FEATURE

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Experts prove very convincingly
e& that nuclear explosions are not
needed to be sure that the existing nuclear weapons are
reliable. Other methods requiring no nuclear blasts can
be used to control reliability as effectively, and notably
less expensively and much more safely at that.

Long-standing practice shows that one can be sure
of nuclear munitions without conducting explosions and
limiting oneself to checks of non-nuclear components of
bombs and warheads. Since 1974 the US and the USSR
do not conduct tests with a yield of over 150 kilotons, in
compliance with the existing treaty. Meanwhile, muni-
tions with yields over that “threshold” make up 70 per
cent of the nuclear arsenal in the US, and our percentage
is no less. This means that both we and they believe in
the reliability of weapons without explosions! So why
muddy the waters?

: If the Americans have doubts about the stability of
their nuclear arsenal let them agree to the drafting of an

other. ’

agreement on terminating tests, and our experts will
share with them the “secrets” how the state of nuclear-
munitions is checked without explosions.

No. The main aim of nuclear weapons tests con-
ducted by the United States is to develop fundamentally
new types of arms. This means that new nuclear war-
heads, with both enhanced yields and high accuracy, are
in development. Space-based nuclear weapons — X-ray
lasers with “nuclear pumping” — are being developed in
the course of the testing. Work is under way to prepare
an entirely new type of weapon capable of reaching tar-
gets both on earth and in space. In such conditions it is
hypocritical to say that the termination of tests will do
nothing for the solution of the problem of nuclear disar-
mament.

As to the second argument, it could have sounded
credible to at least some extent in the first couple of
months of our moratorium. But not now, when silence
reigns on Soviet nuclear test ranges for the second year.

If the development of new; and the modernization
of existing, nuclear weapons requires evef new nuclear
tests — and this is indeed so — then it is only logical to
assume that the U.S., which conducted many more blasts
than the USSR, plus 18 more during our year-old mora-
torium, should be far ahead. It turns out, therefore, that it
is we, not the U.S., who have to catch up.

We also know another view: a compromise between
the Soviet and American positions; that is, not a com-
plete ban, but the “regulation” of nuclear tests in some
way or another.

Of course, when proposing an agreement to the oth-
er side, one cannot reject compromises out of hand. But
the idea of “regulation” instead of termination seems to
me to be incorrect in principle.

First of all, there is already a certain amount of reg-
ulation: the 1963 treaty and the “threshold” agreements
of 1974 and 1976. But they failed to stop the arms race.
As a matter of fact it has become even more intense, but
of course, not because these treaties exist.

The same can happen to the proposed regulation of
underground nuclear tests. It would soon lead to a situa-
tion in which the race will simply go in a different, and
even'more dangerous, direction.

There can be no half-and-half solution to the prob-
lem of nuclear tests. There is one honest way to formu-
late the question — it is either to work toward an

agreement not to test nuclear munitions and to put an end
to that once and for all, or to start even more dangerous

military preparations.

Should the Americans succeed in drawing the world
into a space arms race, whatever terms are used to desig-
nate such weapons — “defensive” or other ones — this
would lead to the destabilisation of the whole of the mili-
tary-strategic situation. The threat to mankind would ac-
quire qualitatively new deadly dimensions. Nobody has a
right to shut his eyes to that.

President Reagan’s advisers and

the spokesmen of some other

NATO governments are trying
to divert attention from the fundamental problem
raised by you — the process of nuclear disarmament
— by resorting to various kinds of speculations about
control and verification.

How do you assess such an approach 4

‘Our two peoples ought to cooperate
rather than quarrel, to be on friendly
terms rather than to war with each

Exactly the way you said — as an

attempt to divert attention. They
seek to extend the life of the bankrupt argument that a
nuclear test ban is ostensibly impossible to control. The
argument became bankrupt above all by virtue of ad-
vances in science. It is now possible to detect any, even
the smallest, nuclear explosion by national means. To
help resolve the problem the Soviet Union, nevertheless,
agreed to other methods of control. The “Delhi six” of-
fered its services — and we agreed. The United States
kept silent. Scientists agreed on the installation of seis-
mograph and other equipment near nuclear test ranges of
the USSR and the U.S. We also backed that initiative,
though the American government treated it scornfully.

Not so long ago I received a group of prominent
scientists — specialists in this field from the USSR,
U.S., West European countries, and Japan and had a
thorough talk with them. I became convinced once again
they had no doubt at all as to the possibility of the most
reliable control over a ban on nuclear tests.

I and our military comrades have repeatedly said:
we know what the Americans are doing, and what is tak-
ing place at their nuclear and other test ranges. Their at-
tempts to conceal something, including some of their ex-

_plosions, convince us once again that one cannot take it

on trust. We have no grounds at all to trust American
generals and we cannot count on trust on their part.
Therefore we stand for strict, scientifically substantiated
control and will insist on it, including on-site inspection.
But, I repeat, not verification of explosions but of the
termination of explosions.

American instruments have already been installed
near the Soviet nuclear test range in the Semipalatinsk
region. We believe that the accord between scientists
could be developed into an official agreement to mutu-
ally verify a test ban treaty. We can also think about
establishing an international control network to over-
see such an agreement. I would like to take this oppor-
tunity to put this idea to the U.S. president. The prob-
lem, as far as we are concerned, is completely solvable.

Going by numerous statements
that are made in the circle.
around the president of the
United States, and judging by the Western press, at-

tempts are now being made to draw the attention of
the world public to your new meeting with Mr. Rea-
gan, to replace topical problems of curbing the arms
race with talk about the meeting itself.
We are for holding a Soviet-Ameri- G
can summit that would be marked p
by a notable headway in solving even one or two of the fl
substantial problems of international security. y
After the Geneva meeting we took many steps to ;
bring closer the stands on a wide range of problems re- in
lated to terminating the arms race. The “all or nothing” fi
approach is alien to us. There is no sense in holding a al
meeting for the sake of “nothing.” th
The questions that are the point of the matter affect f
all countries, the entire international community, though
the measure of tesponsibility of the Soviet Union and the fc
United States is, understandably, particularly great. U
Therefore, no matter how much we are being provoked Cc
we do not snap the. threads of contacts with the U.S ad- 4
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ministration, do not call in question their usefulness, do
not slam the door (though certain persons in the West
and, especially, among the advisers of the President
would like this very much). But contacts are valuable nob:
in themselves, but in the results they produce.

If one proceeds from the view that a moratorium is |
unacceptable, if the question of medium-range missiles
in Europe is blocked, if strategic arms are to be upgraded
and so on, then what is there to agree about? A summit
meeting would hardly be of any use in the atmosphere of | }
a feverish arms race, of the spiralling of tension, when | |!
existing treaties are abandoned. Nothing would be easier | |
than to use the meeting for misleading people, for lulling
the public with pretenses that everything is all right
while continuing a dangerous policy. This is already be-
ing attempting in presenting the matters in such a way as
if the preparation for the meeting is in full Swing. ee

se SS

By feigning a lot of optimism to create the imp
sion that everything is almost ready for the meeting, it
possibly, sought to blame the Soviet Union for the at
of one’s destructive policy. The same purposes are, p
haps, pursued by another version, that the USSR, alle
edly, has arrived at the conclusion that one won't get Bl
anywhere with the Reagan administration. os

__ But we attach too much importance to the factor of :
time to simply decide to stand still for two and a half
years. No. It would be an unpardonable mistake to delay,
to take a wait-and-see stance. We shall continue using
every opportunity for a productive dialogue, for advance
toward arms limitation and reduction, and also for set- |
tling regional conflicts, for developing international co-
operation along all important directions. In this sense,
our conscience before the Soviet people and the o}
peoples is clear.

By our actions and initiatives we are striving to
strengthen the hope of peoples that the situation can
altered, that there is a real alternative to confrontati
believe we have already entered the second phase
global anti-nuclear process, the phase that is not on
of hope, but also of realistic plans and concrete ac
stemming from them. As a Communist I believe in #
strength of the masses who are mastering the new
ing which indicates the way out of the crisis situation

The time for adopting joint and responsible, ever
compromise decisions, is the most valuable thing we S\
have. But it is quickly running out. The age of nucl
weapons is, apparently, the most fleeting of all ages
through which world history passes. What are badly
needed now are concrete deeds. :

12 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 8, 1986