over-
threw the government.

Since the early 1960’s the
Communist Party had been
working with the Free Officers’
Movement, a general alliance of
progressive officers that included
Nationalists, Arab Socialists, and
Communists. Early in 1969 the
Party and the Free Officers set
up a joint committee to discuss
the next steps.

Traditionally, military .coups
have been merely a means of
passing government office from
one group to another, or mind-
ing the shop for capital in times
of general crisis, and growing
mass popular movements. But
today there are factors tending
to produce new types of army
officers and new types of coups.
Where officers are being increas-
ingly drawn from petit-bourgeois
sections as distinct from the old
feudal and bourgeois classes,
some respond actively to the
pressure’ of the democratic
forces for change and against
imperialist and neo-colonialist
domination (Nasser in Egypt;
the new regimes in Peru and
Bolivia). Coups by this type of
officer can be the basis for the
transfer of pbwer from the old
reactionary classes to the new
democratic classes.

The Sudanese Communist
Party noted that “the mapority
of the soldiers and the NCO’s

come from among the toiling

‘country along a Pl

- struggle leading to 4

masses and are, Mel
against imperialism and
vested interest in led

path. Most of the offi
educated petit-bourge?

On May 24 some of F
Officers contacted the Pl
said they would be 4
next morning. Would
back them?

The Party advised #°
pointing out that the ™
ment was not rising: b
offer support for thé
ernment when the
launched. The Commvm,

mination of a gf

power and not merely
for solving contradic
the existing political ©
Nevertheless the party
tions in the army 4”
unions were mobiliZ
port the officers’ actio®
The New Regist?
The first act of they
gime was to ban
parties. General Jaatal iy
became the leader oa
Revolutionary Comm
cil. t
Despite the ban OF .
sitet Party, the Nimell
relied on it for supp
nel and policies. They’
number of civilians, ofl
sonal capacity, to @
cluding three Com
brought the total © 4
ists in government 1 9
Socialist. members ©
Officers, who it seems
privy to the decisio® cl
the coup, were als0 ‘net
the Council—amone ok
Babiker el-Nur, F@ aim
dalla, and Hashem A C
The Revolutionayy
Council moved 1 ‘te
number of policy 5% 99
cluding a key de ] ;
South. The Five-¥&%
the National Charter.
lished in 1970. Thé
statement of gene! f
and an outline of P?
mediate implement@
It outlines a proere
nomic developmen 4
country from forele on
in trade and bank cor
ing the growth of @ 4
a state-private, ®
sector, along with vod!
sures for the int ip
modern techniques —
and agriculture.
The Southern Pres
ed upon by the
lineates the materidl,
the autonomy
within the Suda ;
with special prow.
vestment, to develoP od
and industry, t0 § ers

those who fled
der the previou
policy.

Joseph Garang: ; fie
Communist, Wit? (nail
of struggle oF
people of that @ sol
minister for thé na

The RevolutlO’ nde
Command also ©
matic recognition ub
Datos i
Korea, an :
outlined an antiit
eign policy ° |
with the socially ip
active participay ili
gles against ! sp

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