| By Barry Cohen

[7. tts election year, a weariness
With the continued burden of war
War expenditures is unmistakable.
the question of ending the war in Indo-
thina has become the number one elec-
issue. The Nixon administration is
“sperately trying to assure its election -
» and forestall a complete military rout
~ by arriving at a political formula to
‘td the conflict or at least make the elec-
Mate believe that a solution is im-
Tinent,
_ The Communist Party, in its election
?atform, not only calls for an end to the
"ar in Indochina: It calls for the dis-
Mantling of all military bases, the ending
all military expenditures and the re-
of the federal-tax money to the com-
Tunities to be distributed according to
hepeople’s needs.

N the programs of the Democrats and
Xepublicans, the basic adherence to the
pense of the international positions of
ies imperialism is not at issue. But dif-
“ences between the Nixon and McGov-

ia Candidacies clearly exist, and they
| ,{¥e been translated into hard, cold-cash

Udgetary proposals which allow us to

€ an objective comparison between
tem. The Nixon proposals are available
| "the form of the annual Defense Depart-.
Ment Report for fiscal year 1973, sub-

nitted by Secretary of Defense Melvin

Laing, McGovern’s proposals were for-
Nulated for testimony before the Con-

Sional Joint Economic Committee

are available in.the report ‘Full Em-
oyment for an America at Peace: An

Tnative National Defense and Eco-
| “mic Posture.”

The general trend of military spend-
oy Proposed by Nixon and McGovern

|| ties considerably. The budgetary au-
ise for fiscal 1973 is $83.4 billion, a rec-
‘for any year in U.S. history, including
Nori War II, and 47% above the level of
ha! year 1964, the last pre-Vietnam war
et

ti McGovern proposes a phased reduc-
jy .in military spending to $54.8 billion
|,’ fiscal year 1975. Underlying these
res are significant distinctions in
Icy assumptions,-attitudes toward: the
lows race and East-West military con-
jvutation, the structure of the armed
anes and last, but not least, Vietnam
“future U.S. troop commitments.

The Laird report reiterates U.S. policy
\% Maintain ‘‘all treaty commitments,
"serves the right to use nuclear weap-
Sin connection with any ally of the U.S
%t any “nation whose survival we con-
| “der vital to our security,” and restates
| ® US. intention to ‘furnish military
economic assistance when requested
| Md as appropriate.” Citing ‘Soviet stra-
legic arms build-up”’ and ‘‘Soviet military
Pabilities and presence around the
“rid,” Laird requests increases in
Yery category of military spending. _
| cGovern, for his part, denies any in-
ation to institute ‘“‘major revisions in
“Nerican commitments or a major scal-
"8 down in real American security inter-
tts,» His proposals “‘start by assuming
at the major Communist powers, China
ang the Soviet Union, will remain actively
tostile to U.S. interests, and that there is
x real risk of confrontation if one or the
ther can expect military advantage as a
Sult.’’ Concerning nuclear weapons, he
“Oposes to keep ‘more than ten times
hin Number required to destroy every sig-
aticant target in both the Soviet Union
Nd the People’s Republic of China.”
| The $30 billion saving in McGovern’s
ailitary package comes in three main
ti as: 1) greater restraint in the initia-
oo Of new strategic weapons systems; 2)
in’ss aggressive posture with regard to
| yc Maintenance and deployment of con-
ational forces; and 3) an end to the
®t in Indochina. =
type 1973 Nixon Administration mili-
Ty budget shows that the limited Stra-
Ic Arms: Limitatio:

jJrabiest? tis7 ;

ORLD MAGAZINE

tity request of the-Department of De- -

Agreement _ Minuteman Ill

(SALT), recently concluded in Moscow,
is not in itself sufficient to contain the
arms race if the Administration is’ de-
termined to subvert the sense of the
agreement. The Moscow accords commit
both sides to the concept of “‘equal se-
curity” and require restraint in the de-
velopment of new weapons systems, the
new budget proposals contain the widest
array of strategic arms ever undertaken
at one time. Among the major new pro-
posed systems and their approximate
1973 cost are: é

millions $
Underseas Long Range Missile
Systems (ULMS) 942
New Strategic Bomber (B-1) 445
Short Range Attack Missile
(SRAM) 314

837

1

Poseidon 751
Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS) 474
Safeguard 1,483

These plus some dozens of lesser systems
wili add $1 billion onto last year’s record
research and development and procure-
ment costs. ;
McGovern, while clinging to the con-
cept of deterrance, interprets the con-

~ cept of ‘sufficiency’ more realistically

y

and calls for the halting of deployment of
Minuteman III and MIRV_ warheads,
Safeguard, and the B-1. He calls for lim-
itations on the introduction of Poseidons
and postponement of the development of
ULMS.

The principle advanced for the deploy-
ment of U.S. conventional forces pursuant
‘o “‘all treaties” in the Laird report is

NTYENIASLV: Atii9d? to yey your

oat 168%

rage TO? nod

* PACIFIC TRIBU

, ‘forward-deployment and forward de- .

fense.’’ The meaning of this phrase will be
understood if one recalls that Laird was .
the inventor of the ‘‘protective reaction ‘
strike” and the ‘defensive incursion.’ ,
Conventional force levels are proposed to ¢
be maintained at the level required by the
classical military theory of sufficiency to ‘|
fight ‘two and a half wars’ simultaneous- ;
ly. Laird recommends that all 300,000 U.S.
troops remain in Europe and earmarks
other forces for the Asian, African .and
Latin American theaters.

McGovern would maintain the U.S.
commitment to NATO, but recommends
the recall of 170,000 U.S. troops from Eu-
rope on the grounds that NATO doesn’t
need them because of ‘‘its very definition
as a defensive entity(!)’”” McGovern in-
sists on support for continued Israeli oc-
cupation of land in the Mid-East, but
places stringent conditions for the use of
U.S. troops‘in Latin America and Africa,
and virtually rules out use of U:S. ground
troops in Asia, even calling for the recall -
of U.S. forces in Korea. He advocates’
programming force levels to the.‘one and
a half wars’ concept.

e

Perhaps the most :cléarcut difference
is with regard to Indochina policy. The
Laird report holds out the prospect of-
possible continued involvement. indefi-
nitely and asserts the right of further
air escalation (at an admitted cost. of 9%
billion). McGovern plans on ending ‘all
U.S. involvement in 90 days: _

In listing the ‘four realities’. which.
were -assessed in formulating the 1973
defense budget, Laird includes among’
the political realities ‘‘the difficulty of
maintaining broad domestic public sup-
port for those programs necessary to as-
sure national security.”” And the evi-
dence presented gives ample indication
of the direct effect which antiwar senti-
ment among draft-aged men in particu-
lar has had on the military forces. En-:
rollment in ROTC programs, the princi-:
pal source of commissioned officers,
plummeted ‘from 218,000 in academic
1968-69 to 87,000 in 1971-72. With the falloff
in pressure from the draft reserve, en-
listments have also dropped sharply,
leaving the reserve units 44,000 below
mandated strength.

The projected reaction of the mili-
tary planners to this situation, if con-
‘summated, will mark a new stage in the
maintenance of standing armies in U.S.
history. The thrust of the response is to
create a professional — actually, mer-
cenary — army, insulated from public
sentiment and, consequently, one step
further removed from public control.

In 1973, the lowest military pay-grade
will be $3,980 per year, 325% above com-
parable pay in 1963. Pay for a colonel or
Navy captain will be $24,640 per year,
108% above 1963. Certain military per-
quisites would raise considerably: the
actual pay above the norninal amount. In
addition, those forces which fall into the
combat category, as opposed to support
and strategic forces, would receive large
bonuses.

Weighting of the grade distribution to- -
ward the upper ranks is also becoming
more pronounced. Today there are 5,000
more officers above the equivalent rank
of Lieutenant Colonel than there were
in 1964 to command about 190,000 fewer
men. In 1973 almost one million retired
military officers will be receiving $4.9
billion in retirement pay, four times the
amount in 1964. BPs,

The chief budgetary significance of
the ‘professionalization’ of the military
is the tremendous escalation in its cost. —
Payroll and related costs increased by
$20.8 billion — nearly doubling — from
1964 to 1973, while military and civil
service manpower dropped by 326,000.

McGovern proposes to return the
grade distribution to the 1964 level and to
cut activ-duty military ‘personnel
600,000 below the figure proposed by the
Nixon Administration, thus relieving the
budgetary pressure somewhat. But his
proposals basically affirm the establish-
ment of a permanent, professional armed
force. :

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