we Formers in a2 Y tracto . Midas ae _ rs . the Kabylia mountain region in Aiger stead of by primitive plows os they did during the French ia now cultivate their v Workers checking the defining process at the Tamzali olive oil refinery. Like all of Algeria’s major industries, this refinery Is now nationalized. _ ALGERIA — after Ben Bella HENRI ALLEG bike 2° 880 Algeria still gt tke a Igeria still rave new tional Pening oan and tori liberation Nd’ Atab world,» ; it eae dence was oy) the na sion’ was taken op} en °N-capitalist road bieran this decision aie ‘ M concrete a ers’ takeover tisee and agricul- the Pi s Previously own- the ines Colonialists, Of tho ©, the prepar- se poms land Utumn 1965, a soken toward the a the National nto a Party in- ij SOcialists and an Perialist policy x SOme Courageous President Ben © enthusiasm try oe Peasants inside i *, Boumedienne a Indictment of 48 administra- Claimed that t intended to the socialist Correct the S Of personal If these “errors” were in fact committed, they were not just , the fault of Ben Bella and they do not appear to have been cor- rected by the new regime. By establishing a military | and police regime, by suppressing all freedom of criticism and expres- sion, by sending the National Assembly “on holiday,” it has, on the contrary, aggravated these errors.’ More significant still, however, was the applause with which the new regime was greeted by the most backward forces country, indicating its obvious right-wing character, Big landlords who feared the agrarian reform, rich merchants who wished to continue to bene- fit from the wealth they had acquired more or Jess legally after the departure of the Euro- peans, traders of all sorts inter- ested in deals with foreign monopolies, counter - revolution- aries camouflaged under the convenient slogan of “defense of Islam” and anti-Communism —all joined in. It would be superficial to con- sider the coup of June 19 as just an “army” coup against the “civil power” of Ben Bella. Of course, the leading group of the coup belonged to the higher ranks of the army, but this group consisted of people with contra- dictory political views. Thus, alongside men who in the came from the old colonial army there were also in the army men who were favorable to socialism. In fact, the coup and its sup- porters went far beyond the army and had its roots in the whole bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the state apparatus. This bourgeoisie, which was formed very rapidly after inde- pendence, enjoyed material privi-~ leges which had no relation at all with the general conditions of the mass of the people. Thus, at a conservative esti- mate, about 8,000 families had between them nearly 35 to 40 percent of the national income while the Algerian peasant had an average annual income of less than £15. There are nearly two million unemployed out of a total population of 11 million. The first measures of the new regime were directed against the workers. They were dispossessed: of their self-managed enter- prises. Some of these were hand- ed back to their former owners or given to the families of ex- servicemen to make them reli- able political clients of the re- gime. In this way some 37,000 acres were taken away from collective farms in Oran. ’ Repressive measures’ were taken against the best-known leaders respected for their loyal- ty to socialism, while many militants in the trade union and student organizations were ar- rested in Algiers, Oran, Annaba and elsewhere. All freedom of expression was suppressed, notably by the ban- ning of many newspapers, 1nc- luding the daily Alger Repub- licain and the trade union news- paper Revolution et Travail. Nevertheless, the coup was not able to destroy the deep desire of the Algerian people to continue along the road of pro- gress and socialism. Nor could it resolve the class contradictions that appeared even in the “Council of the Re- volution” itself, which contained men with opposing views—those who sincerely if confusedly be- lieved in socialism and those who were defending the inter- esis of the bourgeoisie and who looked to Paris and Washington. It was fairly easy to carry out the coup “technically” by, gath- ering together ill-assorted forces whose only common aim was to overthrow Ben Bella. But -it is more - difficult to govern when the forces in power contradict each other, which is the case at the movement. The right, although it dealt a serious blow to the revolution with the downfall of Ben Bella, has ‘not yet been able, because of the resistance of the masses, to call into question the orienta- tion of ‘Algeria and is reduced to manoeuvring under the cloak of ‘‘socialism.” At the same time, the left forces have been able since June 1965 to prevent the total liquida- tion of self-managed enterprises. They have been able to secure the liberation of certain political prisoners, as well as ensuring the maintenance of and develop- ment of political and economic relations with the socialist coun- tries, notably with the Soviet Union. Under the pressure of these contradictory tendencies, Col. Boumedienne finds himself in the paradoxical and uncomfort- able position of someone who satisfies no one. - To the bourgeoisie and the American imperialists he’ is still too “‘socialist.” To the masses, whose econo- mic conditions have continued to worsen, while the luxury of the new bourgeoisie continues to increase, he is not sufficiently socialist for them to have any confidence in him. Between these different cur- rents he‘ advances in a zigzag fashion, maintaining an unstable equilibrium which neither of the opposing forces has the power to upset without risks. So the situation is extremely complex because the demarca- tion line between the forces of progress and reaction is not just between the regime in power and. the opposition. There are still, even in official circles, although they are in & minority, revolutionaries who are responsible to popular pres- sure, On the other hand there are men among the opposition who seek the overthrow of the re- gime by a new coup to replace it by a regime even more to-the right. . Algeria today is faced with im- perialist and reactionary pres sures, with neo-colonialist ate, tempts to extend its hold on the economic’ wealth and notably the oil for the country. That is why the most resolute supporters of socialism in the country, the former members of the Algerian’ Communist Party and the left of the National Liberation Front (FLN) have formed themselves into a new party, still clandestine, the Orga- nization of Popular Resistance. Some of its leaders, Hocine Zahouane, Bachir Hadi Ali, Mo- hammed_Harbi, ‘thave been tor- tured, held secretly in prison for over 15 months. The members of this party are fighting for a grouping together of all the democratic and anti- imperialist forces wherever they are that is, inside the regime as well as in the opposition, in a single “Democratic and Popular Front.” Z By isolating the reactionary and pro-imperialist elements of the regime, this Front will enable Algeria to find a democratic and peaceful solution to the crisis in which .it now finds itself and to enjoy a new revolutionary ad- vance for the benefit of its people ‘and for the people of the whole of Africa. HENRI ALLEG was one of the leaders of the Algerian Communist Party during the seven-year war for indepen- dence. In 1957 he was arrest- ed by French colonial author- ities and savagely tortured. He wrote about his experi- ences in his book, “The Ques- tion.” When Algeria was liberat- ed, Alleg was again editor of Alger Republicain. The 1965 Boumedienne coup forced him into exile again, May 19, 1967—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 9 .