PEACE — THE MAJOR CHALLENGE OF THE 1980s one Leecetnage, Sepia epee AMERICAN CHALLENGES IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND — ‘SOVIET RESPONSES... ‘Since 1945 under various pretexts, the U.S. has forced the arms build-up by taking the. so A-algebra Escalating the balance of terror Not-even the most casual reader of the daily press could have escaped an awareness of the massive ac- celeration in the global arms race over the past year or so. The sickening truth is that the nuclear arms build-up is spiralling out of control. With detente in. jeopardy, and the SALT-II treaty scrapped by Carter and Reagan, the United States is driving for a com- plete return to the unrestricted, across-the-board military confrontation that characterized the ‘1950s. The first thing to note about this new arms race is that its most basic features are anything but new. As was the case in each previous upturn in the arms race spiral, it is the American side which has rejected negotiated avenues of arms control and has intro- duced new generations of weaponry together with More aggressive strategic guidelines for their use. The Soviets, as usual, find themselves in the posi- tion of having to respond to U.S. initiatives on Ameri- ca’s terms. For example, in-the absence of interna- tional cooperation to limit the warlike uses of atomic energy after World War Two, the Soviets were forced to counter the American monopoly of atomic weapons with a crash program to develop their own A-Bomb. After arguing against the formation of any military blocs, the socialist countries finally re- sponded to the formation of NATO in 1949 by creat- ing their own alliance, the Warsaw Pact in 1955. America led the way in the 1950s in the construction of strategic bomber fleets, and the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (CBMs). In each case vast rearmament programs were sold to the American public with heavy propaganda barrages about a growing ‘‘Soviet threat’’ and alleged Ameri- can military unpreparedness. The Mad Framework By the mid 1960s, the rough parity that had de- - veloped between American and Soviet nuclear forces led many strategists and politicians on both sides to conclude what the average person already knew: that nuclear warfare had become unthinkable. Missiles were targeted primarily on cities. If one side launched an attack upon the other, it invited retaliation which would wipe out its own population centres. Hence the term Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The only sane route out of the MAD framework was through detente and negotiated arms control. MAD was thus a major premise of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which began in 1969. Number of strategic muclye weapons 20000 = “Trident—2’ 1 SLBM ee 15 on a 3 & ee @ a ae & “MX"ICBM @ : A & FBS — Forward Based Systems {RBM ; 2 SLCM — Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile Pershing—2 ICBM — Intercontinental Ballistic Missile “Mk—-12A"4 GLOM SLBM — Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile MIRV @ IRBM — Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile ALCM @ 10.000 4 MRV — Multiple Reentry Vehicle MIRV — Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle ae wy ALCM = Air Launched Cruise Missile Trident—1" 4 GLCM — Ground Launched Cruise Missile SLBM SSBN — Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine MIRV FBS ICBM in Europe av se SLOM wy 3 {CBM SLBM a MIRV 5000 — IRBM 1 SLBM MIRV iCBM 1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 The days were gone when the U.S. could use first her monopoly of atomic weapons and later her over- whelming strategic superiority to blackmail and _ threaten the USSR, to attempt to force the Soviets to back off from support of national liberation struggles, and of revolutionary regimes such as Cuba. Presidential Directive 59 In Sept., 1980 the White House issued Presidential Directive 59. Essentially, PD-59 makes limited nuc- lear war, or “‘enhanced deterrence’, the official strategic policy of the United States.. The new ap- proach involves a vast increase and upgrading of America’s nuclear capability and a massive shift in the types of targets selected for nuclear missiles. . Now, first priority will go to military, command (i.e. governmental), and industrial targets while cities and population centres will be “‘secondary”’ targets. Implementation of PD-59 involves a vast increase in the number of targets. More than 1,000 new ‘‘milit- ary” and.*‘industrial’’ targets within the USSR have been plotted in recent months. The pressure upon America’s current stockpiles has been so great that it is reported that several missiles formerly aimed at China have been re-oriented to Soviet sites. In the long term, a constellation of new weapons systems will be required: the MX-missile; a more p Bats cated submarine missile, a new nuclear bomber and an extensive anti-ballistic missile system, wider de- ployment of the Pershing-2, Trident, and cruise mis- siles in Western Europe, and more sophisticated satellites, anti-satellites and anti-anti-satellites. ‘ The First Strike? The most worrisome question raised by PD-59 con- cerns American intentions regarding a first strike. The switch from civilian to military targets, and the in- creased numbers and accuracy of the new generation of U.S. weapons have given rise to.the feeling, within thé Pentagon, that America could conceivably defeat the USSR through a fast and decisive ‘‘pre-emptive strike’’. Such a strike might neutralize the Soviet Union’s ability to retaliate, and cripple her economi- cally and militarily .. . or so runs the reasoning. The real danger is that whatever the true intentions of the U.S. leadership, their strategic and technologi- cal initiatives and their scrapping of the arms control process, has made the first strike option into a real, physical possibility. The USSR, which worked hard. and energetically during the 70s for détente and dis- armament, must now, once again, mobilize itself to meet the perceived threat. Where will it end? — TERROR page 6 — ~- - tn The 20-foot Cruise missile flies at subsonic apeais at distances of 1 “500 miles be included in arms limitation agreements. The Pentagon ‘pians to build 3,418 of them e carrying its nuciear — The U.S. ciaims it’s a “tactical” weapon and should not in the 1980s and = as part of its new constellation of weapons. PACIFIC TRIBUNE—JAN. 9, 1981—Page 8